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Chapter 1
Motivation and Contribution
1.1 Background
Individual health directly reflects fundamental physical or psychological needs and
is very important from an economic perspective. For example, health is positively
correlated with important areas of life such as social participation (e.g. Snelgrove
et al., 2009) or membership of the workforce (e.g. Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al., 2010). The
importance of health has been recognised by the WHO, which defines it as ‘a state
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity’1. The relevance of disease is also recognised at the population
level, particularly within the public health sphere, but also because of the impact
on public spending (e.g. Getzen, 2000a) and economic growth (e.g. Karlsson et al.,
2014).
The financial importance of health can be seen at the aggregated level by con-
sidering the amount of money spent on health and health-related initiatives. Figure
1.1 highlights the increasing economic importance of the healthcare sector from an
international perspective. Although there is heterogeneity within the WHO health
regions2, healthcare expenditure as a share of GDP increased for all regions during
the observed period.
1Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International
Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of
61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force
on 7 April 1948.
2Australia and China, for example, are included in the Western Pacific region.
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Figure 1.1 Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Data
source: WHO)
However, Southeast Asia has seen only a very modest increase, and the Eastern
Mediterranean region displayed a small decrease from 2009 onwards. The strongest
increase is seen in Africa, which may be explained to a certain extent by very low
baseline healthcare expenditures, the adoption of professional medical procedures
during the observed period, and increased financing from international development
programs that emphasise health as a major driver of economic development (Rav-
ishankar et al., 2009). Overall, there is a pattern of increased relative healthcare
expenditure over the observed period, although different mechanisms explain varia-
tions within and between regions. Comparing regions highlights the long-recognised
pattern that the relative quantity of healthcare expenditure is greatest in the most
economically developed countries (e.g. Farag et al., 2012), with America at the top
and Southeast Asia at the bottom (from 1998 onwards). High base levels and a
subsequent increase in healthcare expenditure in America are mainly explained by
a mixture of technological progress and a market-oriented approach to the structure
of their healthcare sector (Chandra and Skinner, 2012).
2
Figure 1.2 Expenditures on health as a percentage of gross domestic
product (Year: 2013, Data source: WHO)
Turning to the sources used to finance healthcare expenditures in our six geograph-
ical regions, Figure 1.2 distinguishes between government expenditures and private
expenditures in 2013. Private expenditures are represented by out-of-pocket (OOP)
payments and other private sources such as private insurance. Overall, we find that
the role of government is emphasised in Europe, where private sources play only a
minor role. America has a relatively large share of private healthcare expenditures
based on private insurance markets, while in less-developed regions (Africa, Eastern
Mediterranean, Southeast Asia) OOP payments play a large role. OOP payments
also include financing via private transfer and family networks. As recognised by
Esping-Andersen (1990) in his classification of welfare systems, families generally
play a very important role in providing healthcare and financing social security3.
OOP payments are less important in Europe and America relative to the other re-
gions.
Overall, European healthcare expenditures are much more reliant on government
(including social insurance) than in America and other areas (the latter also have
much lower levels of health expenditures overall). Although the sources of health-
care expenditures are quite different across the six regions, on average the relative
3Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies the welfare state based on whether social security is pro-
vided mainly by the market, the government or reciprocity (including social insurance and family
networks).
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importance of healthcare expenditures, given financial ability, has increased across
every region over the last 20 years. Increasing demand for healthcare, the arrival
of new technologies and an increase in unhealthy lifestyles are a burden for fiscal
budgets, as healthcare expenditures have grown strongly in recent decades in both
developed and less-developed regions. If this trend continues, it may cause problems
for future decision making because individuals, companies, and politicians have to
allocate resources under financial restrictions.
1.2 Contribution and Agenda
Knowledge of how to control and properly predict healthcare expenditures is essen-
tial for good policy advice. This dissertation employs empirical analysis using data
from different countries to provide multiple contributions to the contemporary litera-
ture on managing and projecting healthcare expenditures, which are very important
for both developed and developing countries. The dissertation is organised into five
chapters. Chapter 1 contains this introduction. Chapter 2 empirically emphasises
the importance of ageing and morbidity for future long-term care (LTC) expendi-
tures. Chapter 3 discusses the role of individual characteristics that may serve as
barriers to participating in public health programmes which may be used to reduce
healthcare expenditures. Chapter 4 contributes to the empirical detection of asym-
metric information (IA) in private insurance markets, which are widely acknowledged
to induce inefficient resource allocation. Finally, Chapter 5 examines from a develop-
ment perspective whether introducing a formal, nationwide health insurance scheme
affects participation in informal transfer mechanisms. The following provides a more
detailed description of our research agenda in the context of contemporary literature.
Chapter 2: Ageing, Time-To-Death and Care Costs for Older People in
Sweden
Chapter 2 addresses the ongoing scientific discussion surrounding evidence-based
planning of future healthcare expenditures and the impact of ageing on healthcare
expenditures. This is a particular issue in relatively developed countries, which are
generally seeing a decline in fertility combined with increasing life expectancies (e.g.
Herzer et al., 2012). We add to the health economics literature since Zweifel et al.
(1999), investigating whether age itself is still an important predictor of healthcare
expenditures, once time-to-death (TTD) is accounted via empirical analysis. There
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are various methodological problems with estimating the impact of an ageing popu-
lation on future budgets, and few studies are based on aggregated data. This field
of research is also important in the context of LTC expenditures (e.g. Larsson et al.,
2008). To shed new light on this issue, we use aggregated data from official statis-
tics in Sweden, a country where social care is largely financed by taxes, to estimate
the impact of age on LTC expenditures. Our empirical analysis applies panel data
methods and accounts for end-of-life morbidity, which allows us to separate age and
TTD effects to derive projections of expected future LTC expenditures. We also al-
low for differences between domiciliary and institutional LTC in our analysis, which
may prove important if different treatment paths have a heterogeneous impact on re-
source allocation or healthcare provision. A proper understanding of the association
between age and (non curative) healthcare expenditures is key to adequately pro-
jecting the financial consequences of population ageing on future healthcare budgets.
The main contribution of this chapter is that we provide a theoretically more con-
vincing measure for end-of-life morbidity based on population level mortality than
contemporary literature does.
Chapter 3: The Ability to Memorise and Participation in the English
Bowel Cancer Screening Programme
The third chapter emphasises how policies designed to reduce healthcare expen-
ditures need to incorporate the characteristics of their specific target group to be
successful. It is widely acknowledged that societies where individuals do not have to
(fully) pay a fair premium must finance health expenditures at a societal level (Mul-
lainathan et al., 2012). Healthcare programmes may be able to positively influence
healthcare decisions (from a policy perspective). However, in libertarian societies
the success of such programmes depends on each individual’s decision to partici-
pate or not. Hence, the individual characteristics of a specific target group which
affect participation in such programmes must be carefully identified and accounted
for when designing policies. For example, in programmes designed for the elderly, a
decline in physical and cognitive abilities may be a barrier to participation. In this
context, we use individual-level data and apply regression and matching methods to
empirically assess whether an individual’s declining ability to memorise information
decreases their likelihood of participating in a nationwide healthcare programme
for bowel cancer screening in England. The main contribution of this chapter is
further emphasis that public health programmes need to be designed with careful
regard to the specifics of their target group. We also contribute to the psychological
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and behavioural economics literature that assesses unexpected health-related deci-
sion making processes (e.g. Mullainathan et al., 2012; Chetty, 2015). Our findings
may help further develop and enhance models to better explain real-world health
economic decision making.
Chapter 4: Heterogeneous Parameters and Detecting Selection Based on
‘Unused Characteristics’ in Private Health Insurance Markets
The fourth chapter investigates the empirical detection of selection in private in-
surance markets4. Detecting selection within insurance markets is an important
regulatory issue, because it is often driven by asymmetric information, and limited
resources make it economically essential to find ways to efficiently provide and fi-
nance healthcare. From a health economics perspective, it is widely acknowledged
that health policies must be both efficient and equitable (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993).
This can be seen, for example, in the UK, where healthcare financing and provision
is built to a large extent on the National Health Service (NHS), with optional addi-
tional private health insurance to incorporate the advantages of private markets into
the system. Additional private health insurance can be helpful if it allows for specific
services or treatments which are not necessary from a health policy perspective but
which match an individual’s specific needs and may help satisfy patients and enhance
technological progress, even if public or social insurance guarantees a relatively high
standard of healthcare provision (Colombo and Tapay, 2004).
For private insurance markets, the literature on selection and inefficiencies has
gained a lot of attention in the economics literature, following Akerlof (1970) and
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Further issues surrounding information asymme-
tries and selection in insurance markets, such as moral hazard, cream skimming or
propitious selection have also been considered (e.g. Leidl, 2008; Einav and Finkel-
stein, 2011). Despite numerous theoretical discussions about selection mechanisms
in private insurance markets that can imply inefficiencies, the empirical detection of
selection based on expected risk is not yet conclusive. The main contribution of this
chapter is a discussion of the empirical detection of information asymmetries (IAs)
based on approaches proposed in Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). We formally and
empirically show that indirect assessment of IAs using ‘unobserved’ (Finkelstein and
4There is also a wide-ranging debate about the role of risk selection in public health insurance
systems (e.g. Nuscheler and Knaus, 2005; van de Ven et al., 2007; Bauhoff, 2012), which is crucial for
designing effective risk adjustment schemes. Although we regard the technical issues surrounding
selection to be potentially relevant to such frameworks as well, we only discuss our ideas in the
context of private health insurance, following the literature we respond to.
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McGarry, 2006) or ‘unused’ variables (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014) can lead to
faulty conclusions about the direction of selection being drawn. We criticise stan-
dard approaches used to detect IAs based on ‘unused characteristics’ and suggest a
remedy for their shortcomings. Specifically, we show that the approach suggested
by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) is problematic if the parameters of interest are
driven by heterogeneous sub-populations with different outcomes for an ‘unobserved
characteristic’. We empirically showcase our idea by using simulated data and pro-
vide an empirical application about selection in a private health insurance market
with survey data from England. Our findings are of major importance for designing
and evaluating regulatory frameworks in private (health) insurance markets where
selection is supposed to be based on specific characteristics.
Chapter 5: The Relationship Between Public Health Insurance and Infor-
mal Transfer Networks in Ghana
Chapter five discusses the relationship between formal insurance and informal trans-
fer networks. Private healthcare expenditures based on out-of-pocket (OOP) pay-
ments are a common practice across the world. In private insurance markets, the
contract design usually implements partial financing via OOP payments to reduce
the well-known problem of moral hazard (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). However,
in the absence of public or private health insurance, OOP payments play the most
important role in healthcare expenditures. In this context, leaving aside any con-
cerns about equity, healthcare financing with a small risk pool may be inefficient
due to high uncertainty and risk costs (e.g. Martinez-Giralt and Barros, 2013). Re-
cently, several developing countries have introduced public health insurance to reduce
shortcomings in such informal insurance networks and improve healthcare provision
(Wagstaff, 2010). Although public and social health insurance are playing an in-
creasing role in developing countries, private health expenditures based on OOP
payments are still the dominant way to pay for healthcare (Dye et al., 2013). In
the absence of formal institutions that provide risk sharing, informal networks can
naturally evolve and provide remedy. In such a setting, the role of informal help
from the community, especially family, is very important. However, this kind of risk
sharing is also criticised in the development economics literature as it can constrain
economic growth (e.g. Grimm et al., 2013).
We contribute to the health insurance literature in a development context (e.g.
De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2011; Powell-Jackson et al., 2014), with a focus on the
relationship between formal and informal health insurance markets (e.g. Landmann
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et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2014). We empirically assess whether implementing the
national health insurance scheme in Ghana in 2005 crowded out informal trans-
fer networks in the short run. In addition, we assess whether the new insurance
scheme contributes to health outcomes and individual healthcare expenditures. The
main contribution of this chapter is our identification strategy, which uses the quasi-
exogenous variation in implementing the programme at the regional level. The rela-
tionship between different institutions/markets is also important for designing suc-
cessful policies in more developed countries. Hence, our research question is also of
interest for health economic policies beyond the developing world.
The next section outlines the methods and findings for each of the main chapters.
1.3 Methods and Findings
Chapter 2: Ageing, Time-to-Death and Care Costs for Older People in
Sweden
We test the ‘red herring’ hypothesis in the context of Swedish LTC expenditures by
using municipality-level panel data based on administrative records for 1998 to 2008.
We restrict our sample to all municipalities that exclusively provided LTC services
to allow us to focus solely on non-curative healthcare expenditures. Our sample cov-
ers half of the Swedish population. We investigate whether end-of-life morbidity (or
TTD) is a better predictor of LTC expenditures than age by controlling for contem-
porary and future mortality rates. We derive a retrospective construct of TTD that
captures mortality within two years on the aggregated level and allows us to account
for individual end-of-life morbidity by using future mortality rates with respect to the
population of interest in a given year. We apply a fixed effects estimator to control
for potential endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity between municipalities.
Overall, we find ageing to be the most important driver of LTC expenditures in
our empirical specifications. In sub-sample estimates, we further distinguish between
institutional and domiciliary LTC provision and also provide sex- and age-specific
estimates. The resulting findings suggest that individuals switch between domiciliary
and institutional care at the end of their lives. Sex-specific specifications also show
a negative relationship between end-of-life morbidity and domiciliary LTC expendi-
tures, mostly driven by women. The latter finding may indicate that informal care
also plays an important role in the provision and financing of LTC expenditures in
Sweden. Age-specific TTD effects show that the impact of TTD on LTC expenditures
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can mostly be explained by a relatively young cohort, the 70- to 74-year-olds. Over-
all, Swedish age structure remains a very important driver of total LTC payments.
In the context of Sweden, the high relevance of ageing for financial budgets is also
emphasised by our projections for LTC expenditures, which we calculate based on
our estimates and by ‘increasing’ life expectancy by one year. Based on our findings
and predictions of Swedish age structure from Statistics Sweden, we also calculated
cost projections for a period of 100 years. From an economic perspective, these costs
are considerable.
Chapter 3: The Ability to Memorise and Participation in the English
Bowel Cancer Screening Programme
To analyse the causal impact of the ability to memorise information on participation
in the national bowel cancer screening programme in England, we use panel data
from the ELSA survey, which is representative of the elderly population. We use an
objective measure for an individual’s decline in memory and apply linear regression
and propensity score matching in our identification strategy to estimate the impact
of a decline in memorisation ability on participating in bowel cancer screening dur-
ing the years following the artificial treatment. We apply covariate adjustment by
controlling for important confounders and account for the timings of when the data
was generated to mitigate problems such as omitted variable bias and reverse causal-
ity. We also apply a doubly robust regression approach, which is widely used in
the epidemiological literature and has recently been adopted in the empirical health
economics literature (e.g. Schmitz and Westphal, 2015). This provides unbiased es-
timates when either the treatment or outcome equation of our empirical model is
correctly specified. Dealing with endogeneity is important in our context, since our
treatment – reduced ability to memorise – is probably not randomised during the
survey period. We provide evidence of a negative relationship between our treatment
and participation in bowel cancer screening. Our analysis also distinguishes between
different domains of memorisation and finds that the main effect can be largely ex-
plained by the ability to remember information with some delay. Our findings are
primarily of interest for health policy design and in the context of medical decision
making. If a public health programme is designed to increase health or reduce expen-
ditures, the particulars of its target group should be considered to efficiently achieve
the programme goals.
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Chapter 4: Heterogeneous Parameters and Detecting Selection Based on
‘Unused Characteristics’ in Private Health Insurance Markets
The literature following Finkelstein and McGarry’s (2006) ‘unused characteristics’
approach is based on the idea that there are variables which insurance companies do
not use to calculate risk premiums, but which can be used in an empirical research
analysis. It argues that if these variables hold explanatory power for both an indi-
vidual’s risk and insurance status, the signs of the estimated coefficients can be used
to indirectly detect information asymmetries (IAs). These approaches are important
when testing whether a specific variable introduces selection into insurance markets.
We formally and empirically show that these standard unused characteristics ap-
proaches (e.g. Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) can be problematic if the resulting
evidence is wrongly based on mean coefficients. We highlight this issue by allowing
for heterogeneity in individual parameters. In doing so, we show that a negative
correlation between the coefficients of interest may lead to faulty conclusions if ad-
verse selection was detected in the first place, while a positive correlation may lead
to a faulty conclusion about advantageous selection into an insurance company’s
risk pool. Obviously, the unused characteristics approach can also lead to faulty
conclusions if no selection is detected. We bolster the relevance of this finding by
simulating different correlation structures between a hypothetical unused character-
istic and both insurance and risk status, allowing for individual heterogeneity in the
data generating process. Using a multilevel model for our estimates, we find that
standard unused characteristics approaches do not reveal this kind of heterogeneity
under the circumstances discussed. We also provide an empirical implementation for
the (voluntary) private health insurance market in England. We use panel data from
between 2002 and 2013 from the ELSA survey and choose an individual’s available
time as an unused characteristic, as this variable is clearly not available to insurance
companies for pricing purposes. Our findings show that individual parameter het-
erogeneity is relevant to real markets as well. Although adverse selection into the
insurance market is empirically detected, this adverse selection should be interpreted
with caution, since the estimated parameters are negatively correlated. Our findings
show that although contemporary literature (Einav et al., 2009) focuses on calculat-
ing welfare effects in insurance markets due to IAs, the empirical identification of IAs
is still an important research area. We conclude that knowledge about the empirical
detection of selection in insurance markets is inconclusive, and that future empirical
analysis should account for the correlation structures of coefficients when applying
an unused characteristics approach.
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Chapter 5: The Relationship Between Public Health Insurance and Infor-
mal Transfer Networks in Ghana
To assess the influence of the new Ghanaian health insurance scheme (NHIS), we
analyse cross-sectional data from the fifth Ghanaian Living Standard Survey, which
is representative for the 2005 Ghanaian population. As the NHIS was implemented
at the district level, we can use the variation in when individuals were interviewed at
the various sub-districts. Since most districts introduced the NHIS during the survey
period in 2005, we compare individuals who were interviewed before and after the
introduction of the insurance scheme, conditional on fixed effects of district and
interview month. Using the quasi-exogenous variation in the availability of formal
health insurance, we apply ordinary least squares estimates to estimate the impact
of the new insurance scheme on making and receiving transfers at the extensive
and intensive margin. We also test whether the treatment effect depends on the
relationship between the recipient and donor of a transfer. Our empirical findings
indicate that introducing a formal health insurance scheme reduces the probability
of making transfers. In addition, the number of remittances decreases significantly.
We also find that a relatively close relationship between the recipient and donor of a
transfer, holding everything else constant, reduces the crowding out. One potential
explanation for this heterogeneity is sharing obligations, which are known to be
strong in developing countries and are recognised by the contemporary literature
as being a barrier to economic growth (e.g. Grimm et al., 2013). The decrease in
informal transfer networks due to formal insurance is found to be lowest in kinship
networks; therefore, our findings raise the question of whether formal insurance can
overcome this issue, at least in the short run. Our analysis of health-related outcomes
suggests that the NHIS reduces respondents’ OOP expenditures, which is in line with
our expectations. Overall, our findings indicate that public health insurance schemes
strongly affect how healthcare services are paid for and may also support economic
development in the long run. However, the results also emphasise the effects of new
policies on existing institutions, which can be an important issue in many health
policy contexts.
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Chapter 2
Ageing, Time-To-Death and Care
Costs for Older People in Sweden1
2.1 Introduction
Most developed countries have ageing populations, which has implications for public
spending on long-term care (LTC) and healthcare. Recent population projections for
Sweden suggest an increase in the old-age dependency ratio (population aged 65+
per 100 persons aged 15-64) from 32 in 2015 to 39 in 2050 (United Nations, 2013),
placing an enormous burden on public spending.
An ageing society is expected to lead to an increased demand for care services,
raising concerns about the sustainability of financing these services. Indeed, there
may be no magic wand that guarantees both the availability and quality of LTC
provision without continuous cost increases (Meier and Werding, 2010). Precise
measurement of the influence of ageing on care costs is essential to make reliable
projections of demand for care services. An oft-discussed issue when quantifying the
impact of ageing on public funding is the possibility of omitted variables. If the
period of increased care needs is simply postponed as life expectancy increases, age
itself has limited explanatory power in projecting care expenditures. To circumvent
this problem empirically, older people’s time-to-death (TTD) can be considered. This
study contributes to the literature in four different ways: First, we provide a new
TTD measure to estimate its impact on total, institutional and domiciliary LTC
costs, using high-quality administrative data aggregated at the municipality level.
Unlike existing studies, which are implemented at the macro level and only use raw
1This study is a joint work with Martin Karlsson. See Karlsson and Klohn (2014) for the
corresponding published paper.
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mortality rates to measure TTD, our approach accounts for the probability of dying
within a specific timeframe. Using macro-level data means the findings are repre-
sentative for the population as a whole. Second, we test the extent to which costs
due to TTD vary between different age groups and identify heterogeneity between
men and women. Third, we combine our estimates with freely available population
projections from Statistics Sweden to calculate the future financial consequences of
the expected demographic change. Sweden provides us with an ideal institutional
background for our analysis: As Sweden balances funding on a national level based
on needs, we can expect regional funding to solely reflect local needs. Hence, and
fourth, our explanatory variables do not reflect differences in budget restrictions, a
common problem with macro-level analysis.
This chapter is organised as follows: In the next section, we review the economic
literature on the relationship between ageing, morbidity and care expenditure, fol-
lowed by a discussion of Swedish LTC provision. In the third section, we present the
dataset and discuss our empirical strategy. Our results are then presented along with
an estimate of the budget effects if life expectancy were to hypothetically increase by
one year. In addition, we provide long-term projections based on demographic pro-
jections from the Swedish statistical office. The final section summarises our findings
and the subsequent policy implications.
2.2 Healthcare Expenditures and Ageing Popula-
tions
Over the last decade, much attention has been devoted to the so-called ‘red herring’
hypothesis, according to which care costs are unrelated to age once remaining lifetime
or proximity to death is controlled for. The literature on this topic can be divided
into studies investigating curative care and those investigating LTC provision. Most
studies use individual-level data, although there are contributions using aggregated
data.
In their widely acknowledged study, Zweifel et al. (1999) investigate the red her-
ring hypothesis using Swiss data. They show that the impact of age on healthcare
costs decreases once TTD is taken into account. During the last two years of life,
an individual’s actual age seems to be completely irrelevant. This leads to their
conclusion that age is not necessarily an important determinant of healthcare ex-
penditures. Subsequent studies address methodological issues and provide further
empirical evidence. In an excellent literature review, Payne et al. (2007) provide a
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picture of healthcare expenditures and their interplay with ageing, morbidity and
death. They conclude that, although the impact on cost predictions may be small,
using both age and TTD in expenditure models provides a clear advantage over sim-
ple age-based models by helping to evaluate which services can be provided most
efficiently. A prominent contribution by Felder et al. (2010) suggests that future in-
creases in healthcare expenditures are more likely to be caused by changes in medical
technology than further ageing of the population. Wong et al. (2011) analyse disease-
specific hospital expenditures and find that, while age is a relevant determinant of
healthcare expenditures, its effect is modest compared to that of TTD. In general,
recent evidence based on individual-level data suggests that end of life morbidity
(captured by TTD) is the main predictor of healthcare expenditures, while ageing
itself is of minor relevance.
There are also studies into the red herring hypothesis as it relates to LTC ex-
penditures. Werblow et al. (2007) used panel data from Switzerland on healthcare
and LTC provision and found that most components of care expenditure are driven
by TTD rather than age. Forma et al. (2007) find that, in Finland, hospital stays
increase in the last months of life and demand for public LTC increases strongly in
the 2 years prior to death. In a study using a Swedish sample, Larsson et al. (2008)
find that home help provision is influenced by age and not TTD, while institutional
and hospital care are much more influenced by end of life morbidity than age. Their
results also suggest an increased transition from home- and community-based care
to institutional care during the last year of life. Using a Dutch dataset on the use of
institutional LTC and home care, de Meijer et al. (2011) differentiate between causes
of death and analyse the impact of morbidity. Once morbidity and disability are con-
trolled for, age remains relevant, while TTD becomes insignificant. They conclude
that TTD cannot causally affect care expenditures and might itself be interpreted
as a red herring: as a simple proxy for morbidity and disability. Hence, evidence on
LTC provision based on individual-level data also suggests that end-of-life morbidity
is an important driver of LTC provision, but findings for ageing are mixed. There
also seem to be marked differences between the provision of institutional and home
LTC, as institutional care is in most cases only provided at the very end of life.
Although individual-level data is usually preferred in such analyses, there are
also some issues that are better addressed at an aggregated level. Besides the fact
that aggregated data is often more readily available, evidence based on it is usually
more representative, particularly if it is based on census data containing information
about all individuals living within a certain unit of observation.
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Few studies into the red herring hypothesis use aggregated data. Palangkaraya
and Yong (2009) try to tackle this issue using panel data from 22 OECD countries.
They find the proportion of people aged 65 and older (reflecting age) does not ex-
plain healthcare expenditures once mortality and other factors are controlled for. In
a study on the EU-15 countries, Bech et al. (2011) focus on the relationship between
population demographics, mortality, life expectancy and health expenditures, finding
only short-term effects of ageing on healthcare expenditures. Their findings also sug-
gest that past rather than present mortality rates determine healthcare expenditures,
which they explain as political lag. This is a conceptually important distinction from
the interpretation of mortality in studies using individual-level data, where TTD
(capturing individual mortality) is assumed to be directly associated with higher
healthcare expenditures. Breyer et al. (2015) analyse panel data including German
sickness fund members at the cohort level. They distinguish between the effects of
ageing, contemporary mortality and 5-year survival rates. They interpret the sur-
vival rates as capturing changes in longevity. As in Bech et al. (2011), these survival
rates are prospective measures, whereas yearly mortality rates are retrospective. The
authors find both mortality rates and ageing are positively correlated with healthcare
costs. Karlsson and Klohn (2011) use simple mortality rates to capture the impact of
TTD on expenditures for overall social care for the entire Swedish population. Their
findings suggest that age is a much more relevant determinant of Swedish social care
expenditures than mortality. In a recent study, van Baal and Wong (2012) evaluate
the extent to which including TTD influences forecasts of macro-level healthcare ex-
penditures. They compare different scenarios based on their estimates and find that
including mortality does not decrease predicted expenditures.
Results for the impact of ageing and TTD on care expenditures are strongly
heterogeneous in studies using aggregated data. This might be explained by not
just the data but also diverging empirical approaches. Furthermore, unlike studies
analysing healthcare expenditures, studies focusing on LTC at the individual level
show that TTD is a more robust determinant of care costs.
There is a dearth of research on the red herring analysis using aggregated data.
Freely available datasets of official statistics are attractive and potentially helpful
to policy-makers. However, in order to provide more conclusive evidence on the red
herring hypothesis using aggregated data, several gaps need to be addressed. For
example, the use of raw mortality rates is conceptually unconvincing, since they
do not represent the aggregated equivalent of individual proximity to death. By
focusing on income elasticities of healthcare expenditures, Getzen (2000b) highlights
15
another difference between studies implemented on the micro and macro levels. He
argues that the unit of an analysis is very important, because healthcare tends to
be a necessity at the individual level and a luxury at the macro level. He says a
risk pooling group largely eliminates issues such as ability to pay, while differences
between groups are largely determined by differences in funding structure. As the
aim of risk pooling is to diversify risk within a group, the link between risk and
expenditures may no longer be observable at the aggregated level. In addition,
most studies focus exclusively on aggregate healthcare expenditures, making LTC
provision increasingly relevant.
We fill this gap by providing the first study to evaluate the red herring hypoth-
esis in the market for LTC provision at an aggregate level. First, we combine the
contemporary and future mortality rates of our population of interest to use the
probability of dying as a retrospective measure to control for TTD at an aggregate
level. Accounting for future mortality is crucial when decomposing LTC expendi-
tures into age and TTD effects at the aggregated level, since death-related morbidity
is not exclusively restricted to the last year of life. Since the overall aim of redis-
tributing resources between Swedish municipalities is to compensate for differences
in tax bases and cost structures without altering service quality (Karlsson et al.,
2010), we consider the problems raised by Getzen (2000b) when working with aggre-
gated macro data to only be a minor issue for our analysis. Differences in patient
characteristics that are beyond the control of local government are not expected to
be associated with a region’s ability to pay if variations in costs are eliminated by
national government. Hence, Sweden provides a favourable institutional background
for our empirical analysis (Getzen, 2006).
2.3 LTC Provision in Sweden
The main goal of the Swedish LTC system is to provide high quality services to
every resident according to their needs. While county councils are responsible for
healthcare provision (e.g., hospitals and health centres), municipalities are respon-
sible for all other aspects of care, including social care, institutional care and home
nursing. Although services can be supplied directly by a municipality or by a private
health and social care provider, local authorities remain responsible for funding them
(Fukushima et al., 2010). Directly elected politicians decide on the supply of LTC,
as well as raising the revenues necessary to cover expenditures. The main source of
funding is local income taxes, and out-of-pocket payments are of minor importance
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(4 % of total costs,(Colombo et al., 2011)). The national government lays down
general principles and responsibilities for social care in law and monitors care home
quality. It also redistributes funds to create equal conditions for the provision of LTC
in all parts of the country, despite immense differences in both need and local tax
bases. This equalisation is based on local income, expected costs and other structural
disadvantages. In 2008, the national government transferred 58 billion SEK (e 5.9
bn.) to local authorities, 17.6 % of total revenue (Karlsson et al., 2010). In order
to receive LTC services, an application must be made to the local authority. An
evaluator then interviews the potential recipient and family members to determine
the extent of required support, and whether the services can be provided as domi-
ciliary care. This evaluation is based on restrictions to daily living activities (ADL).
Institutional care is viewed as a last resort (Fukushima et al., 2010).
Although the market share of private providers has increased over the last two
decades in Sweden (e.g., from 5.4 to 13.7 % of nursing home slots (Socialstyrelsen,
2008)), nearly all formal LTC services are still funded and monitored by local au-
thorities.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the red herring hypothesis in the context of expenditures on LTC services,
we use administrative data collected by the Swedish National Board for Health and
Welfare. This data is provided at the municipality level, which allows us to exploit
the panel structure of our data. Since we can analyse high-quality data aggregated
at the regional level2 within an institutional framework that redistributes wealth
to meet local needs, there are very good opportunities to evaluate the relationship
between ageing and LTC without some of the typical confounders.
In some counties, municipalities have also taken over responsibility for healthcare
provision; unfortunately, data from these counties is ambiguous in that it does not
specifically identify LTC and healthcare expenditures. As the focus of our analysis
is on LTC expenditures, we exclude such observations. The remaining municipalities
cover more than half of the Swedish population, including the counties of Blekinge
la¨n, Ga¨vleborgs la¨n, Kalmar la¨n, Norrbottens la¨n, Stockholms la¨n, Va¨rmlands la¨n,
Va¨sterbottens la¨n, Va¨sternorrlands la¨n and O¨stergo¨tlands la¨n. In addition, in parts
of Dalarna la¨n, Jo¨nko¨pings la¨n and Va¨stmanlands la¨n, around 10 % of the municipal-
2Data on LTC expenditures is available at http://www.scb.se.
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ities provide healthcare services. Although comparing variables for the two groups3
shows they are very similar, we do not use such observations in our analysis. As
the quantity of healthcare services offered over time cannot be distinguished from
LTC provision for these regions, this would clearly be a potential confounder in our
analysis, because our fixed effects estimator uses deviations from the municipalities’
means over time for identification. Hence, we exclusively use the data on LTC provi-
sion, representing more than half of the population (capturing 4.9 out of 9.2 million
individuals).
Our main units of observation are 152 out of a total of 290 Swedish municipalities4.
Our analysis focuses on the sub-population of inhabitants aged 65+, since only this
group is eligible for LTC. Therefore, our main dependent variable captures publicly
financed, overall LTC expenditures5 divided by the average population aged 65 or
older, but we also provide separate regression estimates for institutional and domi-
ciliary LTC costs. Since all variables are expressed in terms of averages per 65+
inhabitant, all estimated parameters correspond to their individual-level equivalents.
As can be seen in Table 2.16, the average costs for overall LTC expenditures are
around SEK 57,400 (e 6,400) per capita. Institutional and domiciliary expenditures
do not completely account for total LTC, as the figure includes additional services
which cannot directly be attributed to one of the two categories, such as preventive
care.
To account for TTD in our model, we consider contemporary and future mortality
rates among the 65+ population. Thus, we assume a high mortality rate among the
65+ population is related to a high level of care and is therefore also positively
correlated with LTC expenditures. According to the red herring hypothesis, the
mortality rate for the following period should also be correlated with higher LTC
use, since individuals dying in the next year also have a higher probability of using
LTC services today. Hence, we define the TTD variables as
TTDait = (1− (1−mrtait)× (1−mrta+1i,t+1))×
Nait
N65+it
(2.1)
which can be interpreted as the probability of dying within two years for people
3See Appendix 2.A1
4Data provided by Statistics Sweden can be downloaded at http://www.ssd.scb.se.
5As already mentioned, some 4 % of total costs are covered by user charges. These are included
in our cost variables to reflect the actual total costs of LTC for each individual in the publicly
funded system.
6For a detailed variable description, see Appendix 2.A2
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Total 57.4 9.418 30.995 94.41 1,589
Inst 37.532 8.609 14.771 70.396 1,589
Dom 17.536 5.659 4.258 39.3 1,589
age6569 0.267 0.034 0.203 0.457 1,589
age7074 0.236 0.016 0.19 0.281 1,589
age7579 0.21 0.017 0.142 0.264 1,589
age8084 0.158 0.019 0.084 0.21 1,589
age8589 0.089 0.014 0.045 0.132 1,589
age9094 0.033 0.007 0.012 0.06 1,589
age95100 0.007 0.002 0 0.017 1,589
mrt 0.052 0.007 0.031 0.089 1,589
mrtL1 0.054 0.007 0.03 0.082 1,589
TTD65 0.102 0.012 0.065 0.147 1,589
TTD6569 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.017 1,589
TTD7074 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.023 1,589
TTD7579 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.034 1,589
TTD8084 0.024 0.004 0.007 0.041 1,589
TTD8589 0.023 0.005 0.006 0.041 1,589
TTD9094 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.029 1,589
TTD95100 0.005 0.002 0 0.011 1,589
medinc65 08 156.551 20.648 100.984 240.874 1,589
privcare 0.061 0.133 0 0.946 1,435
wom65 0.557 0.018 0.498 0.633 1,589
density 157.767 537.992 0.2 4307.8 1,589
rightwing 0.337 0.106 0.105 0.764 1,589
taxrate 0.214 0.013 0.149 0.231 1,589
mrtl1 0.052 0.007 0.032 0.089 1,589
lifexp 18.424 1.035 14.015 22.52 1,589
Summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables of our
baseline specification (not sex specific).
19
in a specific age group (cf. Wilmoth et al. (2007)). More specifically, our overall
TTD variable, TTD65+it , is defined as the probability of dying within two years for
an individual aged 65+, whereas the age-specific TTD is the probability of dying
within two years multiplied by the proportion of the 65+ population within that
specific age range, a. Hence, it gives the weighted probability of dying within two
years for a given age group. The mortality rates mrt are calculated as the number of
older people in a specific age group, a, who died within a year, divided by the number
of people, Nait, in the age group alive at the beginning of the same year. Using the
population at the beginning of each period is important, since the number of deaths
in a given period negatively affects the number of inhabitants within a municipality.
The next year’s mortality rate is calculated with respect to the initial age group,
a, which we now (with some abuse of notation) call a + 1, as we need to account
for the fact that individuals from age group a are one year older in period t+1.
The final term in equation (2.1) is used for rescaling the age- and sex-specific TTD
variables to the 65+ level, as the pure survival rates resulting from the first two terms
were calculated for the group-specific population numbers, not reflecting their actual
relevance, given the number of older (65+) people in each municipality. In this way,
we can provide a reliable retrospective measure for TTD to control for an individual’s
proximity to death (here: probability of dying within two years) at an aggregated
level. Exploring age-specific mortality in future periods is an important distinction
from existing macro studies using aggregated data (e.g., Bech et al. (2011), Breyer
et al. (2015)), and important if end-of-life morbidity is not restricted to the last year
of life. In our baseline model, a simply represents the total 65+ population, but
group-specific TTD variables created with respect to age group a are also used later
in our analysis (e.g., TTD6569it and sex-specific TTD variables
7).
It could be argued that accounting for the probability of dying within the next two
years is insufficient, since dying in more distant periods might also generate extra
costs of dying. Thus, we also derived the TTD variable based on three periods. The
results suggest that using three periods does not increase LTC costs significantly. As
using more distant information decreases the number of observations available for
analysis, what follows relies on the TTD variable based on two periods. Another
important factor in the choice of number of periods is immigration: As we are not
observing individuals but municipalities, there is the potential problem that elderly
people may move from one municipality to another. Using more distant periods to
7The pattern of lower probabilities of dying for higher age groups, as seen in Table 2.1, is simply
a result of the variables being rescaled as described above.
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calculate the TTD variable would increase measurement error if some individuals
changed municipalities at the end of their life. However, we regard this issue as
being of minor empirical relevance, as we know that older individuals are less likely
to change their municipal residency8.
The other main explanatory variables are those capturing the age structure
amongst the old in each municipality. These variables are defined as the number
of older people, measured in intervals of five years, divided by the number of people
aged 65+. Again, these variables are measured at the beginning of each year. As
expected, the share of individuals decreases with the specific age group, from 27 %
to less than 1 % on average.
Other variables used for robustness checks include the median incomes (1,000
SEK) of people aged 65+, the share of private LTC provision, life expectancy for
people aged 65+, the lagged mortality rate, local tax rates, the centre-right parties’
share of all seats in the town council, population density and the share of women in
the 65+ population. To account for inflation, we standardised all monetary variables
for 1998 to 2008 according to the Swedish price index, expressing them in 2008 SEK.
Due to missing values in the data, our final sample is restricted to 1,589 observations.
We assume a flexible relationship between our explanatory variables (age groups
and TTDait) and the dependent variable (care costs per 65+ population), as we
allow ageing to have a heterogeneous impact on LTC costs. Endogeneity may be an
issue in this analysis, and the possibilities to adjust for it are limited. While the age
distribution at the beginning of the year is clearly predetermined, it may be correlated
with unobservable characteristics that explain LTC expenditures. The TTD variable
is also problematic in this regard. Hence, we rely on a fixed effects estimator9,
assuming that possible confounders in our baseline specification are constant over
time. The functional relation is
yit = Xβ + µi + νit (2.2)
where β is a vector of length k × 1, and X is an N × K matrix containing a con-
stant, the age variables and other controls depending on the specification. µi is a
municipality-specific error term. In addition to the baseline specification, we provide
estimates with other covariates included to evaluate the robustness of our findings.
We also estimate the impact of age and TTD on LTC costs, allowing for age-specific
8The 65+ population changes its municipality with a probability of around 0.011. This drops
to 0.007 for the 80+ population (2006; Centralbyr˚an (2009)).
9A Hausman test supports the hypothesis that the consistency of a random effects estimator
can be rejected.
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TTD effects. This specification is saturated since, apart from municipality and time
effects, it controls for all possible combinations of our age categories and TTD. Hence,
the functional form of the relationship between independent and dependent variables
is less of an issue. In another specification we calculate age and TTD with respect
to the municipality-specific distribution of sex, as done in earlier studies (e.g., Felder
et al. (2010), Breyer et al. (2015)). Since we observe expenditures at the municipal-
ity rather than individual level, we estimate specifications using the same dependent
variables as before, and ‘interact’ the explanatory variables capturing age and TTD
with indicators for the region-specific distribution of men and women. To allow for a
straightforward interpretation of this specification and avoid assumptions about sex-
specific costs in the control group, we exclude the constant from this specification.
For this reason, coefficients for the share of 65- to 69-year-old males and females
are also provided here. To account for heteroskedasticity, all estimates use weighted
least squares. The weights reflect the inverse relation between the variance of the
outcome variable and the size of the population.
2.5 Findings
2.5.1 Baseline Specification
Table 2.2 shows the results of our fixed effects specifications. The table provides a
comparison between the impact of ageing on total, institutional and domiciliary LTC
expenditures when TTD is omitted and included.
For overall LTC costs, the coefficients for the older age groups are positive and
significant. This suggests that age-related costs are not a major issue in these younger
cohorts.
When TTD is excluded (column 1), the coefficient for 85- to 89-year-old people
indicates that an individual in this age group incurs an increase in total LTC ex-
penditures of SEK 103,000 (e 10,000) per year (in addition to the average for an
individual aged 65 to 69, captured by the constant). In accordance with the red her-
ring hypothesis, the coefficients for the older age groups decrease once the probability
of dying within two years is included in the model.10 However, the effect of including
TTD is modest. Thus, our results support the existence of a red herring, but age
10We also estimate specifications which include both contemporary and next year’s mortality.
Wald tests do not reject the null hypothesis of the equality of both coefficients, suggesting they
control for the same mechanism influencing LTC costs. Therefore, we regard aggregating both
variables as an appropriate way to control for the overall effect – TTD65+.
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itself seems to have a strong impact on LTC expenditures, even after controlling for
mortality.
Table 2.2 Impact of TTD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Total Inst Inst Dom Dom
age7074 -10.61 -13.70 13.83 9.62 -13.53 -12.66
(22.83) (22.43) (26.20) (25.92) (21.59) (21.76)
age7579 -14.22 -20.16 -25.45 -33.53 6.78 8.44
(22.81) (22.62) (31.45) (31.59) (23.88) (24.21)
age8084 27.52 19.26 23.77 12.53 10.41 12.73
(26.69) (27.00) (29.91) (29.83) (21.55) (22.12)
age8589 102.81*** 87.06*** 37.57 16.13 54.20** 58.62**
(29.33) (29.55) (27.18) (28.15) (22.08) (23.21)
age9094 214.69*** 188.17*** 105.37* 69.29 98.68** 106.11**
(40.64) (39.50) (54.30) (55.63) (42.42) (44.54)
age95100 273.74*** 248.44*** 93.33 58.89 187.11* 194.20*
(90.29) (90.19) (125.60) (125.63) (102.70) (104.10)
TTD65 60.63*** 82.50*** -17.00
(19.21) (23.08) (19.12)
Constant 37.78*** 37.73*** 23.86 23.79 9.80 9.82
(13.50) (13.29) (16.52) (16.24) (12.38) (12.37)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589
R2 0.557 0.561 0.234 0.244 0.452 0.453
Fixed effects estimates for our three cost categories, including and excluding TTD. Columns
1 and 2 show the coefficients for total LTC costs, 3 and 4 for institutional LTC and 5 and
6 for domiciliary LTC. Year dummies are included, and the regressions are weighted by the
square root of a municipality’s average 65+ population. The unit of observation is a Swedish
municipality for the period 1998-2008. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Separate estimates for institutional and domiciliary LTC costs reveal differing
patterns for most age groups, suggesting ageing is the most relevant predictor for
domiciliary care, whereas TTD is much more relevant for institutional LTC costs.
For institutional care, we also find the effects of ageing are offset by the inclusion
of TTD. The differing signs of the coefficients for TTD might be interpreted as an
indicator of age-related switching behaviour from domiciliary into institutional care.
This finding is in line with Larsson et al. (2008), who argue there is a transition
process from home to institutional LTC at the end of life.
Overall, the estimated morbidity effects in all scenarios but the institutional care
are dwarfed by the increase in expected costs at higher ages. Thus, our conclusion
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here differs from that of Larsson et al. (2008), who find that TTD is much more
important than age in Sweden. However, their study is implemented on the individual
level and does not use monetary equivalents of LTC utilisation.
To check whether our estimates suffer from omitted variable bias, we further
consider a specification that takes into account other variables that might be potential
determinants of LTC expenditures. The sociodemographic variables are the median
income of the 65+ population, population density and the share of females in the 65+
population. To account for potential variation in the supply side of LTC services, we
add the share of private LTC providers. In addition, municipalities’ health and LTC
policy might vary over time and thus not be accurately captured by municipality
fixed effects. We add the local tax rate and the centre-right parties’ share of all
local government seats to account for this. As studies emphasise that changes in
life expectancy are an important determinant of healthcare provision (e.g., Bech
et al. (2011), Breyer et al. (2015)), we add the local life expectancy of 65-year-old
people to our model. We include the lagged mortality rate, which Bech et al. (2011)
find is relevant. Including these variables allows us to check whether the estimated
coefficients are robust or simply reflect a partial correlation with other important
variables.
We find the age coefficients (shown in Table 2.3) are slightly higher than for
our baseline model. The median income of the elderly population, local tax rate
and lagged mortality rate are significantly correlated with LTC expenditures. The
positive correlation with income is remarkable, since equalisation grants from the
national government are provided to compensate for differences in local needs. Thus
the coefficient might still capture an income effect on demand. The tax rate and
lagged mortality rate capture municipality-specific LTC provision. The relevance of
lagged mortality is in line with empirical evidence on the healthcare market (Bech
et al., 2011). Bech et al. (2011) argue that it takes time for shifts in demand for
healthcare services to be incorporated into public funding. Interestingly, increasing
life expectancy did not affect our estimates, once conditioned on TTD. However,
as we are exclusively interested in the effect of ageing on LTC expenditures, the
inclusion of potential confounders can be problematic, because we do not know the
underlying mechanism that relates these variables to LTC provision. Hence, later in
this study we use the estimates of our baseline specification to calculate economic
implications, keeping in mind that these projections are conservative.
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Table 2.3 Robustness estimates
Full sample Full sample Restricted Restricted
Total Total Total Total
age7074 -13.70 -6.39 -3.87 -0.75
(22.43) (21.20) (21.52) (20.19)
age7579 -20.16 -12.13 -13.34 -9.18
(22.62) (23.70) (21.96) (22.93)
age8084 19.26 41.38 27.05 43.65
(27.00) (26.17) (29.56) (28.05)
age8589 87.06*** 120.30*** 84.96*** 118.14***
(29.55) (27.29) (31.15) (28.96)
age9094 188.17*** 216.78*** 185.12*** 213.81***
(39.50) (39.61) (39.22) (40.92)
age95100 248.44*** 320.88*** 243.50*** 310.59***
(90.19) (92.16) (90.84) (89.95)
TTD65 60.63*** 42.35** 49.64** 34.59
(19.21) (21.15) (19.64) (21.69)
medinc65 08 0.23*** 0.23***
(0.07) (0.07)
wom65 -6.81 -0.10
(28.99) (29.15)
density -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
rightwing -0.95 -3.88
(6.59) (6.91)
taxrate 174.49*** 165.02***
(51.48) (52.40)
mrtl1 55.80*** 56.15***
(20.83) (20.88)
lifexp -0.23 -0.20
(0.14) (0.14)
privcare -0.93
(2.65)
Constant 37.73*** -40.27 34.37** -42.60
(13.29) (27.00) (13.53) (26.57)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,435 1,435
R2 0.561 0.585 0.496 0.524
Fixed effects estimates with total LTC expenditures as the dependent vari-
able. We estimate our baseline specifications with and without other con-
trol variables that might determine LTC expenditures. As we do not have
information on private LTC provision for all our municipalities, we per-
formed the robustness check twice to determine whether excluding obser-
vations with missing values might change our estimates. Year dummies are
included and the regressions are weighted by the square root of each mu-
nicipality’s average 65+ population. The unit of observation is a Swedish
municipality for the period 1998-2008. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.5.2 Age-Specific TTD Effects
In addition to the specifications above, we now analyse the red herring hypothesis
in more detail by testing whether TTD impacts LTC expenditures differently for
different age groups. This is the analogue to a fully interacted specification in an
analysis using micro data, i.e., this specification reflects the spirit of a saturated
model, as we allow for all combinations of our age variables and TTD. If TTD effects
vary with age, the age coefficients might falsely pick up TTD-related variations in
LTC costs. We therefore estimate our baseline specification for overall, domiciliary
and institutional costs with age-specific TTD variables, i.e., instead of the single
TTD measure TTD65+, we use group-specific TTDa variables.
The results in Table 2.4 suggest that LTC costs differ both between age groups as
well as between domiciliary and institutional care. Again, compared to our baseline
model, the inclusion of age-specific TTD variables increases the impact of age for
the older age groups. The comparison between domiciliary and institutional care
supports the hypothesis, mentioned in the last section, that the negative coefficient
of TTD for domiciliary LTC is driven by switching between care settings at the end of
life. This substitution between domiciliary and institutional LTC is mainly relevant
for people aged 90 to 94. However, the negative coefficient for domiciliary care is
much higher than the positive corresponding coefficient for institutional LTC, i.e.,
for the oldest individuals, the shift to institutional care yields a decrease in total cost.
When we look at the TTD coefficients in the specification including institutional care,
we find the strong positive effect of our baseline estimate to be mainly driven by the
relatively young, the 70- to 74-year-olds, for whom age is not a relevant determinant
of LTC expenditures. The estimates strongly suggest an age-specific impact of TTD
between institutional and domiciliary LTC expenditures. But once again, the age
coefficients seem to be most relevant for domiciliary care.
In summary, ageing is again the main driving force behind LTC expenditures,
even if we allow for age-specific TTD influences.
2.5.3 Sex-Specific TTD Effects
Although sex is already taken into account via our robustness checks, we also iden-
tify the parameters of interest separately for women and men. Hence, relative to
the estimated specifications above, we further relax the assumption of homogeneous
relationships between our age variables and LTC provision.
We again provide different specifications for our LTC categories. First, we run a
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Table 2.4 Age-specific TTD effect
(1) (2) (3)
Total Inst Dom
age7074 -21.66 6.20 -17.38
(22.59) (26.26) (22.30)
age7579 -21.26 -29.80 2.56
(23.68) (32.01) (24.11)
age8084 18.43 15.44 7.21
(27.99) (30.92) (22.45)
age8589 103.36*** 23.44 64.46***
(31.25) (29.96) (23.72)
age9094 232.77*** 84.17 146.91***
(45.72) (65.93) (50.53)
age95100 334.09*** 84.20 272.96**
(119.98) (165.16) (133.08)
TTD6569 64.54 114.29 -50.62
(68.92) (69.33) (60.61)
TTD7074 210.65*** 179.63*** 29.40
(59.64) (60.08) (51.67)
TTD7579 86.23 55.92 40.48
(52.49) (48.92) (35.89)
TTD8084 88.32** 87.24* 13.86
(39.99) (49.85) (40.38)
TTD8589 -9.15 59.43 -51.64
(42.31) (53.12) (36.10)
TTD9094 -45.28 48.53 -120.58**
(57.09) (64.69) (55.63)
TTD95100 -57.13 47.31 -120.84
(121.94) (133.91) (109.58)
Constant 37.38*** 22.30 11.38
(13.26) (16.19) (12.27)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589
R2 0.566 0.246 0.457
Fixed effects estimates for our three cost categories when
age-specific TTD is accounted for. Column 1 shows the
coefficients for total LTC costs, 2 for institutional and 3
for domiciliary LTC. Year dummies are included and the
regressions are weighted by the square root of each munici-
pality’s average 65+ population. The unit of observation is
a Swedish municipality for the period 1998-2008. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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fixed effects regression using only sex-specific age variables11, we then include sex-
specific TTD variables, followed by life expectancy (which was also found to be differ-
ent for women and men in the descriptive statistics). The final regression, shown in
columns 4-5 of Table 2.5, includes TTD variables that allow for heterogeneity in both
sex and age. Unlike the specifications in the sections above, we excluded the con-
stant from these estimates, introducing the share of 65- to 69-year-old men/women
as additional covariates. This is because the dependent variable cannot be defined
separately for men and women. Hence, in order to avoid the same constant for men
and women, we account for age effects of both sexes in these estimates.
For total LTC expenditures we find a strong sex-specific pattern to the age vari-
ables, as seen in Table 2.5. Although age is again positively related to LTC expen-
ditures for all individuals aged 80+, this effect is overall much stronger for women
than for men. The overall TTD effects in our next specification (column 2), again
offsetting the effect of ageing, shows that the average TTD effect is mostly driven
by men. Introducing sex-specific life expectancy (column 3) does not change these
findings much. Looking at joint age- and sex-specific TTD effects, we again find the
highest TTD effects for people aged 70-74. Here offsetting age by including TTD is
found to be of minor relevance.
When focusing on institutional and domiciliary LTC separately (Appendix 2.A4
and 2.A5), we find the TTD effect for individuals aged 70-74 to be driven by insti-
tutional care. Once again, the positive TTD effects are not prevalent when focusing
on domiciliary care; here TTD for women is strongly negatively associated with LTC
expenditures. Both effects seem to offset themselves in the aggregated variable total
LTC. The fact that TTD is only negatively related to domiciliary LTC for older
women is an interesting finding. This indicates that switching behaviour between
domiciliary and institutional care at the end of life mostly relates to women. We sup-
pose that this can be attributed to the relevance of informal care as well. Sex-specific
differences in informal care are discussed by Paraponaris et al. (2012), who find that
being female is a strong determinant of receiving formal care. Our age-specific de-
composition shows that the effect is highest for the 65- to 69-year-old and 85- to
94-year-old women. The same age groups show a positive TTD effect when using
institutional care as the dependent variable. We find this pattern for the age-specific
TTD variable and the 65+ TTD variable. Again, the small change in age effects due
to the inclusion of TTD casts doubt on the relevance of the red herring hypothesis,
i.e., excluding the probability of dying does not change the economic relevance of
11Descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 2.A3
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Table 2.5 Sex-specific total LTC expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Total Total Total Total
Men Women
age6569m 42.61* 39.94* 42.38* 42.89*
(23.89) (23.90) (24.34) (24.40)
age7074m 35.79 25.67 27.93 12.80
(27.97) (28.38) (28.43) (29.71)
age7579m -3.27 -17.48 -14.30 -25.97
(32.28) (33.75) (33.83) (34.84)
age8084m 44.65 23.11 26.79 29.30
(43.34) (47.14) (46.98) (48.27)
age8589m 87.70* 54.24 59.26 96.49
(52.92) (55.09) (55.28) (62.26)
age9094m 245.58*** 193.70** 199.69** 254.97**
(86.05) (89.14) (89.86) (108.85)
age95100m 121.19 106.19 115.76 144.31
(186.79) (185.84) (188.37) (281.03)
age6569w 27.85 32.10 34.79 33.01
(25.45) (25.67) (26.04) (27.05)
age7074w 22.48 25.38 28.37 21.74
(29.46) (29.84) (30.41) (30.51)
age7579w 45.53* 45.49* 48.92* 49.86*
(24.21) (24.68) (24.92) (25.58)
age8084w 73.56** 74.04** 78.29** 73.02**
(30.09) (31.35) (31.15) (33.85)
age8589w 164.35*** 158.85*** 163.87*** 159.19***
(36.02) (37.61) (37.70) (41.38)
age9094w 249.44*** 233.13*** 238.96*** 270.40***
(50.90) (50.24) (50.86) (61.25)
age95100w 393.19*** 372.40*** 381.66*** 460.86***
(103.93) (108.18) (108.93) (146.18)
TTD65m 79.59** 73.42**
(34.23) (35.86)
TTD65w 45.77 32.01
(31.50) (34.67)
lifexpm -0.03 -0.00
(0.09) (0.10)
lifexpw -0.09 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10)
TTD6569s 45.37 56.58
(90.92) (121.90)
TTD7074s 216.87*** 209.90**
(79.23) (92.21)
TTD7579s 140.42** 27.74
(66.22) (73.38)
TTD8084s 83.30 68.55
(65.17) (59.55)
TTD8589s -41.86 26.22
(66.21) (60.56)
TTD9094s -22.30 -72.66
(118.99) (72.70)
TTD95100s 75.38 -95.09
(271.57) (156.61)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589
Fixed effects estimates for total LTC expenditures when age-specific
control variables are included. We included sex-specific coefficients
for the 65-69 age group as we do not rely on a constant in this spec-
ification. Column 1 accounts for age, column 2 includes TTD and
column 3 uses life expectancy. In columns 4 and 5 (coefficients taken
from a single regression), we allow for age- and sex-specific TTD ef-
fects on total LTC expenditures. Year dummies are included, and
the regressions are weighted by the square root of each municipality’s
average 65+ population. The unit of observation is a Swedish munic-
ipality for the period 1998-2008. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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ageing very much.12
Overall, we find the age coefficients, especially for women, are highly significant
and economically relevant when focusing on total expenditures, whereas some become
statistically insignificant for domiciliary and institutional costs. As we again find a
sex-specific shift between the two types of services, but lack reliable information
about future changes to the distribution of men and women, we do not use these
estimates to project care expenditures in the following section.
2.5.4 Implications
To illustrate how our findings can be used to project costs, we first calculate the
expenditures arising due to a hypothetical increase in the life expectancy of the 65+
population of exactly one year. We show how costs change for different estimated
specifications. Second, we use population projections from the Swedish Statistical
Office for the next 100 years to further project the financial consequences of expected
changes in age distribution on total LTC expenditures, based on our estimates. These
projections are inversely weighted by the total population (and the 15- to 64-year-old
workforce), to reveal the importance of differences in the potential to contribute to
funding LTC services for the elderly.
The following equation shows the implied changes in expenditures driven by in-
creased life expectancy13:
4LTCi =

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k=65
(
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k
j
) (
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)
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∞∑
k=65
((
αj + β
k
j
) (
s
k−1
2008 − s
k
2008
)
+ δ
k
j
(
TTD
k−1
2008 − TTD
k
2008
))
with j = i ,for i=3 (2.3b)
αj=1 ,for i=4 (2.3c)
where we calculate the changes for total, institutional and domiciliary LTC costs
(4LTC) and distinguish between four different scenarios, i, by combining our esti-
mates with the Swedish age structure and age-specific mortality from 2008. Since
this information is provided for every age cohort, the overall cost projection can be
12To evaluate the extent to which the coefficients of sex-specific TTD are reliable and not a result
of colinearity due to including so many TTD variables, we ran single regressions including only a
single TTD variable. One explanation for the problem could be comorbidity of very old people,
which would not allow TTD effects to be identified separately for both sexes. However, these
estimates prove the findings for the entire specification are very similar, both in terms of economic
relevance and statistical significance.
13The formula for cost increase per life year is provided in Appendix A2.6.
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written as the sum of age-specific projections from ages 65 to infinity, but ends at
k=105 in our setup.
We differentiate between a naive demographic extrapolation (i.e., not taking TTD
into account), two scenarios where TTD (overall and age-specific) is accounted for,
and a pure red herring scenario (i.e., all age-related costs are costs of dying). j
indicates which parameter estimates are used for each scenario, i. If j =1, we use
coefficients from a regression where only age is controlled for (odd columns in Ta-
ble 2). If j =2, then TTD65+ is included, whereas j =3 indicates the inclusion of
the seven age-specific TTDa variables into the regression. If j =4, we again use the
parameter estimate of the specification controlling only for age. In this pure red her-
ring scenario, we assume that all relevant costs are captured by a constant, although
we accounted for age in the specification. α represents our estimated constants, β
the age coefficients (and is therefore fixed within five-year intervals). sk2008 are year-
specific survival rates based on Swedish life table estimates, which we use to model a
hypothetical increase in life expectancy of exactly one year. We assume that each in-
dividual is one year ‘younger’ (in terms of mortality) in the counterfactual situation,
i.e., the survival rate of age cohort k in period t equals sk−1 in year t + 1. TTDk2008
are TTD variables calculated for individual ages k = {65,..,100}.
The TTD variable is only included in the formula for the specification controlling
for age-specific TTD effects, as they only occur once in an individual’s life and are
therefore only influenced by a change in life expectancy if they vary with age. To
quantify the implications of our estimates, we exclusively rely on the size of our
estimated parameters and do not use statistical significance.
Figure 2.1 shows the implied change in lifetime LTC costs (from the current level
of SEK 947,000 in scenario 1 for total costs), and Figure 2.2 shows the corresponding
increase in average costs per person per life year (assuming a stationary population).
Although our results imply lower cost increases for total and institutional LTC costs
once TTD65+ is controlled for (10 and 20 %, respectively), including the TTDa
variables increases the expected costs for all three kinds of services, a result driven
by the relatively high age coefficients for the oldest individuals14.
14The pattern is similar if we use sex-specific estimates (Appendix 2.A7/2.A8).
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Figure 2.1 Total cost increase per capita associated with an increase in
life expectancy of one year (various scenarios)
Figure 2.2 Total cost increase per capita and per life year associated with
an increase in life expectancy of one year (various scenarios)
The projections of total LTC expenditures for the next 100 years are derived using
the coefficients from three estimated specifications, s. The projections are based on
regressions when age is accounted for, when TTD65+ is included and finally when
age-specific TTD is included. Since, from a policy perspective, it is very important
to determine the extent to which such future expenditures will be sustainable, we
calculate the projected total yearly costs in relation to future fiscal potential. In
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doing so, we rescale the projected expenditures for the 65+ population, (N65), with
Np, the number of all inhabitants and the 15- to 65-year-old inhabitants. Formally,
these projections are written as:
P = x
′
tβs ×
N65
Np
. (2.4)
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show that although the TTD variable is strongly correlated
with LTC expenditures, including this variable into the specification only modestly
affects cost projections. The shape of yearly projected values is very marginally
lower in the projection based on the specification where TTD is included, although
the difference increases to approximately 5 % over time. Including age-specific TTD
effects does not change this pattern. Assuming the validity of the projected age
structure, we find expenditures will increase from SEK 11,000 to SEK 20,000 per
capita over the next 100 years, and from SEK 17,000 to SEK 35,000 if costs are
divided by the potential workforce (15- to 64-year-olds). The shape of the projections
shows that expenditure increases will be highest in the near future (until 2040) and
then increase moderately. This suggests that future budget impacts of ageing can be
expected to be considerable in the short run. However, we must also bear in mind
that projections for more distant points in time are based on higher uncertainty, due
to underlying assumptions about demographic changes in Sweden. As we do not
have information about the degree of this uncertainty, we do not provide confidence
intervals for our estimates.
Figure 2.3 Projected LTC expenditures per capita
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Figure 2.4 Projected LTC expenditures per member of the workforce
(15- to 64-year-olds)
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analysed the effect of ageing and increases in longevity on LTC
costs in Sweden. Evaluating these relationships is crucial for policy makers as it
allows them to determine future budget expenditures for LTC services.
To increase our knowledge of the ‘red herring’ hypothesis, we used administrative
data on Swedish municipalities, investigating whether TTD is a better predictor of
LTC costs than age by controlling for local mortality. One advantage of our study is
that we use freely available administrative data that covers all Swedish municipalities
that exclusively provide LTC but not healthcare. Compared to other studies using
macro data, Sweden provides an excellent framework for our analysis, because the
financial redistribution between our units of observation renders budget restrictions
for LTC expenditures mostly irrelevant. In addition, we used the panel structure of
our data to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The main innovation of this chapter
is that our measure for TTD allows us to account for individual end-of-life morbidity
effects on the aggregated level more convincingly than existing studies using macro
data, by using a retrospective measure for TTD. Based on our empirical findings,
we calculated the financial consequences of life expectancy increasing by one year for
various scenarios. We also used our estimates to calculate cost projections for the
next 100 years based on recent predictions of the Swedish age structure provided by
official statistics. It transpires that age is the main determinant of LTC expenditures,
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although TTD remains relevant when projecting expenditures.
In addition to our baseline model, we considered several other specifications:
Separate estimates for institutional and domiciliary LTC costs revealed a morbidity-
related substitution into institutional care in line with evidence based on micro-level
analysis. However, another sex-specific specification revealed that the high negative
correlation between TTD and domiciliary care is driven mainly by women. This
might suggest that, on average, older men do not ‘need’ to switch to institutional care
like women do, because they may still have complementary informal care available
to them at the end of their lives courtesy of their spouses. This is a fruitful topic for
future research.
Age-specific TTD effects revealed the costs of end-of-life morbidity itself to be
strongly related to actual age at death. This issue is usually not accounted for in the
literature. Our study found the impact of TTD on LTC costs is mainly driven by a
relatively young cohort, the 70- to 74-year-olds. When accounting for heterogeneity
in sex as well, this phenomenon is more important for men than women. For men,
the effect of TTD lasts even longer: from age 70 to age 79. Whether this finding is
a matter of rationing or less demanding care services remains an open question. It
would be helpful to assess whether this pattern can be found at the individual level
as well.
Our findings show that considerable upward budget shifts due to LTC spending
driven by future demographic changes can be expected. Although LTC expenditures
for the older population can be explained to a certain extent by TTD (captured
by the probability of dying within two years), Sweden’s age structure remains more
important when focusing on overall LTC. Most importantly, the share of the oldest
individuals remains an important determinant of total LTC expenditures. The major
significance of ageing is also supported by our cost projections.
However, our study has also some limitations. We are not able to solve the poten-
tial endogeneity problem that arises if LTC provision itself influences TTD. However,
since – in contrast to healthcare – LTC services mainly emphasise the treatment of
chronic illnesses (Norton, 2000), this problem should be of minor relevance in our
context. Another possible issue is that we only use data on municipalities that are
exclusively responsible for providing LTC expenditures. Although a comparison of
observable characteristics suggests our observations are very similar to the situation
for the rest of the population, we cannot rule out different outcomes when healthcare
is provided at the municipality level. In addition, the time dimension of our data
means the population changed to a certain extent, with some individuals leaving the
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sample and others entering. This could be a problem if these individuals benefit
differently from medical innovations (if not captured by life expectancy, which we
account for in our analysis). However, this problem might be more relevant when
focusing on curative health care rather than LTC provision. Finally, as we do not
include the information in our analysis, our results do not allow any inferences about
a LTC receiver’s quality of life. However, they highlight that keeping high quality
LTC services available will require new ways to use resources efficiently.
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Appendix Chapter 2
2.A1 Comparison between municipalities providing and not providing
healthcare in 2008
Healthcare=0 Healthcare=1
Variable Mean Time var. Mean Time var.
Total 57.4004 4.5212 57.3170 4.5738
Inst 37.5317 3.9136 35.8417 3.8765
Dom 17.5361 3.7201 18.8287 3.7382
age6569 0.2667 0.0133 0.2622 0.0148
age7074 0.2356 0.0108 0.2311 0.0109
age7579 0.2099 0.0131 0.2085 0.0136
age8084 0.1581 0.0096 0.1605 0.0091
age8589 0.0894 0.0073 0.0932 0.006
age9094 0.0331 0.0041 0.0362 0.0038
age95100 0.0072 0.0016 0.0084 0.0018
mrt 0.0517 0.0047 0.0512 0.0046
mrtL1 0.0536 0.0049 0.0531 0.0048
TTD65 0.1025 0.0066 0.1016 0.0067
TTD6569 0.0076 0.0015 0.0072 0.0015
TTD7074 0.0112 0.0021 0.0105 0.0021
TTD7579 0.0175 0.0033 0.0164 0.003
TTD8084 0.0238 0.003 0.0232 0.003
TTD8589 0.0235 0.0028 0.0239 0.0027
TTD9094 0.0141 0.0023 0.0149 0.0022
TTD95100 0.0045 0.0012 0.0053 0.0014
medin 08 156.5511 10.63 150.368 11.1718
privcare 0.0612 0.0477 0.0412 0.0476
wom65 0.5575 0.0063 0.5518 0.006
density 157.7674 17.0796 92.0616 6.6494
rightwing 0.3369 0.0233 0.3538 0.0222
taxrate 0.2138 0.003 0.2122 0.0045
mrtl1 0.0519 0.0047 0.0516 0.0046
lifexp 18.4242 0.8155 18.7221 0.7898
N 1,589 1,419
Mean comparison of municipalities by healthcare provision. Healthcare=0 rep-
resents the sample used in our analysis, whereas Healthcare=1 represents ex-
cluded observations. Time var. represents standard deviation within time to
show that changes over time are similar for both groups.
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2.A2 Variable definitions
Variable Description
Total total LTC costs per 65+ inhabitant in 1,000 SEK
Inst institutional LTC costs per 65+ inhabitant in 1,000 SEK
Dom domiciliary LTC costs per 65+ inhabitant in 1,000 SEK
age6569 proportion of the 65+ population aged 65-69
age7074 proportion of the 65+ population aged 70-74
age7579 proportion of the 65+ population aged 75-79
age8084 proportion of the 65+ population aged 80-84
age8589 proportion of the 65+ population aged 85-89
age9094 proportion of the 65+ population aged 90-94
age95100 proportion of the 65+ population aged 95 to 100+
mrt mortality rate among the 65+ population
mrtL1 Next year’s mortality rate among the 65+ population
TTD65+ two-year mortality rate for the 65+ population
TTD6569 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 65-69
TTD7074 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 70-74
TTD7579 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 75-79
TTD8084 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 80-84
TTD8589 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 85-89
TTD9094 two-year mortality rate for the population aged 90-94
TTD95100+ two-year mortality rate for the population 95 to 100+
medinc65 08 median income of 65+ population
privcare share of people using private LTC services
wom65 share of women (65+)
density population density
rightwing share of seats occupied by right-wing parties
taxrate local tax rate
mrtl1 last period’s mortality rate among the 65+ population
lifexp life expectancy for members of the population aged 65
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2.A3 Sex-specific summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
age6569m 0.131 0.02 0.089 0.236
age7074m 0.111 0.01 0.081 0.144
age7579m 0.093 0.009 0.066 0.125
age8084m 0.064 0.009 0.024 0.099
age8589m 0.032 0.006 0.008 0.053
age9094m 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.022
age95100m 0.002 0.001 0 0.008
lifexpm 16.838 1.321 13.189 22.454
TTD65m 0.048 0.007 0.028 0.073
TTD6569m 0.005 0.002 0 0.016
TTD7074m 0.007 0.002 0 0.017
TTD7579m 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.023
TTD8084m 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.025
TTD8589m 0.01 0.003 0.001 0.021
TTD9094m 0.005 0.002 0 0.014
TTD95100m 0.001 0.001 0 0.005
age6569w 0.136 0.016 0.097 0.221
age7074w 0.125 0.01 0.093 0.153
age7579w 0.117 0.012 0.071 0.165
age8084w 0.094 0.012 0.043 0.138
age8589w 0.058 0.01 0.029 0.09
age9094w 0.023 0.005 0.007 0.042
age95100w 0.006 0.002 0 0.014
lifexpw 19.994 1.229 14.057 25.222
TTD65w 0.052 0.007 0.031 0.076
TTD6569w 0.003 0.001 0 0.007
TTD7074w 0.004 0.001 0 0.011
TTD7579w 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.017
TTD8084w 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.023
TTD8589w 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.029
TTD9094w 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.018
TTD95100w 0.003 0.001 0 0.01
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables used for
sex-specific estimates. w(omen) and m(en) indicate which
sex each variable corresponds to.
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2.A4 Sex-specific institutional LTC expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inst Inst Inst Inst Inst
Men Women
age6569m -6.34 -6.38 -4.74 -4.89
(30.09) (29.69) (30.11) (29.67)
age7074m 7.52 1.40 3.13 -8.24
(35.06) (35.90) (36.03) (36.35)
age7579m -28.81 -37.39 -34.99 -43.89
(41.94) (41.36) (41.99) (43.94)
age8084m -5.81 -17.32 -14.19 -18.01
(49.19) (51.01) (51.26) (53.71)
age8589m -15.75 -34.60 -30.26 7.44
(70.40) (75.07) (75.05) (80.50)
age9094m 90.98 58.29 63.65 150.57
(110.29) (116.90) (116.56) (143.91)
age95100m -120.94 -96.52 -87.78 -150.26
(227.01) (218.12) (220.83) (358.92)
age6569w 53.12 53.60* 55.27* 50.88
(32.67) (32.07) (32.31) (32.33)
age7074w 53.46 51.89 53.62 49.76
(33.04) (33.00) (32.86) (33.80)
age7579w 11.60 2.63 4.52 14.71
(32.46) (32.84) (32.90) (34.11)
age8084w 75.96* 65.33 67.76* 74.20*
(39.92) (40.82) (40.86) (43.86)
age8589w 93.57** 70.73* 73.28* 60.14
(38.58) (39.76) (39.67) (42.22)
age9094w 131.46* 88.42 90.96 77.41
(75.65) (78.43) (78.01) (87.08)
age95100w 215.05 153.87 158.04 200.92
(153.52) (156.87) (157.61) (203.97)
TTD65m 65.46* 58.14
(38.14) (41.59)
TTD65w 109.98*** 103.99***
(34.67) (37.43)
lifexpm -0.04 -0.02
(0.12) (0.12)
lifexpw -0.04 -0.03
(0.10) (0.10)
TTD6569s 67.01 214.90*
(92.84) (127.68)
TTD7074s 148.50* 247.47**
(84.30) (100.15)
TTD7579s 102.49 1.78
(74.34) (75.00)
TTD8084s 88.86 56.68
(77.74) (71.85)
TTD8589s -52.75 141.72**
(79.28) (69.47)
TTD9094s -112.95 120.44
(122.73) (85.61)
TTD95100s 207.60 1.45
(321.43) (178.44)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589
Fixed effects estimates for institutional LTC expenditures
when age-specific control variables are included. We in-
cluded sex-specific coefficients for the 65-69 age group as
we do not rely on a constant in this specification. Column
1 accounts for age, column 2 includes TTD and column 3
uses life expectancy. In columns 4 and 5 (coefficients taken
from a single regression), we allow for age- and sex-specific
TTD effects on institutional LTC expenditures. Year dum-
mies are included and the regressions are weighted by the
square root of each municipality’s average 65+ population.
The unit of observation is a Swedish municipality for the
period 1998-2008. Standard errors are clustered at the mu-
nicipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.A5 Sex-specific domiciliary LTC expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dom Dom Dom Dom Dom
Men Women
age6569m 33.24 30.50 31.06 30.91
(23.33) (23.43) (23.77) (23.52)
age7074m 24.22 19.63 20.06 16.17
(27.69) (27.55) (27.56) (28.18)
age7579m 18.66 12.20 12.82 10.73
(30.00) (30.25) (31.07) (32.53)
age8084m 75.85* 64.60 65.17 71.23
(39.90) (41.88) (42.73) (43.28)
age8589m 103.42* 86.87 87.62 87.00
(55.06) (60.83) (60.29) (64.36)
age9094m 152.84 130.56 131.38 125.74
(93.44) (97.12) (97.09) (121.78)
age95100m 325.83* 286.53 287.77 408.56
(175.56) (176.17) (177.09) (272.44)
age6569w -15.37 -11.42 -10.74 -7.44
(22.54) (22.05) (22.03) (22.76)
age7074w -19.76 -15.22 -14.42 -17.11
(27.25) (27.30) (27.02) (26.97)
age7579w 18.41 27.08 28.04 17.30
(26.75) (27.64) (27.61) (27.61)
age8084w -14.83 -4.02 -2.87 -17.15
(31.71) (32.64) (33.05) (35.03)
age8589w 49.84 66.27* 67.76* 73.10*
(33.01) (35.42) (35.61) (37.52)
age9094w 104.96* 129.74** 131.65** 183.78***
(58.75) (61.77) (61.46) (66.52)
age95100w 146.10 183.81 186.78 233.29
(114.14) (117.52) (118.41) (154.54)
TTD65m 19.35 19.24
(30.20) (33.30)
TTD65w -59.04** -63.55*
(28.50) (32.73)
lifexpm -0.00 0.02
(0.09) (0.09)
lifexpw -0.03 -0.01
(0.08) (0.08)
TTD6569s 1.91 -178.11*
(90.29) (106.98)
TTD7074s 78.05 -40.94
(69.33) (83.05)
TTD7579s 33.85 52.07
(56.42) (58.54)
TTD8084s 6.56 30.42
(60.78) (62.61)
TTD8589s 19.68 -96.55*
(63.75) (50.42)
TTD9094s 46.69 -208.08***
(94.60) (75.19)
TTD95100s -158.21 -98.52
(254.08) (137.84)
Observations 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,589
Fixed effects estimates for domiciliary LTC expenditures
when age-specific control variables are included. We in-
cluded sex-specific coefficients for the 65-69 age group as
we do not rely on a constant in this specification. Column
1 accounts for age, column 2 includes TTD and column 3
uses life expectancy. In columns 4 and 5 (coefficients taken
from a single regression), we allow for age- and sex-specific
TTD effects on domiciliary LTC expenditures. Year dum-
mies are included and the regressions are weighted by the
square root of each municipality’s average 65+ population.
The unit of observation is a Swedish municipality for the
period 1998-2008. Standard errors are clustered at the mu-
nicipality level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.A6: Changes in cost increase per 65+ life year
4LTCit =
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2.A7 Total cost increase per capita associated with an increase in life
expectancy of one year (various scenarios based on sex-specific
estimates)
2.A8 Total cost increase per capita and per life year associated with an
increase in life expectancy of one year (various scenarios based on
sex-specific estimates)
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Chapter 3
The Ability to Memorise and
Participation in the English Bowel
Cancer Screening Programme
3.1 Introduction
Classical economic theory suggests that a rational individual will maximise their ex-
pected utility and base their decisions on the expected outcomes in different scenarios.
In a situation governed by standard economic assumptions, where an individual is
fully informed and can use this information in a decision making process without
further restrictions, such an analysis is perfectly reasonable. However, individu-
als often face restrictions in the transmission of information when making decisions
(Kahneman, 2003). These restrictions may induce additional costs or prevent an
individual from making proper decisions if pertinent information cannot be fully
used. One example of such a constraint is cognitive ability, which may be a strong
barrier to making economic or health related decisions. This is especially relevant
for the elderly, as cognitive decline has been identified as part of the human life
cycle (Salthouse, 2009), potentially distorting corresponding health decisions in the
elderly.
Many European countries have begun to involve patients in the medical decision
making process by implementing preventive cancer screening programmes – mostly
focused on breast cancer – which may help contain costs and reduce healthcare ex-
penditures (Maciosek et al., 2006) in times of substantial fiscal burden. The UK
programme for breast cancer screening is very successful and has been thoroughly
evaluated (e.g. Marmot et al., 2013). However, there is little evidence about partic-
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ipation in the bowel cancer screening programme launched 2006 in England. The
gerontological literature suggests that a decline in cognitive abilities is a general phe-
nomenon throughout the life cycle, especially in the elderly population (Salthouse,
2009). As the target population of the bowel cancer programme is individuals aged
60+, we investigate whether memorisation ability is a determinant of an individual’s
bowel cancer screening decision. The main contribution of this chapter is our as-
sessment of the link between memorisation ability and bowel cancer screening from
a causal perspective by mitigating common identification problems such as reverse
causality and omitted variable bias. We use longitudinal data from the ELSA project,
a national representative survey from England, which has the advantage that we can
use objective information about cognitive skills based on respondents’ performance
on specific tasks. We use individual changes in the ability to memorise informa-
tion over time as our treatment to estimate the impact of declining memory on the
likelihood of participating in a public bowel cancer screening programme. Our iden-
tification strategy is based on covariate adjustment by applying linear probability
models, propensity score matching and a double robust estimator. We find that a
decline in memorisation ability is negatively related to an individual’s participation
in bowel cancer screening.
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section provides a litera-
ture overview that discusses existing evidence from an economic and psychologi-
cal/medical perspective. We then provide an overview of the NHS bowel cancer
programme, followed by a description of our identification strategy and the data.
After presenting descriptive statistics and our empirical findings, we discuss our re-
sults, followed by a conclusion that emphasises policy implications and potential
future research.
3.2 Literature
The economics literature is home to a huge debate about factors that explain so-called
‘healthy behaviours’. Cutler and Glaeser (2005) highlight the huge uncertainty sur-
rounding possible mechanisms, as both levels and differences in health behaviours
such as smoking or preventive activity are not very strongly correlated. There is some
economic evidence for cognition and health behaviour which emphasises the impor-
tance of education and complex health decisions due to quicker adoption of new
technologies (Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2008) or higher intellectual curiosity (Cutler
and Lleras-Muney, 2010). However, despite a consensus about the empirical asso-
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ciation between education and health, the causal pathways are difficult to discern,
due to the problem of reverse causality. Many empirical studies focus on the impact
of schooling on health outcomes (Eide and Showalter, 2011) and many distinguish
between direct and indirect effects of education. Lange (2011), for example, analyses
the role of information in the impact of education on breast cancer screening using
data from the US. Mocan and Altindag (2014) also use US data to identify the role
of education in health production. However, as the empirical evidence from these
studies is inconclusive, it is natural to directly assess the impact of cognitive abilities
on health behaviours such as preventive healthcare activities.
Although there is evidence for the direct association between cognitive abilities
and health outcomes later in life (Kaestner, 2009), economic literature on the rela-
tionship between cognitive abilities and preventive medical activities remains scarce.
Avitabile et al. (2011) assess the extent to which education and cognitive abilities
such as cognitive fluency and numeracy complement or supplement health promo-
tion programmes in European countries.Wu¨bker (2012, 2014) uses verbal fluency as a
proxy for cognition and analyses its impact on mammography take-up across Europe.
Wu¨bker (2012) also uses the ability to memorise (among other variables) as a driver
of an individual’s decision to participate in mammography screening. Here, memory
is not found to be relevant across the estimated specifications. This is surprising,
because the psychological literature emphasises the potential role of memorisation
on medical decision making, as discussed in the following.
The role of cognitive abilities in health behaviours is discussed in more depth in
the psychological and epidemiological literature. One major branch of this literature
emphasises medication adherence. Hayes et al. (2009) find that people with a rel-
atively high cognitive function take their medication more regularly than a control
group. The authors use both a very general measure for cognition and a measure for
the ability to memorise. Insel et al. (2013) emphasise the role of working memory and
executive function to evaluate whether anchoring strategies can improve medication
adherence in the elderly. The results of their study are not yet available.
A relatively large research area in the psychological literature focuses on the im-
portance of health literacy, which also involves cognitive processing. A recent review
by Oldach and Katz (2014) reveals mixed results in the association between health
literacy and cancer screening participation. Recent medical evidence on colorectal
cancer screening in England (Kobayashi et al., 2014) suggests that health literacy
may be a driver of cancer screening participation in the elderly. One drawback of
this study is that the findings merely represent statistical associations, since their
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analysis does not use other important factors such as measures for cognitive abili-
ties. Recent evidence suggests that the ability to memorise is an important driver
of health literacy itself (Wilson et al., 2010), potentially explaining why some older
people participated in the NHS bowel cancer programme while others did not.
The lack of evidence for the relationship between memorisation ability and cancer
screening is evident in England, where the bowel cancer programme targets people
aged between 60 and 70 years (currently until age 75). It is well established that
memorisation ability declines with age, and can even accelerate in old age (Salthouse,
2009), potentially becoming an obstacle to medical decision making. Most existing
studies merely reflect descriptive patterns rather than causal relationships, since it is
not possible for researchers to randomly assign cognitive ability to participants of a
study. We contribute to the literature by applying covariate adjustment methods to
reveal a potential causal relationship between an individual’s memorisation ability
and their participation in the English colorectal cancer screening programme.
3.3 The English Bowel Cancer Programme and
Memorisation Ability
There are two steps to the screening process. First, an invitation letter is sent to
eligible candidates, men and women aged 60 to 70. It contains information about the
benefits of screening. A week later, respondents are sent a cancer screening kit, which
instructs them to collect samples and return them for laboratory testing1. There are
several reasons why cognitive distortions may affect participation in screening. First,
the costs and benefits outlined on the information leaflet must be understood and
memorised to proceed to the second step. If a respondent does not fully remember
the contents of the information leaflet, they are less likely to participate in the actual
screening. Second, a decline in cognition can make participating in cancer screening
more costly, as decisions cannot be implemented as efficiently as before, e.g., more
time and effort is required to carry out everyday decisions.
1Further details on the programme procedures can be found at:
http://www.cancerscreening.nhs.uk/bowel/index.html
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3.4 Analysis
3.4.1 Empirical Approach
We use the (negative) change in someone’s ability to memorise between two waves
as our treatment because we assume that an analysis based on levels is more likely
to be confounded by other factors (cf. Frey, 1990). More specifically, we choose the
difference T = Mit−1−Mit as our treatment, where t is a survey wave indicator and
M represents an individual’s level of memory. A similar strategy is used by Decker
and Schmitz (2015), who analyse the impact of an individual health shock on risk
preferences. We assume that, given characteristics X, a decline in memorisation
ability, T , is exogenous in the short run of the potential outcomes Y1 and Y0, which
represent participation in the bowel cancer programme when being ‘treated’ and ‘not
treated’, respectively. More formally, we assume Y1, Y0 ⊥ T |X. Although we use the
panel structure of our data to model the causal relationship between our variables
using data from several waves, our estimates rely solely on cross-sectional variation.
More detailed information about the estimated specifications can be found in the
next section.
We begin by assessing the impact of a change in memorisation ability on future
screening participation by applying a linear probability model (LPM). We provide
both a bivariate regression and a specification where other variables (from the previ-
ous period) such as lagged health information and sociodemographic characteristics
are included into the regression model, mainly to increase the precision of our esti-
mates but also to control for potential confounders. One important missing factor
may be unobserved preferences that determine an individual’s decisions, leading to
changes in both memorisation ability and screening behaviour. To mitigate the
potential problem that such preferences (if not already captured by the observable
health information) are correlated with both changes in cognition and an individual’s
decision to participate in cancer screening, we control for further observable char-
acteristics which we interpret as indicators of ‘healthy behaviour’, social activities
and other characteristics.2 The corresponding estimates are based on the following
equation:
yi = β0 + β1Ti +X
′
β + i (3.1)
Second, we apply propensity score matching by explicitly modelling the treatment
2A more detailed discussion of the variables used is provided below.
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‘decline in memorisation ability’ and then calculating the treatment effect using an
individual’s probability of ‘being treated’. To model the treatment decision, we
estimate a logit model where 1(T > 0) (i.e., a variable that takes a value of 1 if there
is a measurable decline and zero otherwise) serves as our dependent variable.
The matching estimator has the advantage that it reduces the potential problem
of insufficient common support while introducing relatively few parametric assump-
tions (Lechner, 2009).
Third, we apply a double robust estimator (Robins et al., 1995), a weighted re-
gression approach that allows us to deconfound both the outcome and treatment
equations and provides unbiased estimates even if one of both equations is wrongly
specified. Following Morgan and Todd (2008), we assign a weight of 1 to all treated
observations and a weight of pˆi
1−pˆi to the control units to estimate the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT). The estimated probabilities, pˆi, are used to turn
the control group into a sample that is representative of the treatment group.
3.4.2 Data and Specification
To capture the impact of a decline in memorisation ability on participation in colorec-
tal cancer screening in England, we use information from the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th
wave of the ELSA English household survey, which were conducted between 2006 and
2013. There is a gap of around two years between the interview dates. We restrict
the analysis to individuals who participated in all four ELSA waves. This data source
strongly complements our research question, as it is representative for the population
aged 50+ and contains important health-related information. One main variable of
interest captures a change in memorisation ability. ELSA respondents participated
in several tests to measure their performance in different areas of cognitive ability.
Several ELSA waves contained tests on memorising information. We aggregate infor-
mation from three tasks to derive a summary measure of respondents’ memorisation
ability. The first two tasks measure respondents’ ability to memorise a list of 10
words (directly for the first task, and after some delay for the second). The third
task measures respondents’ ability to memorise the components of the current date.
The aggregated variable used in our analysis varies between 0 and 24 points. Other
research has shown that aggregated variables representing cognitive abilities derived
from ELSA can be used very effectively in longitudinal comparisons (Steel et al.,
2004). When applying the LPM, we chose the decline in cognitive abilities between
waves three and four for our treatment variable. We chose this timeframe because
our outcome variable is only observable after this point. To create the propensity
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scores used in our matching approach and the double robust estimator, we use this
difference to create a dummy representing the binary treatment, as discussed in the
previous section.
Our dependent variable captures the decision to use a bowel screening kit. This
variable is available in and derived from ELSA waves 5 and 6. During these two
waves, individuals were asked whether they had participated in the cancer screening
programme and how recently they last participated. As we want to correctly model
the decision making process over time with our empirical specification (to rule out
reverse causality), we assigned the fourth wave as the point when our artificial treat-
ment occurs. Our dependent variable has a value of 1 if the respondent participated
in screening after the wave 4 interview and 0 otherwise3. To ensure a clean control
group, we exclude all individuals who participated in bowel cancer screening before
the interview date during wave 4. This information is retrospectively provided from
wave 5 onwards. The sample is restricted to people aged 60 to 67, because we know
this group is eligible for screening and was invited via information leaflets. As we
evaluate the probability of screening within a time range of 4 years after the year of
treatment, this age range guarantees that all individuals in our sample were actually
invited for screening during the 4 years after treatment. Hence, we rule out the
possibility that our results are affected by heterogeneity (in information) due to the
fact that older individuals were no longer invited for screening.
We include control variables in our empirical specifications to account for po-
tential confounders which may be associated with both a decline in memorisation
ability and participation in cancer screening. The time-variant control variables are
taken from wave 3 to prevent them being affected by our treatment variable, which
would bias our estimate. Figure 3.1 shows the timeframe we use for our identification
strategy.
time
wave 3 wave 4 wave 5 wave 6
X T Y
Figure 3.1 Definition of outcome, treatment and control variables within
the chosen timeframe
Table 3.1 shows all the variables used in our analysis. The most important control
3Due to a substantial number of missing values for colorectal cancer screening in wave 5, we are
unfortunately unable to distinguish between short- and long-term effects
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variables represent an individual’s health status, captured by self-assessed health
(where 1 indicates bad/very bad health and 4 very good health), six disease-specific
illness categories and problems with everyday activities. Of the six illness variables,
the most important is ‘ill5’, which captures mental disorders such as dementia or
Alzheimer’s. In addition, ex ante differences in activities of daily living (ADL) are of
special interest to our analysis, as the programme targets older people and problems
with ADL usually increase with age (Gremeaux et al., 2012).
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Total mean Min Max Mean (T=1) Mean (T=0)
screening 0.814 0 1 0.795 0.829
memory decl 0.137 -14 11 2.863 -2.032
memory 15.411 4 24 16.755 14.342
educ low 0.190 0 1 0.175 0.202
educ mid 0.584 0 1 0.586 0.582
educ high 0.226 0 1 0.240 0.216
wealth 382.012 -42.051 20818.01 345.154 411.337
adl 0.190 0 1 0.188 0.192
health 1 0.052 0 1 0.049 0.054
health 2 0.207 0 1 0.198 0.215
health 3 0.461 0 1 0.470 0.454
health 4 0.280 0 1 0.283 0.278
ill1 0.506 0 1 0.494 0.517
ill2 0.166 0 1 0.163 0.169
ill3 0.396 0 1 0.400 0.393
ill4 0.072 0 1 0.069 0.075
ill5 0.159 0 1 0.157 0.160
ill6 0.130 0 1 0.136 0.126
female 0.547 0 1 0.525 0.565
age 63.118 60 67 63.247 63.016
black 0.015 0 1 0.017 0.013
couple 0.789 0 1 0.792 0.786
smoker 0.143 0 1 0.147 0.139
smoke past 0.481 0 1 0.501 0.466
organisation 0.465 0 1 0.475 0.457
phys act2 0.166 0 1 0.152 0.177
phys act3 0.559 0 1 0.584 0.538
phys act4 0.254 0 1 0.242 0.263
life exp 49.256 0 100 49.208 49.295
N 1564 693 871
Our analysis also uses participants’ self-assessed probability of living to 85 to
capture heterogeneity not already captured by the other controls for health. This
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variable may also capture some heterogeneous preferences for health consumption
in the spirit of Fang et al. (2007). Another control variable is the baseline ability
to memorise, because any change in cognitive abilities may also depend on initial
levels. Inclination towards healthy behaviour and social activities are captured by
an individual’s smoking status, smoking history and whether the individual is active
in more than one organisation. In addition, we allow for differences in physical
activity levels. Other common sociodemographic characteristics such as sex, age,
education and household wealth are also accounted for.
Comparing the last two columns in Table 3.1 (representing our binary treatment)
show that most variables are very similar across the treatment and control group.
The share of women is slightly lower in the treatment than in the control group (53
compared to 57 %). The share of former smokers is also higher in the treatment
than in the control group. Substantial differences were found in baseline ability to
memorise, where the treatment group was able to answer an average of around two
additional questions correctly compared to the control group. Average (financial)
wealth was lower in the treatment group than the control group. There was also
some heterogeneity in physical activity levels between both groups.
3.4.3 Findings
The results in Table 3.2 show the estimates for the LPM. We see that a reduction in
memorisation ability is a negative predictor of future screening participation (Column
1). Reducing the test score by one point (over time) decreases participation by around
1 %. This finding is strongly statistically significant. If other covariates are included,
the effect is slightly higher (Column 2). The signs of most covariates are in line with
our expectations, although not all are significant. Being female, lagged memorisation
ability, wealth, general health status, being in a relationship and being a member
of organisations are all positively associated with screening behaviour. The dummy
for high education has a negative point estimate, which may initially seem odd, but
both its economic and statistical relevance are very low. Smoking behaviour, also
an indicator of unobserved preferences for healthy living, is negatively related to
screening participation. As expected, level of physical activity correlates positively
with bowel cancer screening.
We now use our matching estimates4 to evaluate our artificial binary treatment.
The main difference from the regression-based approach – which assumed all poten-
4We use the statistics package psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2014).
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Table 3.2 Impact of a cognitive decline on screening (OLS)
Specification 1 Specification 2
Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
memory decl -0.009*** (-2.82) -0.012*** (-3.41)
memory 0.007* (1.82)
educ mid 0.021 (0.78)
educ high -0.019 (-0.56)
wealth 0.0000272** (2.29)
adl 0.037 (1.28)
health 2 0.181*** (3.18)
health 3 0.181*** (3.17)
health 4 0.155** (2.57)
ill1 -0.033* (-1.72)
ill2 -0.010 (-0.35)
ill3 -0.010 (-0.49)
ill4 -0.069* (-1.84)
ill5 0.013 (0.46)
ill6 0.012 (0.42)
female 0.051** (2.50)
black 0.000 (0.00)
couple 0.053** (2.01)
smoke -0.157*** (-4.43)
smoke past -0.006 (-0.31)
phys act2 0.214** (2.47)
phys act3 0.213** (2.50)
phys act4 0.227*** (2.61)
organisation 0.058*** (2.84)
life exp 0.000 (0.41)
cons 0.815*** (79.60) 0.273** (2.34)
N 1564 1564
adj.R2 0.01 0.07
Notes: Age fixed effects included in specification 2. Standard errors
are clustered at the household level. t-statistics (in parentheses) *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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tial confounders in the outcome equation were considered – is the need to include
all potential confounders related to the ‘treatment assignment’. For the matching
algorithm, we employ radius matching with a calliper of 0.01 and excluded 14 ob-
servations from the matching procedure due to insufficient overlap at the right hand
tail of the distributions of the propensity scores between the treatment and control
group. Applying the PS-matching estimator again shows a strong negative impact
of reduced memorisation ability on screening participation (Treatment effect: -0.052;
t-stat: -2.04). In a logit regression, where all variables are considered to estimate the
propensity score5, wealth and being female are negatively associated with a decline
in cognitive abilities, whereas smoking has a positive impact. We also find a positive
impact of lagged memory as expected, since very high values before our treatment
year will have a tendency to swing back towards the population mean (Yudkin and
Stratton, 1996). In addition, conditioning on the ‘lagged treatment’ captures baseline
differences in memorisation ability between the treatment and control group.
In applying the double robust estimator, a weighted regression which combines
the covariate adjustment strategies from pure linear regression and propensity score
matching, we follow Crump et al. (2009) and drop observations from our analysis
that have estimated propensity scores < 0.1 or > 0.9, to compensate for insufficient
overlap. These estimates also suggest a causal effect between decline in memorisa-
tion ability and future screening (Treatment effect: -0.045; t-stat: -2.03). Although
slightly smaller than the estimate from propensity score matching, we conclude from
this result that the estimated effect is robust to misspecification, assuming that one
model is correctly specified.
To shed some light on how reduced memorisation ability can affect screening par-
ticipation, we further utilise the fact that our measure for memorisation is based on
different tasks respondents had to perform during the interview. Hence, we sepa-
rately estimate the impact of decreased performance in each of these tasks on future
bowel cancer participation.
The resulting estimates, provided in Table 3.3, show the ability to memorise
with some delay is particularly important in the context of the decision to undergo
colorectal cancer screening, while the ability to remember components of the date is
the least important. This suggests that the main trigger is the capacity to memorise
and numerical skills, which are another important dimension of cognitive ability, are
less important. We are not able to assess this issue in more detail, as the information
on numeracy was not provided in the ELSE waves we are interested in.
5See Appendix 3.A1.
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Table 3.3 Treatment heterogeneity
Treatment Coef z-stat N
decline total -0.045 (-2.03) 1466
decline date -0.038 (-1.08) 1032
decline words -0.019 (-0.83) 1489
decline delay -0.042 (-1.96) 1498
Notes: Outcomes for the double robust estima-
tor. Observations with propensity scores below
0.1 and above 0.9 are excluded. The resulting co-
efficients show the treatment effects when using
a decline in different aspects of memorisation as
the treatment. Standard errors are clustered at
the household level. All control variables are ac-
counted for in underlying estimates.
Although our findings are closely related to the literature on medication adher-
ence, the relationship between an individual’s memory and the ability to use medi-
cation on a regular basis is quite different from participation in a cancer screening
programme. Whereas in the former case the decision about willingness to take a spe-
cific drug is already made, memory may have an additional impact on this decision in
the latter case. This may happen if an individual cannot memorise the information
about the programme between the time they receive information about it and later
receipt or use of the screening kit. Evaluating the specific mechanism which leads to
a reduction in screening participation is an important question for future research.
Our results show the negative impact of a decrease in memorisation ability on
participating in the programme for bowel cancer screening. This shows the impor-
tance of considering specific characteristics of a programme’s target population when
designing health economic policies in order to more effectively increase public health
or decrease healthcare expenditures.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the causal impact of the ability to memorise information on
participation in a national bowel cancer screening programme in England. After
discussing existing evidence on this research question from different scientific fields,
we introduced our empirical strategy and the data. Our main contribution is that we
used four waves from the ELSA survey, a national representative data for the English
elderly population, reducing common problems such as omitted variable bias and
reverse causality. We provided robust evidence about the suggested relationship and
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implemented regression, propensity score matching and double robust techniques in
our empirical strategy. When distinguishing between different dimensions of memory,
we find evidence that the estimated effect is driven to a large extent by the ability
to memorise information with some delay.
Our findings are related to research into medication adherence, which has found
wider consideration in the medical and psychological literature (e.g. Hayes et al.,
2009; Insel et al., 2013). Studies have shown that the ability to memorise is a
fundamental issue in the successful treatment of several illnesses via medication. Our
findings contribute to this, as we show that memorisation ability can also affect health
via the channel of preventive medical behaviour. This suggests that heterogeneity in
mental ability along further dimensions of a target population must be considered
when optimising the planning and supply of healthcare provision. Another finding
is that the main driver relating an individual’s memorisation ability with preventive
activities is based on the ability to memorise with some delay (as compared to time
orientation or direct recall). One explanation for this is that the ability to memorise
over a longer period can be a fundamental layer of further dimensions of cognitive
functioning, as suggested by Serper et al. (2014).
Our findings have strong policy relevance, as the target group for the screening
programme consists of people aged 60 to 70, and it is well known that a higher de-
crease in cognitive functioning can be expected during later life (Salthouse, 2009).
Due to the demographic changes which have successively increased the share of el-
derly people in many developed countries, specific characteristics of this older popula-
tion should be considered when implementing public (health) programmes. Although
there has been an ongoing discussion about the benefits, costs and the (future) finan-
cial burden of preventive health programmes for society since Fries (1980), specific
characteristics of the target group should obviously be accounted for from a norma-
tive point of view, given the goal of a specific policy. Hence, a receiver adequate
way to provide information is needed, maybe based on the integration of different
healthcare providers.
Although we provide evidence that a decrease in mental ability is a general phe-
nomenon in the context of bowel cancer screening for the elderly and not driven by
specific diseases, we cannot fully identify the point in the data generating process
at which the decrease in memorisation ability determines screening behaviour. This
would be a fruitful topic for future research. In addition, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that further unobserved factors that cannot be controlled for in our analysis
are confounding our estimates. From both a theoretical and applied perspective, it
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is also important to determine how to provide sufficient information to a policy pro-
gramme’s target group to simultaneously mitigate potential (cognitive) constraints
among decision makers while still allowing individuals to make individual choices.
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Appendix Chapter 3
3.A1 Impact of characteristics on decline in memorisation ability (Logit)
Variables Effect z-stat
memory 0.085*** (15.64)
educ mid -0.057 (-1.52)
educ high -0.119** (-2.55)
wealth -0.000*** (-2.73)
adl 0.047 (1.16)
health 2 -0.038 (-0.56)
health 3 -0.038 (-0.55)
health 4 -0.061 (-0.83)
ill1 -0.022 (-0.79)
ill2 -0.040 (-1.06)
ill3 0.020 (0.68)
ill4 -0.059 (-1.13)
ill5 -0.010 (-0.27)
ill6 0.007 (0.17)
female -0.112*** (-3.77)
black 0.176 (1.51)
couple 0.010 (0.28)
smoker 0.089** (2.03)
smoke past 0.054* (1.79)
organisation -0.017 (-0.58)
phys act2 -0.075 (-0.78)
phys act3 -0.033 (-0.35)
phys act4 -0.075 (-0.77)
life exp -0.000 (-0.58)
N 1564
pseudoR2 0.152
Notes: Average marginal effects (in-
cluding age fixed effects), robust stan-
dard errors, z-statistics (in parentheses)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 4
Heterogeneous Parameters and
Detecting Selection Based on
‘Unused Characteristics’ in Private
Health Insurance Markets1
4.1 Introduction
In addition to access to the National Health Service (NHS), around 11 % of the
UK population have either private health cover for specific conditions (such as can-
cer), or broader coverage which includes complementary therapies and diagnostic
tests (Cylus et al., 2015). There are several possible explanations for people’s dif-
ferent private insurance requirements, based on the supply and demand sides of the
insurance market. One common explanation is that risk preferences, or an individ-
ual’s degree of risk aversion, influence the probability that an individual will buy
insurance. Another explanation asserts that insurance companies do not take into
account risk heterogeneity when calculating premiums, but customers take this into
account when deciding whether to buy insurance. However, the converse may also
be true: insurance companies use some risk-related customer characteristics to lower
their exposure to high risk policyholders. During the last decade, a great deal of
literature has emerged which attempts to identify the specific origins of selection
and information asymmetries (IAs) in insurance markets (e.g., Finkelstein and Mc-
Garry, 2006; Fang et al., 2008). However, evaluating these issues is still an important
1This study is based on joint work with Martin Karlsson and Ben Rickayzen. See Karlsson et al.
(2012) for a very early draft of our research.
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topic in economic research, and little research has been done in this area before now,
particularly in relation to UK data.
And individual’s level of health directly affects their expected contribution to the
economy, their happiness and their ability to participate within society at large. Pro-
viding healthcare for an entire population is becoming increasingly expensive, in part
due to technical advances in treatments but also due to demographic change (i.e., an
ageing population). In the face of restricted public budgets, private health insurance
that partly or fully takes on coverage is a potential remedy (e.g., Arentz et al., 2012;
Leidl, 2008). Since the seminal works by Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) on market efficiency in insurance markets, there has been a preponderance
of theoretical and empirical research into selection based on IAs. However, how to
accurately and adequately measure IAs and their consequences remains unexplored.
This is a very important area of research, since it directly affects the funding of a
country’s health and welfare system. A specific branch of the literature (Finkelstein
and McGarry, 2006; Fang et al., 2008) concerns the indirect detection of IAs by har-
nessing ‘unused characteristics’, i.e., variables that insurance companies do not use
to calculate risk premiums, but which are still available as observations for empirical
analysis.
The aims of this chapter are threefold. The main contribution of this study is a
technical one, and we first formally demonstrate that standard ‘unused characteris-
tics’ approaches which allow the detection of IAs based on specific characteristics can
lead to erroneous conclusions. This is the case if the parameter of a potential source
of IA in a framework with two equations differs from an individual’s risk/insurance
status, i.e., whether the estimated coefficient of interest is driven by different parts
of the population. Second, we create artificial data to emphasise this issue under
different assumptions about the underlying data generating process that causes a se-
lection effect in the insurance market. Third, taking this phenomenon into account,
we provide empirical evidence of selection in the market for private health insurance
using data for the English population over age 50.
We begin by describing the institutional background to the current healthcare
system in England. We then provide a literature overview, with an emphasis on
several commonly used tests to identify IAs. Following this, we show formally and by
simulation that, under specific circumstances, tests based on two equations that try to
detect IAs with ‘unused characteristics’ can be misleading. The empirical section of
this chapter provides evidence by applying such tests, and also allowing for individual
parameter heterogeneity by using a multilevel model. Our empirical analysis is based
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on the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA), an individual-level dataset
representative of the English population over age 50. ELSA has both a cross-sectional
and longitudinal dimension. After discussing our findings, we draw conclusions and
make suggestions for future research in this field.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations
4.2.1 Institutional Background
The population of England is entitled to free healthcare, provided by the National
Health Service (NHS) through primary care (general practice) and secondary care
(hospital-based care given through both NHS and Foundation Trusts). The guiding
principle of the NHS is to make health services available to every citizen in need.2
However, in practice, there are a number of treatments which are not available within
the system. Most of these are excluded because they are viewed as being non-
essential, but some are excluded for financial reasons.3 In addition to the public
provision of healthcare via the NHS, individuals can choose to top up their provision
by purchasing private health insurance (PHI). This can be done on an individual basis
or as part of a benefits package offered by employers.(Boyle, 2011) Private insurance
covers services which duplicate those provided under the NHS (Kiil, 2012), but also
provides cover for enhanced services such as faster access and wider choice. Insurers
can freely determine the services they offer, but most packages cover surgery as
an inpatient or day case, hospital accommodation, nursing care and inpatient tests.
Since there is no regulation on products or pricing (Boyle, 2011), we can assume that
the market for (voluntary) PHI in England is competitive. Although a competitive
market should result in an actuarially fair risk premium due to the possibility of
consumers switching between different contracts, we cannot draw any conclusions
about the efficiency of this market, i.e., selection effects due to IAs which are not
accounted for in the risk premium.
4.2.2 Detecting Information Asymmetries
Empirical evidence for the existence of IAs is mixed. Cohen and Siegelman (2010)
provide a metastudy on testing for adverse selection in a wide range of insurance
markets. They focus on the positive correlation approach and find a correlation
2http://www.nhshistory.net/a guide to the nhs.htm
3http://www.londonhealth.co.uk/nhs/index.html
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between risk and insurance in some studies but not others. For example, evidence
in health insurance markets appears strongly heterogeneous. Looking at studies
which focus on the US market, they find evidence for both the existence of IAs and
market efficiency. They also assert that it is necessary to distinguish between different
kinds of IA. They conclude that it might be useful to evaluate the circumstances
under which adverse selection does or does not arise. This perspective is particularly
relevant from a policy perspective, given that we would like to be able to predict
efficiency changes based on initial market conditions in the face of any institutional
changes. In their work, Cohen and Siegelman (2010) mainly focus on an approach
to detecting IA, developed by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997), which is usually called
the ‘positive correlation test’. This test is still widely used today, despite ongoing
developments in the field. The main thrust of the test is to jointly estimate two
separate equations. The first captures the probability of buying an insurance contract
given the information about an individual which an insurance company will use to
calculate the risk premium. The second measures the correlation between these
variables and the probability of the insurer making a loss on the contract. The
error term in both equations covers all the information about both events which is
not used for pricing purposes. If risk and insurance coverage are correlated, this
is usually interpreted as indicating that a self-selection process is occurring based
on unused variables. Hence, it is useful to estimate the correlation between both
equations’ error terms. This approach is often called the ‘positive correlation test’.
Formally, this approach can be described by the following equations, where I is an
indicator of insurance status and R is an indicator of being at risk, while X is a
matrix containing the variables used by the insurance company to calculate the risk
premium:
I = Xφ+  (4.1)
and
R = Xψ + η (4.2)
Subsequent literature assesses the problem of multiple dimensions of private in-
formation in the context of detecting IA, which is also a focus of this chapter. As
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) (FMG) argue, the correlation between error terms
in the ‘Chiappori approach’ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the
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existence of IAs. The authors suggest that misleading results may arise if several
characteristics have an impact on both dependent variables (some negatively, some
positively) and effects cancel out on average. For example, in addition to an in-
dividual’s class of risk, heterogeneity in consumer risk preferences might offset the
correlation between the two equations’ error terms. The authors assert that if an
econometrician can identify such relevant information, and this information is not
used by the insurer for pricing, then including this variable as an additional ex-
planatory variable into equations (4.1) and (4.2) will make it possible to detect and
separate out this kind of self-selection, despite the second relevant variable having an
offsetting effect. This approach, which we call the ‘unused characteristics’ approach,
is based on the following equations:
I = Xφ+ Zδ +  (4.3)
and
R = Xψ + Zβ + η. (4.4)
where Z represents a matrix containing additional information about the insured
but which is not used for pricing. The condition for recognising IAs is that any
new variable included in the model affects the probability of both getting insurance
and ‘being at risk’. In their study, Finkelstein and McGarry use information that is
assumed to be unknown to the insurer in the market for long term care (LTC) in the
US.
The unused characteristics approach described above can also be useful if we are
interested in selection in terms of pricing, without using ‘unobserved’ information.
In contrast to the case mentioned above, Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) focus on
a scenario where insurance companies observe, or could observe, relevant customer
characteristics, but do not use this information when calculating their risk premium.
Analysing the UK annuity market, they show that annuity purchases and the an-
nuitant’s mortality are regionally correlated. Assuming that regional information is
not used to calculate the risk premium, this is interpreted as an indicator of ad-
verse selection. Finkelstein and Poterba’s results raise the question of why insurance
companies do not tend to use this kind of information.
Cutler et al. (2008) look for selection within several insurance markets in the
US, based on data from the Health and Retirement Study. They also use a dual-
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equation model with insurance status and risk occurrence as dependent variables.
While conditioning on variables used for insurance pricing, they also include some
behavioural variables which are used to measure heterogeneity in risk preference (e.g.,
seatbelt usage, preventative activities) and individual risk behaviour (e.g., alcohol
consumption), which are probably not available to an insurance company. Their
findings suggest advantageous selection in the market for life and LTC insurance,
but adverse selection for annuities.
Fang et al. (2008) (FKS) develop a similar approach that tries to reveal unused
characteristics that drive selection in insurance markets. Assuming unused infor-
mation is already partialled out, their approach is based on the regression model:
I = α1 + α2R + νi (4.5)
followed by a regression which includes an unobserved variable, z:
I = γ1 + γ2R + γ3z + µi. (4.6)
It can be shown that the regression based on (4.5) will result after applying the
expectation operator into E(αˆ2) = γ2 + γ3θ32, where θ is based on the auxiliary
regression R = θ+ θ32z+λi. The detection of IAs is based on the difference between
the estimates for α2 and γ2. Hence, the detected IAs induced by z are defined as
E(αˆ2) − E(γˆ2) = E(γ2) + E(γ3θ32) − E(γ2) = E(γ3θ32). For advantageous selection,
this difference will be negative, i.e., (γ2 > α2) if γ3 < 0 and z is partially positively
correlated with R. Unlike the approach suggested by FMG, the evidence is not
directly based on comparing two different outcomes for z, but on a single coefficient
and the partial correlation between z and R.
Both approaches are applied in the literature. For example, Cutler et al. (2008)
apply the FMG approach and look for IAs within several insurance markets in the
US, based on data from the Health and Retirement Study. Bolhaar et al. (2012) also
implement the FMG framework to assess multidimensional asymmetric information
in Ireland, whereas the approach developed by FKS is applied by Buchmueller et al.
(2013), who analyse advantageous selection using Australian data.
There is little evidence on selection in the market for PHI in England. Prop-
per et al. (2001) analyse the dynamics in the demand for PHI between 1978 and
1996 in the UK, using the Family Expenditure Survey. Controlling for consumer
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characteristics and health service quality measures, they find that the availability
of private healthcare facilities and cohort effects, which might indicate changes in
tastes/attitude to PHI, are important factors in deciding whether to purchase PHI.
Wallis (2004) also looks for the determinants of demand for PHI in the UK, based
on data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The author evaluates
individuals’ switching behaviours and focuses on characteristics which influence the
probability of purchasing insurance and those which influence the individual cost of
PHI (i.e., the risk premium). The study differentiates between consumer demand-
side characteristics and supply-side factors that can influence insurance status, e.g.,
quality of service.
Another study using BHPS data was carried out by Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez
(2013), who focused on adverse selection in the market for PHI, using hospitalisa-
tion as a measure for being at risk. Assuming that an individual’s health status is
independent of receiving PHI as a fringe employment benefit, their results suggest
the existence of adverse selection in the PHI market in England.
Until now, there has been no empirical investigation into whether specific sources
of selection exist in the English PHI market.
4.2.3 Using Unused Variables
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) argue that the standard positive correlation test
suggested by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997) will fail if there is more than one charac-
teristic that is not used for pricing purposes but which affects insurance status and
risk of loss to the insurance company. These characteristics can offset the correlation
between the equations’ error terms.
The advantage of an unused characteristics approach is that it allows the iden-
tification of specific characteristics which can, from a theoretical perspective, be
assumed to be a source of IAs, even if the positive correlation test does not reveal
as much. It is perfectly reasonable to interpret the coefficients in these models if
we have an underlying theory as to why these characteristics should be correlated
with both insurance and health status. Thus the suggested approach is very helpful
when we want to assess whether a specific characteristic is a source of IA in a set-
ting with multidimensional private information. However, we do not know how this
approach performs if we allow for another source of heterogeneity. More precisely, it
is not clear how evidence based on this approach changes if we allow the outcomes
of an unused characteristic to be heterogeneous across the risk pool. This is a very
important issue, and parameter heterogeneity has not been discussed so far in this
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context.
The motivation behind this question stems from the fact that conclusions about
selection effects are derived based on the relevance of the variables included in both
equations. This approach can, however, be problematic if we find an additional
variable to be relevant in our framework and we do not have a good a priori theory
about the mechanism which relates this variable to risk and insurance status. This
is the case since a variable might, on average, control for relevant factors which
explain, for example, insurance probability and risk situation, but it is possible that
these estimated coefficients are driven by different parts of the sample. We suggest
that if individuals with a shared characteristic are heterogeneous in outcomes of
this characteristic (i.e., marginal changes in risk and insurance probability due to
an unused variable being negatively or positively related) an unused characteristics
approach can lead to erroneous conclusions.
From this, it follows that an individual’s expected risk from an insurance perspec-
tive, conditioned on certain characteristics (which are not used to calculate the risk
premium), can equal the population’s expectation of risk, even though such char-
acteristics are related to both risk and insurance probability, which would usually
be interpreted as an indicator of IAs. From a policy perspective, this is a crucial
issue for both judging the efficiency of an insurance market and predicting changes
in welfare when planning to implement new policies (e.g., regulation of contracting
health services). To describe this issue formally, we simplify equations (4.3) and (4.4)
without loss of generality, assuming that there is no used ‘observable’ information,
X, included in either equation, allowing for just one ‘unused’ variable, z:
E(I|z) = E(δz + )
and
E(R|z) = E(βz + η)
where estimates βˆ > 0 and δˆ > 0 would usually be interpreted as an indicator
of adverse selection. We now relax the assumption of parameter homogeneity and
assume that every parameter is defined for every individual, i, with the population
means E(βi) = µβ > 0 and E(δi) = µδ > 0. We further assume, for simplification
purposes, that Cov(zi, βi) = 0, Cov(zi, δi) = 0 and Cov(ηi, i) = 0.
Based on this model, we now evaluate the risk position of the sub-population
being insured (δizi + i > 0):
E(Ri|Ii > 0) = E(βizi|δizi > −i)
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Given the population means µβ and E(zi) = µz, this equation can be rewritten as
E(βizi|δizi > −i) =µβµz (4.7)
+ µβ × E(zi − µz|δizi > −i)
+ µz × E(βi − µβ|δizi > −i)
+ E((βi − µβ)(zi − µz)|δizi > −i).
We want to find the circumstances under which E(Ri) ≥ E(Ri|Ii > 0), since this is
when the unused characteristics approach has falsely detected adverse selection. The
first and second terms in decomposition (4.7) are positive based on our assumptions.
Hence, E(βizi|δizi > −i) ≤ E(R) can be true if E(βi − µβ|δizi > −i) < 0 or
E((βi − µβ)(zi − µz)|δizi > −i) < 0. Therefore, we would need Cov(βi, δi) < 0, and
thus E(βi|δizi > −i) < µβ to offset the other terms in the decomposition.
This condition requires the expectation that, for an individual whose βi is smaller
than the population mean, µβ, the individual coefficient, δi, will be higher than the
estimated population mean, µδ, and vice versa.
Clearly our framework requires Cov(βi, δi) > 0 in the case where µβ < 0 and
µδ > 0 (or vice versa), i.e., wrongly detected advantageous selection using the unused
characteristics approach. If the correlation between βi and δi is strong enough, the
suggested direction of selection may even be the opposite of what it should be.
To solve this problem, it is possible to compare insurance and risk status at
the individual level, as done by Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997), by calculating the
correlation between the error terms. As Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) argue, this
approach is not helpful in all contexts, since some correlations can cancel out.
Does the problem of parameter heterogeneity also affects the approach suggested
by Fang et al. (2008)? Remember, this model emphasizes the partial regression
coefficient γIz|R 6= 0 and the difference between γIR|z and the correlation αIR when
detecting IAs. This is very similar to the FMG approach, since both approaches
assume that z is a determinant of both risk and insurance status. However, the
selection in both the FMG and FKS approaches is assumed to be based on constant
coefficients, which by definition do not reflect parameter heterogeneity. Hence, the
above discussion of parameter heterogeneity is also relevant in this context. The
following section provides an empirical comparison between both approaches in terms
of the effect of correlated coefficients.
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4.2.4 Econometric Model
The need to determine parameter heterogeneity at the individual level (δi, βi) imposes
stronger requirements on the data than analysis where both the FKS and FMG
approaches are usually applied. To be able to estimate coefficients for each individual
in the data, we need to add degrees of freedom at the unit level where heterogeneity
occurs. Therefore, we rely on a panel data setting in the following. We are aware
of one other study by (Bolhaar et al., 2012) that identifies unused characteristics in
the context of PHI using panel data. However, while they use dynamic panel data
estimators to distinguish between short- and long-term determinants of selection, we
emphasise the role of different outcomes from the unused characteristics, z.
To derive the following equations, we now assume a longitudinal data structure
with t = 1, .., T periods, where δ and β represent vectors containing our i = 1, .., N
coefficients, δi and βi.
Iit = δ
′
zit +Xφ+ it (4.8)
and
Rit = β
′
zit +Xψ + νit (4.9)
Our analysis is based on estimating the impact of zit on Rit and Iit while jointly
controlling for other observable characteristics which are used to calculate the risk
premium, captured by the matrix X. The coefficients of zit are allowed to be
individual-specific, but we impose the assumptions of parameter constancy on all
other variables in the model, as suggested by standard unused characteristics ap-
proaches. To see whether conclusions based on these approaches can be misleading
due to parameter heterogeneity, we will calculate Corr(βˆi, δˆi).
When assessing the role of heterogeneity in selection into the English health
insurance market we use a linear probability model, which is a simplification of the
framework provided above, since our dependent variables are no longer continuously
defined.
In our comparative analysis, we apply both unused characteristics approaches by
pooling the data to compare their results. In an additional specification, we allow
for individual parameter heterogeneity and estimate equations (4.8) and (4.9) using
multilevel models, where βi and δi are supposed to be determined at the individual
level. We provide an example with a variable that is supposed to induce selection
into the insurance market and test whether the estimates for βi and δi reveal a corre-
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lation structure that suggests a bias in the interpretation of the standard approaches,
i.e., both E(βi)× E(δi) > 0 based on pooled regressions but Corr(βˆi, δˆi) < 0 when ac-
counting for parameter heterogeneity, or E(βi)×E(δi) < 0 but Corr(βˆi, δˆi) > 0. Such
a finding, ignoring the correlation structure between δi and βi, is usually interpreted
as indicating a selection mechanism due to IA. When applying the FKS approach, we
derive the direction and degree of selection based on the difference between the par-
tial correlation between I and R before and after an unused characteristic is included
in the specification. We then run regressions allowing for parameter heterogeneity by
regressing I and R on z using multilevel models, fixing the parameters δ and β at the
individual level. All other variables, X, included in the specifications are assumed to
have a fixed impact on the outcome variables, as usually assumed by unused charac-
teristics approaches. We use the correlation between δˆi and βˆi as a measure to test
whether an offset is occurring in the standard approaches, as described above.
Before analysing the phenomenon of parameter heterogeneity in the context of
selection into English PHI market, we first assess how the approaches discussed so
far perform under different assumptions via simulation.
4.3 Empirical Implementation
4.3.1 Simulations
In order to compare the outcomes for both unused characteristics approaches under
parameter heterogeneity at the individual level, we create artificial data by impos-
ing different assumptions about variables, parameter heterogeneity and the correla-
tion between variables. Panel data with 1,000 cross-sectional observations and five
time-series units is generated with assumptions about E(δi), E(βi) and Corr(βˆi, δˆi).
Assuming that other information, X, used to calculate the risk premium is already
partialled out before estimation, the simulations are based on the following structural
equations:
Iit = δizit + it (4.10)
and
Rit = βizit + ηit (4.11)
where zit, it and ηit are standard normal random variables, whereas δi and βi are
random variables that vary between each of the 100 simulations. The population
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means, standard deviations and degree of correlation between the parameters δi and
βi vary between different scenarios. We use the generated data to run 6 times 100
regressions for each scenario and calculate the correlation between the estimated
random coefficients.
We divide our analysis into four separate blocks, which are further divided into
different sub-scenarios. In our simulations, we assume that IAs are solely driven by
an unused characteristic, z. We also assume that observable characteristics which
are allowed to be used to calculate the risk premium are already partialled out.
Column 1 (see tables in Appendix 4.A1 to 4.A4 of this chapter) shows the degree
of selection within the insurance market. Since, by definition, selection is solely
driven by z, we choose the regression coefficients of I on R (αˆ2) as a measure to
detect IAs. Columns 2 to 4 show further results of the FKS approach, estimating
specifications based on equations (4.5) and (4.6). Columns 5 and 6 show evidence
based on regressions reflecting the results of FMG approach, while columns 7 to 9
show results for the multilevel model with random coefficients for each cross-sectional
unit. We now compare the extent to which both approaches reveal IAs associated
with z.
Scenarios 1a to 1c in Appendix 4.A1 represent the case where both the FMG
and FKS approaches suggest no selection due to z, i.e., E(δi) = E(βi) = 0, but a
positive selection due to Corr(βˆi, δˆi) < 0 (scenario 1a) and a negative selection in
scenario 1c. Although both types of selection are well detected by a regression of I
on R (column 1), the association with z is not detected using either standard unused
characteristics approach. We see that the outcomes in columns 3 to 6 are unaffected
by the joint variation of βi and δi.
To investigate the role of the standard deviation of βi and δi (Appendix 4.A2),
we let it vary between 0.5 (row 2a) and 1.5 (row 2c). Obviously, the higher the stan-
dard deviation of the coefficients, the greater the role of Corr(βˆi, δˆi) in the selection
mechanism. This implies that, given the levels of βi and δi for z, a higher coefficient
variation positively affects selection. Again, neither the FKS nor the FMG approach
detect this kind of selection, since columns 3, 5 and 6 remain stable.
In alternative scenarios (scenarios 3a-3c in Appendix 4.A3), we try to determine
what happens if there is a positive correlation between z and R but a negative
correlation between z and I. Do these associations necessarily induce advantageous
selection? Increasing the association Cov(βˆi, δˆi) from 0 (row 3a) to 0.6 (row 3c) again
reveals that the point estimates of the standard unused characteristics approaches
are very similar across the scenarios, but the issue of parameter heterogeneity is
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completely ignored, i.e., both approaches suggest advantageous selection. This is
also revealed for the FKS approach in column 3, where the difference E(αˆ2)− E(γˆ2)
is found to be negative across all scenarios. Columns 5 and 6 have opposite signs,
which is interpreted as an advantageous selection in the FMG approach. In contrast,
negative selection in the insurance market is revealed by the increasing positive
correlation between the estimated random coefficients (row 3b and 3c in column 9).
Scenarios 4a-4c (Appendix 4.A4) show the implications if there is a positive cor-
relation between both z and R and z and I, i.e., the unused characteristics approach
suggests adverse selection, but Corr(βˆi, δˆi) < 0 suggests offsetting. Adverse selection
is identified under both the FKS (E(αˆ2)−E(γˆ2) > 0) and FMG approaches (positive
estimates in columns 5 and 6), despite decreasing Cov(βˆi, δˆi) from 0 (row 4a) to -0.6
(row 4c), which actually implies advantageous selection in scenarios 4b and 4c. This
advantageous selection is suggested by the negative correlation between our random
coefficients (rows 4b and 4c in column 9).
4.3.2 ELSA Data
Our empirical exploration of this idea is based on ELSA, which is a representative
individual-level dataset for England’s 50+ population. The ELSA dataset contains a
broad range of information on each individual’s health and financial circumstances,
together with overall demographics, which makes it an ideal source to model both
economic decisions and health-related characteristics.
For our analysis we use both the cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions of
the ELSA survey to ensure the period we are using captures the time from 2002 to
2013. For our analysis, we restrict the data to individuals aged 90 or younger, since
we cannot verify the actual age of people over age 90. Due to the longitudinal nature
of our dataset, we only analyse individuals who were eligible for an interview during
all six ELSA waves. In our empirical analysis, we apply the sample weights provided
with the ELSA data that account for attrition and which make the sample we use
representative for the first wave.
We use self-assessed health as the main dependent variable as a measure for
being at risk. Although this information can be subjective, we assume it to be a
reasonable indicator, since it does not only capture observable information (which
we control for in our analysis), but all information that can affect future demand
for healthcare which cannot be accounted for by using only observable and objective
health data. Based on their findings, Idler and Benyamini (1997) argue that a global
health rating “. . . represents an irreplaceable dimension of health status and in fact
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that an individual’s health cannot be assessed without it.” Other studies into IAs,
such as those by Doiron et al. (2008) and Bolin et al. (2010), also use self-assessed
health to capture individual risk. Hence, we assume that self-assessed health is a
suitable measure for our purposes.
ELSA provides the commonly used 5-point self assessed health (SAH) measure,
which we collapse into binary variables that we call ‘high risk’ (HR) and ‘low risk’
(LR) (see descriptive statistics in table 4.14). HR captures having ‘fair’ or ‘poor’
health, while LR captures ‘excellent’, ‘very good’ and ‘good’ health. HR is used
in our analysis to capture information when an individual poses a relatively high
health risk from an insurance company’s perspective. The second main dependent
variable is a dummy variable, PHI, which equals 1 if an individual has private health
insurance and 0 otherwise. We exclude people who only have PHI cover as part of
an employee benefits package offered by their employer. This is because the way in
which such group cover is purchased by employers and the way in which it is priced,
are both very different from the approach adopted for individual policies.
Table 4.1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
privins 0.126 0.332 0 1 31431
HR 0.266 0.442 0 1 31431
time avail 0.774 0.418 0 1 31431
female 0.565 0.496 0 1 31431
age 67.629 8.958 50 89 31431
nwhite 0.015 0.121 0 1 31431
couple 0.690 0.463 0 1 31431
children 0.883 0.322 0 1 31431
educ 0.688 0.463 0 1 31431
working 0.289 0.453 0 1 31431
not work 0.112 0.316 0 1 31431
retired 0.599 0.49 0 1 31431
smoke now 0.129 0.335 0 1 31431
smoke past 0.5 0.5 0 1 31431
ill1 0.431 0.495 0 1 30314
ill2 0.181 0.385 0 1 30314
ill3 0.451 0.498 0 1 30314
ill4 0.092 0.29 0 1 30314
ill5 0.116 0.32 0 1 30314
ill6 0.289 0.453 0 1 30314
4Information about variable definitions can be found in Appendix 4.A5
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As previously mentioned, it is important for our analysis to assume that the
econometric model contains all the relevant information used by an insurance com-
pany to calculate the risk premium. Since the people in our sample have PHI with
different suppliers, we cannot provide a general framework for calculating these pre-
miums. We therefore have to make reasonable assumptions and try to stay as close
to the existing literature as possible. We assume that the following variables are
used by insurance companies: age, sex, smoking (history), employment status (i.e.,
in the labour market, not in the labour market, retired), education (where ‘no qual-
ification’ is the reference group), race, family status (indicator for being married or
cohabiting) and whether an individual has children. We also use dummy variables
for the government office region the respondent is living in. Since we have detailed
information on each individual’s health, we also use indicator variables capturing a
broad range of self-reported illness categories which are available in the data and are
assumed to be used to calculate risk premiums. This is important, since insurers re-
quire applicants to provide detailed information about their past and present health
status (cf. Boyle, 2011).
For the unused characteristics, we take a variable from the literature which is
known to drive selection within the PHI market yet which cannot directly be assessed
by an insurance company and is therefore not available to calculate premiums. From
a health economics perspective, the restrictions on an individual’s time are of great
interest, since the decision to take out PHI in the UK is known to depend on waiting
times for healthcare (e.g., King and Mossialos, 2005; Johar et al., 2013). As the
waiting times in the English healthcare market are usually much shorter for those
with PHI than under the NHS, an individual’s available time and the corresponding
opportunity costs will determine whether they take out PHI or not. If a patient is
willing and able to wait longer for treatment, there is less incentive to opt into the
PHI market.
Hence, we directly utilise self-assessed information on respondents’ available time.
A respondent’s subjective level of available time may reflect low opportunity costs
when facing a relatively long waiting time for healthcare services. As shown above,
this directly decreases demand for PHI. Therefore, we would expect people with a
relatively large amount of available time to take out less insurance. We also expect
that the relationship with an individual’s health risk status will be negative if a
larger amount of available time affects health-related decisions that increase the
decision maker’s health stock, lowering their health risk. However, actual health-
related decisions depend on other factors such as an individual’s preferences or the
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urgency of a specific case. Therefore, we regard the assessment of such a relationship
as mainly an empirical question.
In order to capture a respondent’s level of available time, we use their answer to
the question ‘Do you have enough time to do everything?’ to see whether this factor
drives selection in the PHI market and whether there is individual heterogeneity
in its outcomes. The ELSA survey offers six different responses to this question,
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. To give our resulting estimates
a proper meaning, we collapse ‘agree’ and ‘do not agree’ into one binary variable
that takes a value of 1 if the respondent’s answer to the question reflects agreement
and 0 otherwise. We provide results for three different specifications. In the baseline
specification, we condition on variables that are assumed to be used to calculate the
risk premiums for PHI contracts. We then further use time dummies to rule out
changes over time that may affect our estimates. Finally, we also include variables
capturing diseases from certain health domains.
4.3.3 Results and Discussion
The coefficients from the linear probability model5 based on the FMG approach (see
specification 1 from Table 4.2) show that an individual’s available time is negatively
correlated with that individual’s health risk status (-0.014) and their ownership of
PHI (-0.076)6. Taken together, this would usually be interpreted as adverse selec-
tion (due to z) under FMG. However, as can be seen in column 3 under the FKS
approach, there is a negative correlation between health risk and insurance overall.
This empirical finding is also predicted by Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez (2013), who
discuss the issue of IAs in the UK’s PHI market. However, we are not interested in
the overall degree of IAs, instead focusing on a specific characteristic, z, that may
imply selection.
The FKS approach also indicates Cov(R, z) < 0 and Cov(I, z) < 0, although the
impact of health risk on I is very similar once our unused variable z is conditioned on
(column 4), and the difference is not statistically significant. However, the literature
does not usually test whether the differences are statistically significant (e.g., Buch-
mueller et al., 2013; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014). When focusing on the estimates
5Despite theoretical concerns over the interpretation of the coefficients in an LPM (e.g.,
Wooldridge, 2003), we find that the LPM fits our data well. Its coefficients are very similar to
the marginal effects derived from a probit model, both in terms of economic relevance and statisti-
cal significance.
6The results for other control variables can be found in the Appendix 4.A6, but are not of interest
for our analysis, since we assume they are used when calculating the individual’s risk premium.
74
Table 4.2 Estimates ELSA data
Spec. N FMG FKS RC-Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
βˆ δˆ αˆ2 E(αˆ2 − γˆ2) γˆ3 E(βˆi) E(δˆi) Corr(βˆi, δˆi)
1 31431 -0.014** -0.076*** -0.034*** 0.001 -0.017*** -0.011* -0.067*** -0.061***
(0.026) (0.000) (0.000) 0.829 (0.008) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000)
2 31431 -0.014** -0.075*** -0.033*** 0.001 -0.017*** -0.013** -0.063*** -0.060***
(0.024) (0.000) (0.000) 0.830 (0.008) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
3 30314 -0.014** -0.046*** -0.037*** 0.001 -0.016** -0.014** -0.040*** -0.058***
(0.027) (0.000) (0.000) 0.893 (0.013) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The columns for each specification show results of unused characteristics approaches. Estimates in columns (1) to (5) are based
on LPMs. Columns (1) and (2) are estimates from the FMG approach represented by the structural equations (4.3) and (4.4), whereas
columns (3) to (5) reflect the estimates based on the structural equations, (4.5) and (4.6), suggested by FKS. Coefficients of other used
characteristics are not shown above, but detailed regression results can be found in Appendix 4.A6. An F-test is used to test whether
the coefficient of R (based on the specification in column 3) equals the coefficient of R after including z into the model. Columns
(6) and (7) show the coefficients from a multilevel model where the explanatory variable ‘available time’ takes a random coefficient
and the effect of all other variables is fixed. Finally, column (8) shows the correlation between the individual parameters Corr(βˆi, δˆi).
Standard errors clustered at the individual level; t-statistics in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
in our multilevel model, we also find that the estimates for the fixed part of our model
(columns 6 and 7) are very similar to the FMG approach. However, calculating the
correlation between the estimates for our individual coefficients, δˆi and βˆi, reveals
that they are negatively correlated (-0.061). This means that although the impact of
z on I (domain 1) and HR (domain 2) is negative, suggesting adverse selection, the
impact on domain 1 is actually highest for the coefficients for which it is lowest in
domain 2, and vice versa. As we use variation over time in our estimation strategy,
we would like to see whether changes over time that are identical for the population
as a whole are affecting our estimates. As can be seen in table 4.2, the estimates for
specification 2 are nearly identical to those for specification 1. The same is true for
specification 3 if the illness variables are included7. However, we see that the impact
of z on PHI greatly decreases, which suggests that an individual’s health is a strong
predictor for uptake of PHI. This is consistent with the existing literature, since it
is known that, in the context of the English NHS, healthier individuals tend to have
a higher demand for PHI (Olivella and Vera-Herna´ndez, 2013). Nevertheless, the
main relationships revealed in specification 1 do not change. Although the unused
characteristics approaches suggest adverse selection, this interpretation is clearly off-
set by a negative correlation with the coefficients of interest. Hence, we find robust
evidence for the role of an individual’s available time on health risk and demand for
PHI in England. What is the explanation for our findings? As mentioned above,
economic theory suggests a negative relationship between someone’s available time
and their desire to purchase PHI. However, there is a relatively small, but statisti-
cally significant, impact on health risk. Our findings can be explained as follows.
Some individuals who, in relative terms, have a substantial amount of time are rel-
atively healthy (property (a)) and take out more insurance (property (b)), while
7Note that the number of observations is slightly lower in this specification, since some survey
respondents did not answer this question.
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other individuals with the same characteristic are relatively unhealthy (property (c))
but take out less health insurance (property (d)). The negative correlation between
available time, z, and both insurance and health status is found in the data, because
the effects of properties (a) and (d) dominate the overall correlation between z and
the outcomes. This heterogeneity at the individual level is captured with individ-
ual coefficients, and cannot be detected using the cross-sectional data normally used
when applying unused characteristics approaches. Although this chapter assumes a
specific correlation structure, Cov(δi, βi) 6= 0, for the outcomes of z for both R and
I, one may also consider a correlation Cov(δa, βa) 6= 0 on an arbitrary level, a, that
can confound the interpretation of a standard unused characteristics approach.
Our empirical findings from the ELSA data show that our idea is not simply a
theoretical artefact, but can be found in the real world and should be carefully ac-
counted for when detecting the data generating process of selection within insurance
markets. Hence we conclude that, although a variable can be correlated with insur-
ance and health status, the relationship does not necessarily tell us anything about
the importance of selection in insurance markets or IAs. This is because the esti-
mated coefficients of such a variable (indicating IA) can be the result of contributions
from different parts of the population. In addition, even if no correlation is found
between z and both I and R, there might still be a selection mechanism driven by z
which can incorrectly be hidden when the standard unused characteristics approaches
are applied. We believe our approach will be of great importance when empirically
determining whether a specific characteristic is the source of adverse/advantageous
selection within an insurance market without a clear theory about the underlying
selection mechanism. In such cases it may well be that pure randomness in the out-
comes of such a variable is falsely interpreted as selection in the market of interest,
as demonstrated above.
Our findings show that, as two different sources of private information can off-
set the correlation between the errors in the approach by Chiappori and Salanie´
(Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), including private information within an unused
characteristics framework can lead to erroneous conclusions about the interpretation
of the selection mechanism if said mechanism is heterogeneously associated with both
risk and insurance status.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of commonly used testing procedures for detecting
selection in insurance markets, focusing on their strengths and weaknesses. We
argued that, although the classical positive correlation test might lead to erroneous
conclusions about selection, it still has the advantage that it uses cross-equation
correlations of the residuals acquired at the individual level. We also showed that
standard unused characteristics approaches (e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006;
Fang et al., 2008), which are often used to identify specific sources of IAs, can be
problematic if evidence is wrongly based on mean coefficients. We also provided
empirical findings based on simulations and for the English PHI market.
To emphasise this potential problem, we formally discussed the circumstances
that can lead to erroneous conclusions by allowing for individual heterogeneity in
parameters. We demonstrated the relevance of this finding through simulations im-
posing different correlation structures between an unused characteristic, z, insurance
status and risk, while also allowing for individual parameter heterogeneity in the
data generating process. The results show that standard unused characteristics ap-
proaches do not identify this kind of heterogeneity, and thus a detected source of
adverse selection may indeed be a source of advantageous selection if the individual
coefficients are negatively correlated. The same phenomenon can obviously be found
under certain correlation structures between the parameters if adverse selection or
even no selection is detected.
Our empirical implementation used the English PHI market as an example, in
combination with the unused characteristic ‘available time’, which is not directly
assessable by insurance companies. This variable may reflect opportunity costs of
waiting times in the healthcare sector, resulting in demand for PHI. Our findings
show that individual parameter heterogeneity is also relevant to real markets. Al-
though adverse selection within the insurance market can be empirically detected,
this adverse selection should be interpreted carefully, since the estimated parameters
may be strongly negatively correlated due to the heterogeneous outcomes for the
variable of interest. Again, the estimated ‘mean’ coefficient of such variables can
be driven by different parts of the population and do not allow a meaningful inter-
pretation of the underlying selection mechanism. When interpreting the empirical
findings, it must be remembered that our aim is to focus on one specific source of
selection. The total degree of selection within the insurance market is beyond the
scope of this study.
Since the relevance of parameter heterogeneity is an empirical question, and a
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general conclusion for other markets and characteristics cannot be provided, anyone
wanting to identify a specific source of selection within insurance markets should test
this possibility. Our findings are important for analysing the efficiency of insurance
markets. They will be of interest to both the insurance industry and policy mak-
ers, and should be accounted for when predicting outcomes of structural changes to
insurance policies or the overall design of the insurance market. For example, the
expected impact of new regulations on calculating risk premiums based on charac-
teristics such as ethnicity or gender might be of interest in this context. If one wishes
to assess counterfactual situations about policies to regulate insurance markets, and
parameter heterogeneity of the variable of interest is an issue, then its impact on
selection within the insurance market should obviously be accounted for to achieve
a market that works as expected.
Our findings are particularly relevant in the case of unused variables for which,
a priori, we cannot assume any specific relationship with either insurance or health
status. In this case, it is essential to be very careful about potential parameter
heterogeneity, because even random outcomes of such unused characteristics may
be falsely interpreted as being sources of selection in insurance markets and market
inefficiencies.
We do not make any claim about the implications for welfare in private insurance
markets based on our findings. Nevertheless, the economic implications of our ideas
should be taken into account in welfare analysis if parameter heterogeneity is an
issue, since they directly affect the interpretation of which kind of selection is being
identified in the observed market. We also leave the implications of our findings for
optimal policy design open for further consideration.
In terms of empirical applications, we assume that a subjective health risk variable
is a good indicator of individual health status, but we do not know whether it is also a
good measure for future healthcare uptake. Hence, we make the implicit assumption
in our analysis that people with a relatively low (or relatively high) self-assessed
health status are correlated with a higher (or lower) probability of making a health
insurance claim. Future research should evaluate whether the robustness of this
assumption can be supported when using objective data about healthcare utilisation
(e.g., number of doctor visits) or, even better, treatment costs.
Finally, note that we do not explain why an unused characteristic, z, is (or should
be) expected to have a heterogeneous impact on both health risk and the decision
to take out insurance. We simply make the claim that, if this is the case, then the
commonly applied unused characteristics approaches can be as misleading as the
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Chiappori approach (no correlation of the error terms) when two different charac-
teristics offset each other (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). One interesting area for
future research would be to allow for heterogeneity at another level, a, in the asso-
ciation between an unused characteristic, z, and both R and I. A general condition
such as Cov(δa, βa) 6= 0 may also lead to erroneous conclusions based on unused
characteristics approaches and would be assessable even using cross-sectional data.
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Appendix Chapter 4
4.A1 Simulation 1
Scenario Parameter Selection FKS FMG RC-Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
αˆ2 γˆ2 E(αˆ2 − γˆ2) γˆ3 βˆ δˆ E(βˆi) E(δˆi) Corr(βˆi, δˆi)
1a E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, -0.150 [0] -0.150 [0] 0.000 [46] 0.000 [48] 0.003 [48] -0.001 [49] 0.001 [51] -0.001 [48] -0.245 [0]
Cov(βi, δi)=-0.3 [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [0] [2] [4] [2] [4] [2] [4] [3] [1] [1] [3] [100] [0]
[46]n− [54]n+ [0]− [0]+ [0]− [1]+; [43]n− [57]n+
1b E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, 0.000 [48] 0.000 [47] 0.000 [48] 0.000 [48] 0.003 [48] 0.000 [48] 0.001 [51] -0.001 [47] -0.001 [47]
Cov(βi, δi)=0 [1] [3] [0] [0] [0] [0] [4] [3] [2] [4] [4] [3] [3] [1] [4] [3] [2] [2]
[48]n− [52]n+ [0]− [0]+ [0]− [1]+; [48]n− [52]n+
1c E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, 0.200 [100] 0.199 [100] 0.000 [54] 0.000 [50] 0.003 [48] 0.000 [51] 0.001 [51] -0.001 [45] 0.324 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.4 [0] [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [3] [3] [2] [4] [4] [5] [3] [1] [4] [4] [0] [100]
[54]n− [46]n+ [0]− [0]+ [2]− [0]+; [61]n− [39]n+
Simulations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N×T 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5
Notes: Each scenario reflects the combination of E(δi) and E(βi) with the correlation structure Cov(βi, δi), σβ and σδ set to 1. Column (1) indicates whether there is a significant
correlation between insurance (I) and risk (R), indicating IA. Columns (2) to (4) show estimates of the structural equations, (4.5) and (4.6), of the FKS approach. Column (3) can be
interpreted as the degree of IA associated with z (the ‘omitted variable bias’) suggested by the FKS model: An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification
in column (2)) equals the coefficient of R in column (1). Columns (5) and (6) are based on estimates of the equations (4.3) and (4.4) from the FMG approach. Column (5) provides the
estimate of the effect of z on R in the FMG approach, and column (6) shows its effect on I. These estimates are based on least squares estimates. Columns (7) and (8) show coefficients
from a multilevel model where parameters δ and β are estimated for each individual. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Column (9) shows the correlation between βˆi
and δˆi. [] indicate counts from 1 to 100. [] on the right side of coefficients counts the number of positive values. [] on the left hand side under a coefficient counts the number of cases
a coefficient is both negative and significantly different from zero (5 % level); [] on the right side under a coefficient suggests the number of positive coefficients (null rejected). []− ([]+)
indicate the number of cases that adverse (advantageous) selection will not be rejected based on the joint interpretation of the estimates in the corresponding approach when we rely on
statistical significance. []n− ([]n+) indicate the number of cases of adverse (advantageous) selection if we rely solely on the signs of the coefficients.
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4.A2 Simulation 2
Scenario Parameter Selection FKS FMG RC-Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
αˆ2 γˆ2 E(αˆ2 − γˆ2) γˆ3 βˆ δˆ E(βˆi) E(δˆi) Corr(βˆi, δˆi)
2a E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, 0.080 [100] 0.080 [100] 0.000 [56] 0.000 [53] 0.002 [49] 0.000 [54] 0.002 [49] 0.000 [47] 0.229 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.4 [0] [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [3] [3] [0] [5] [3] [3] [3] [3] [3] [4] [0] [100]
σβ = 0.5, σδ = 0.5 [56]
n− [44]n+ [0]− [0]+ [0]− [0]+; [57]n− [43]n+
2b E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, 0.200 [100] 0.199 [100] 0.000 [54] 0.000 [50] 0.003 [48] 0.000 [51] 0.001 [51] -0.001 [45] 0.324 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.4 [0] [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [3] [3] [2] [4] [4] [5] [3] [1] [4] [4] [0] [100]
σβ = 1, σδ = 1 [54]
n− [46]n+ [0]− [0]+ [2]− [0]+; [61]n− [39]n+
2c E(δi)=0, E(βi)=0, 0.276 [100] 0.276 [100] 0.000 [56] 0.000 [50] 0.004 [50] 0.000 [48] 0.001 [52] -0.003 [45] 0.356 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.4 [0] [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [3] [2] [2] [3] [3] [6] [3] [1] [4] [3] [0] [100]
σβ = 1.5, σδ = 1.5 [56]
n− [44]n+ [0]− [0]+ [2]− [0]+; [62]n− [38]n+
Simulations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N×T 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5
Notes: Each scenario reflects the combination of E(δi) and E(βi) with a correlation structure Cov(βi, δi), σβ and σδ . Column (1) indicates whether there is a significant correlation between
insurance (I) and risk (R), indicating IA. Columns (2) to (4) show the estimates of the structural equations, (4.5) and (4.6), of the FKS approach. Column (3) can be interpreted as the
degree of IA associated with z (the ‘omitted variable bias’) suggested by the FKS model: An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification in column (2))
equals the coefficient of R in column (1). Columns (5) and (6) are based on estimates of the equations (4.3) and (4.4) from the FMG approach. Column (5) provides the estimate of the
effect of z on R in the FMG approach, and column (6) shows its effect on I. These estimates are based on least squares estimates. Columns (7) and (8) show coefficients from a multilevel
model where parameters δ and β are estimated for each individual. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Column (9) shows the correlation between βˆi and δˆi. [] indicate
counts from 1 to 100. [] on the right side of coefficients counts the number of positive values. [] on the left hand side under a coefficient counts the number of cases a coefficient is both
negative and significantly different from zero (5 % level); [] on the right side under a coefficient suggests the number of positive coefficients (null rejected). []− ([]+) indicate the number
of cases that adverse (advantageous) selection will not be rejected based on the joint interpretation of the estimates in the corresponding approach when we rely on statistical significance.
[]n− ([]n+) indicate the number of cases of adverse (advantageous) selection if we rely solely on the signs of the coefficients.81
4.A3 Simulation 3
Scenario Parameter Selection FKS FMG RC-Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
αˆ2 γˆ2 E(αˆ2 − γˆ2) γˆ3 βˆ δˆ E(βˆi) E(δˆi) Corr(βˆi, δˆi)
3a E(δi)=-0.5, E(βi)=0.3, -0.073 [0] 0.000 [47] -0.072 [0] -0.500 [0] 0.303 [100] -0.500 [0] 0.301 [100] -0.501 [0] -0.001 [47]
Cov(βi, δi)=0 [84] [0] [0] [0] [98] [0] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [2] [2]
[0]n− [100]n+ [0]− [98]+ [0]− [100]+; [0]n− [100]n+
3b E(δi)=-0.5, E(βi)=0.3, 0.071 [100] 0.149 [100] -0.079 [0] -0.545 [0] 0.303 [100] -0.500 [0] 0.301 [100] -0.501 [0] 0.242 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.3 [0] [84] [0] [88] [93] [0] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [0] [100]
[0]n− [100]n+ [0]− [93]+ [0]− [100]+; [0]n− [100]n+
3c E(δi)=-0.5, E(βi)=0.3, 0.214 [100] 0.299 [100] -0.085 [0] -0.590 [0] 0.303 [100] -0.499 [0] 0.301 [100] -0.501 [0] 0.487 [100]
Cov(βi, δi)=0.6 [0] [100] [0] [88] [68] [0] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [0] [100] [100] [0] [0] [100]
[0]n− [100]n+ [0]− [68]+ [0]− [100]+; [0]n− [100]n+
Simulations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N×T 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5
Notes: Each scenario reflects the combination of E(δi) and E(βi) with the correlation structure Cov(βi, δi), σβ and σδ set to 1. Column (1) indicates whether there is a significant
correlation between insurance (I) and risk (R), indicating IA. Columns (2) to (4) show estimates of the structural equations, (4.5) and (4.6), of the FKS approach. Column (3) can be
interpreted as the degree of IA associated with z (the ‘omitted variable bias’) suggested by the FKS model: An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification
in column (2)) equals the coefficient of R in column (1). Columns (5) and (6) are based on estimates of the equations (4.3) and (4.4) from the FMG approach. Column (5) provides the
estimate of the effect of z on R in the FMG approach, and column (6) shows its effect on I. These estimates are based on least squares estimates. Columns (7) and (8) show coefficients
from a multilevel model where parameters δ and β are estimated for each individual. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Column (9) shows the correlation between βˆi
and δˆi. [] indicate counts from 1 to 100. [] on the right side of coefficients counts the number of positive values. [] on the left hand side under a coefficient counts the number of cases
a coefficient is both negative and significantly different from zero (5 % level); [] on the right side under a coefficient suggests the number of positive coefficients (null rejected). []− ([]+)
indicate the number of cases that adverse (advantageous) selection will not be rejected based on the joint interpretation of the estimates in the corresponding approach when we rely on
statistical significance. []n− ([]n+) indicate the number of cases of adverse (advantageous) selection if we rely solely on the signs of the coefficients.82
4.A4 Simulation 4
Scenario Parameter Selection FKS FMG RC-Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
αˆ2 γˆ2 E(αˆ2 − γˆ2) γˆ3 βˆ δˆ E(βˆi) E(δˆi) Corr(βˆi, δˆi)
4a E(δi)=0.3, E(βi)=0.4, 0.056 [100] 0.000 [47] 0.056 [100] 0.300 [100] 0.403 [100] 0.300 [100] 0.401 [100] 0.299 [100] -0.001 [47]
Cov(βi, δi)=0 [0] [70] [0] [0] [0] [91] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [2] [2]
[100]n− [0]n+ [91]− [0]+ [100]− [0]+; [100]n− [0]n+
4b E(δi)=0.3, E(βi)=0.4, -0.083 [0] -0.150 [0] 0.067 [100] 0.360 [100] 0.403 [100] 0.299 [100] 0.401 [100] 0.299 [100] -0.245 [0]
Cov(βi, δi)=-0.3 [96] [0] [88] [0] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [100] [0]
[100]n− [0]n+ [100]− [0]+ [100]− [0]+; [100]n− [0]n+
4c E(δi)=0.3, E(βi)=0.4, -0.222 [0] -0.300 [0] 0.078 [100] 0.420 [100] 0.403 [100] 0.299 [100] 0.401 [100] 0.299 [100] -0.487 [0]
Cov(βi, δi)=-0.6 [100] [0] [88] [0] [0] [92] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [0] [100] [100] [0]
[100]n− [0]n+ [92]− [0]+ [100]− [0]+; [100]n− [0]n+
Simulations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N×T 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5 1000 × 5
Notes: Each scenario reflects the combination of E(δi) and E(βi) with the correlation structure Cov(βi, δi), σβ and σδ set to 1. Column (1) indicates whether there is a significant
correlation between insurance (I) and risk (R), indicating IA. Columns (2) to (4) show estimates of the structural equations, (4.5) and (4.6), of the FKS approach. Column (3) can be
interpreted as the degree of IA associated with z (the ‘omitted variable bias’) suggested by the FKS model: An F-test is used to test whether the coefficient of R (based on the specification
in column (2)) equals the coefficient of R in column (1). Columns (5) and (6) are based on estimates of the equations (4.3) and (4.4) from the FMG approach. Column (5) provides the
estimate of the effect of z on R in the FMG approach, and column (6) shows its effect on I. These estimates are based on least squares estimates. Columns (7) and (8) show coefficients
from a multilevel model where parameters δ and β are estimated for each individual. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Column (9) shows the correlation between βˆi
and δˆi. [] indicate counts from 1 to 100. [] on the right side of coefficients counts the number of positive values. [] on the left hand side under a coefficient counts the number of cases
a coefficient is both negative and significantly different from zero (5 % level); [] on the right side under a coefficient suggests the number of positive coefficients (null rejected). []− ([]+)
indicate the number of cases that adverse (advantageous) selection will not be rejected based on the joint interpretation of the estimates in the corresponding approach when we rely on
statistical significance. []n− ([]n+) indicate the number of cases of adverse (advantageous) selection if we rely solely on the signs of the coefficients.83
4.A5 Data description
Variable Description
PHI owner of private health insurance
HR 2 lowest health categories based on self assessed health
smoke now current smoker
smoke past past smoker
female women
age actual age of respondent
working respondent is employed or self employed
not work is not at the job market
retired respondent is retired
educ more than no qualification
couple married or cohabit
nwhite ethnicity recoded to non white
children respondent has children
ill1 diagnosed cardiovascular diseases
ill2 pneumological disease, asthma
ill3 arthritis, osteoporosis
ill4 cancer
ill5 psychiatric disorder, Alzheimer’s
ill6 specific eye problems
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4.A6 Estimates standard approaches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Approach FMG FKS
Dep. var. privins HR privins privins
HR -0.034*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.000)
time avail -0.014** -0.076*** -0.017***
(0.026) (0.000) (0.008)
female 0.020*** -0.043*** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011)
age -0.001** 0.002*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.015) (0.000) (0.017) (0.022)
black -0.031 0.187*** -0.024 -0.024
(0.266) (0.000) (0.392) (0.381)
couple 0.037*** -0.064*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
children -0.033*** 0.030** -0.033*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005)
educ 0.072*** -0.107*** 0.069*** 0.068***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
working 0.011 -0.132*** 0.009 0.007
(0.185) (0.000) (0.271) (0.441)
not work 0.006 0.152*** 0.012 0.011
(0.446) (0.000) (0.123) (0.148)
smoke now -0.053*** 0.162*** -0.048*** -0.048***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
smoke past -0.012 0.053*** -0.010 -0.010
(0.120) (0.000) (0.192) (0.188)
cons 0.087** 0.362*** 0.087** 0.100***
(0.014) (0.000) (0.013) (0.005)
N 31431 31431 31431 31431
Notes: All columns show coefficients from a linear probability model. Columns 1 and 2 are
estimates from the FMG approach, whereas columns 3 and 4 reflect the coefficients based on
FKS. Regional dummies are included and standard errors are clustered at individual level;
p-values in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Chapter 5
The Relationship Between Public
Health Insurance and Informal
Transfer Networks in Ghana1
5.1 Introduction
In the developing world, individual access to health services is largely determined by
income. The ‘cash and carry’ system that is prevalent in most developing countries
restricts medical access to the amount of money directly paid to healthcare providers.
In order to be able to afford treatment costs, many poor households rely on infor-
mal transfers within networks of relatives or neighbours. These support schemes
are important and beneficial, since the risk of becoming sick can be shared with
other members of the network (Fafchamps, 2008). An individual’s engagement in
an informal transfer network is usually governed by two main motives: altruism and
reciprocity (Leider et al., 2009). Altruism is a preference for contributing without
expectations of being rewarded, while reciprocity is based on an exchange motive
with the prospect of future benefits (e.g., Cox, 1987; Ligon and Schechter, 2012).
Support schemes can be a crucial insurance mechanism in times of severe hardship
in Ghana (Tsai and Dzorgbo, 2012) and frequently support individuals during the
more vulnerable stages of their lives, e.g., when they are young or very old (Kabki,
2007).
However, these networks can provide inadequate protection if many members are
suffering from economic hardship or refuse to contribute due to personal conflicts
1This study is joint work with Christoph Strupat. See Klohn and Strupat (2013) for an older
working paper.
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(Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1999). Kinship networks in particular are often char-
acterized by strong sharing obligations, meaning productive network members face
demands for transfers from less productive relatives (Platteau, 2000; Hoff and Sen,
2005; Di Falco and Bulte, 2011). This redistributive pressure can adversely affect the
incentives for enterprise-owning network members to invest in their own businesses
(Grimm et al., 2013) or save above a certain amount (Duflo et al., 2009; Wahhaj,
2010; Brune et al., 2015). Thus, adverse incentives prevent members from improving
their economic situations and may be an important barrier to economic transition.
To overcome the imperfections of informal transfer networks and help relatively
productive individuals such as enterprise owners develop their full economic poten-
tial, formal health insurance schemes or micro-insurance are seen as an important
remedy (Landmann et al., 2012). In recent years, some developing countries (India,
Ghana and Nigeria) have introduced country-wide health insurance schemes, while in
other countries many micro-insurance initiatives have been launched to complement
informal insurance mechanisms. While there is already some empirical evidence for
the crowding out of informal mechanisms after receiving public transfers (Dercon
and Krishnan, 2003; Pavan and Colussi, 2008; Orucˇ et al., 2011), there have been
few studies into the relationship between formal insurance and informal transfer
networks. None of these studies have investigated the effect of a formal, nationwide
health insurance scheme. Attanasio and Rıos-Rull (2000) provide theoretical and em-
pirical evidence that formal insurance crowds out informal insurance and potentially
increases welfare in Mexico. Dubois et al. (2008) analyse the interaction between
formal and informal agreements using data from Pakistan. They assert that pol-
icy interventions can complement or weaken informal cooperation. Landmann et al.
(2012) ran an experiment in the rural Philippines and showed that formal insur-
ance can lead to lower voluntary transfers among network members. In a theoretical
and experimental analysis, Lin et al. (2014) found that introducing formal insurance
significantly crowds out private transfers and reduces income inequality.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter provides the first empirical evidence
on whether informal transfers are affected by a formal, nationwide health insurance
scheme. The launch of the Ghanaian National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in
2003, coupled with differences in the date of implementation between local districts,
makes Ghana an ideal setting for examining the relationship between formal health
insurance and informal transfer networks. We also examine the impact of the NHIS
on health-related outcomes such as health status and out-of-pocket (OOP) payments,
which may help understand how the implementation of the NHIS has affected infor-
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mal transfers. Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, while
many studies on this topic use experimental methods that may have limited exter-
nal validity, we use survey data which is representative for the entire population.
Second, we look at the exogenous introduction of a public health insurance scheme
using a quasi-experimental setup that allows us to evaluate the causal impact of a
formal health insurance scheme on informal transfer behaviour. Third, as sharing
obligations are generally strong within kinship networks in Ghana (Udry and Con-
ley, 2004), we use detailed information on the relationship status between donors
and recipients of transfers (e.g., parents, siblings, non-relatives) to explore whether
the impact of the NHIS varies with relationship status.
As the health insurance scheme was implemented on different dates by most dis-
trict authorities between 2005 and 2006, we use the fifth wave of the Ghanaian Living
Standard Household Survey (GLSS), which was conducted over a 12-month survey
period (October 2005 to September 2006). The districts in this cross-sectional house-
hold survey contain enumeration areas (which we call sub-districts in the following)
that were interviewed in different months during the survey period. We use this vari-
ation in interview dates for our identification strategy. In particular, we are able to
identify the sub-districts that were interviewed before and after the implementation
of the NHIS, as we use the exact implementation dates of the NHIS, which vary at
the district level. In addition, we also identify those districts that implemented the
NHIS after the survey period. Thus, our identification strategy uses a difference-
in-difference framework comparing individuals at different points in time (interview
months) who live in districts where the NHIS has been implemented with individuals
where it has not.
In our empirical analysis, we first estimate a linear probability model (LPM) to
evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the NHIS influenced the prob-
ability of sending or receiving regular transfers2. In a second step, we investigate
the extent to which the NHIS affected the number of transfers sent and received.
Our econometric specifications control for district-specific unobserved characteristics
(such as supply-side healthcare provision factors) and seasonality during the course
of the year. We also examine the impact of the NHIS on health-related outcomes
such as the probability of low health status (reflecting whether a respondent had to
stop usual activities for two weeks), the number of sick days during the previous two
weeks and OOP expenditures.
2We use variables that show whether household members send and receive transfers in the form
of money or goods on a weekly, monthly or quarterly basis within Ghana.
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We find that introducing a formal health insurance scheme has no effect on health,
but substantially reduces OOP expenditures, which in turn lowers the need for reg-
ular informal transfers for health purposes. As a consequence, we find a reduction
in remittances to other households for health purposes. In particular, the amount of
remittances to non-relatives is reduced, which might be due to relatively low sharing
obligations between unrelated network members. As the NHIS covers all outpa-
tient/inpatient services and also treatment for chronic diseases, our results show
that it is not only ill individuals who benefit financially from the NHIS, but also
donors who are relieved of their financial burden.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
theoretical framework of our study and provides information about the national
health insurance scheme in Ghana. In section 3 we describe the data and provide
details about our identification strategy. Section 4 presents the results and further
robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings
and a research outlook.
5.2 Theoretical Framework and the National
Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework
In Ghana, reciprocity is widespread and often necessary to reduce economic insecu-
rity, building trust and solidarity within transfer networks (Udry and Conley, 2004).
From an economic perspective, reciprocity is an exchange motive with respect to
future benefits (e.g., Cox, 1987; Ligon and Schechter, 2012) which drives the forma-
tion of transfer networks as an informal institution and provides signals for being
trustworthy which can foster an individual’s social status. In Ghana, transfer net-
works are largely made up of relatives, forming kinship networks in which reciprocal
transfers are used to generate responsibility and obligations between network mem-
bers. These networks can provide a crucial insurance mechanism in times of severe
hardship (Tsai and Dzorgbo, 2012), but also regularly support individuals during the
more vulnerable stages of their lives, e.g., when they are young or very old (Kabki,
2007). Thus, reciprocity is an important driver for participating in informal transfer
networks in Ghana, either through direct financial benefits due to risk sharing, or
through indirect benefits such as increased social status within the community.
Against this background, our theoretical framework assumes that an individual’s
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engagement in an informal transfer network is determined by the exchange motive
(reciprocity). In line with Morduch (1999), the framework is based on two individuals
who form a transfer network with repeated interactions over time. Both individuals
contribute to the network until one individual reneges on the arrangement. Hence,
there is a trade-off between leaving the network today and future benefits from
further participation. A rational individual will make a cost-benefit analysis which
consists of three components: (future) benefits of the reciprocal arrangement in
terms of received transfers, costs as determined by (current) transfer payments to
the network partner and finally exit costs for leaving the network, as determined by
the relationship between network partners and their respective sharing obligations.
This analysis also contains opportunity costs due to a possible (partial) substitute
(e.g., a formal insurance scheme). Including exit costs is in line with the social
network analysis literature, which characterises networks between immediate family
members as generally closed and associated with strong sharing obligations and high
(psychological) exit costs (Granovetter, 1973; Grimm et al., 2013). In contrast,
networks between non-relatives are often characterised by lower sharing obligations
and exit costs.
The decision to stay in the network is negatively correlated with opportunity costs
and (current) transfer payments. In contrast, it is positively correlated with expected
benefits and exit costs. If, for example, transfer payments to the network partner are
low and the expected benefits of this reciprocal arrangement are high, the individual
will stay within the network. After the introduction of a formal insurance scheme,
new opportunity costs can change this decision if overall costs (including opportunity
costs) exceed expected benefits. Thus, an individual with higher opportunity costs
may decide to leave the network or reduce transfer payments. Importantly, high
(low) exit costs will decrease (increase) the probability of reducing the contribution
to the network.
Two predictions arise from our simple theoretical framework. First, we expect
that the availability of the NHIS will decrease informal network participation at the
extensive and intensive margin, for both sending and receiving transfers. Second, we
expect that the degree of crowding out will depend strongly on the relationship status
and sharing obligations between the network partners, i.e., the closer the relationship
(strong kinship ties and high exit costs), the lower the crowding out.
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5.2.2 The National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana
The Ghanaian Parliament passed the National Health Insurance Scheme into law
in 2003. The scheme was incrementally implemented at the district level by the
end of 2006. The aim of the scheme is to provide healthcare services to a broad
swathe of the population and to establish an alternative to the existing ‘cash and
carry’ system. The insurance covers all basic outpatient, inpatient and dental health
services such as X-rays, blood tests, malaria treatments, surgical operations and
maternal care services (e.g., antenatal care, deliveries and postnatal care). In this
latter category, the NHIS has been effective in improving health outcomes for recent
mothers, who are now more likely to receive prenatal care, deliver at a hospital, have
their deliveries attended by trained health professionals and experience fewer birth
complications (Mensah et al., 2010).
Membership in the health insurance scheme is voluntary for all adults (age 14-69)
who work in the informal sector, such as self-employed individuals, while membership
is mandatory for formal sector employees, with insurance premiums deducted from
their monthly payrolls. The income-related insurance premium varies between a min-
imum of 7.2 Ghanaian cedis (GHC) (US$3) and a maximum of 48.0 GHC (US$19),
paid on an annual basis.3 All children under 14 whose parents have enrolled in the
scheme and all people over 69 are covered by the insurance but exempted from paying
premiums.
The NHIS is monitored and regulated by the National Health Insurance Authority
(NHIA). Covered health services are mainly financed by a health insurance levy (a
2.5% addition to the value added tax), payment of insurance premiums and money
allocated by the government. The NHIA licenses district mutual health insurance
schemes (DMHISs) that are established by the district authorities to collect sufficient
insurance premiums to meet the expected healthcare claims within each district.
After a DMHIS has paid two million GHC into the NHIA, and health insurance
cards have been distributed to inhabitants who paid the insurance premium, the
DMHIS is officially launched and all basic healthcare services are covered by the
insurance (Seddoh et al., 2011). As acceptance of health insurance and the financial
ability of each district varies, the DMHISs were implemented at different dates, with
most district authorities launching the scheme in 2005 and 2006.
31GHC=0.4US$
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5.3 Data and Identification Strategy
5.3.1 Data Description
Our analysis uses the fifth wave of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS5),
which is based on interviews conducted by the Ghana Statistical Office and the
World Bank during the period between October 2005 and September 2006. This
nationwide survey contains socio-economic variables measured at the individual and
household levels, including information on informal transfer networks. It is the source
for a nationally representative sample of 8,687 households living in 110 districts and
580 sub-districts, with 37,128 household members.
Our treatment variable is a binary indicator representing the availability of the
NHIS in an individual’s district. In order to construct this variable, we collected the
exact implementation dates of the NHIS at the district level by contacting district
officials and using district-specific media reports on health insurance. Figure 5.1
shows how the NHIS implementation evolved over time and districts.4 The two
dashed lines indicate the start and end of the survey period.
Figure 5.1 NHIS availability at the district level
As measures for participating in reciprocal transfer networks, we define variables
that show whether household members sent or received transfers in the form of
money or goods on a weekly, monthly or quarterly basis within Ghana. In addi-
tion, we also use information on the number of transfers made and received. These
regular transfers include no labour compensation for extended family members or
4We use 90 out of 110 districts for our analysis, as the district authorities provided the exact
date of the NHIS implementation.
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neighbours who work in a business linked to the household. Most of these transfers
occurred within inner family networks, especially to children/parents (50 percent)
and extended family members such as grandparents, cousins and aunts and uncles
(15 percent), while transfers to non-relatives were less common (35 percent). Al-
though we analyse the short-term effects of the policy, we combine all monetary
values into an annual amount to simplify comparisons with other financial informa-
tion that is provided on an annual basis. As 42 percent of all household members did
not provide information for both transfer variables, we investigate the impact of the
NHIS implementation on sent and received transfers separately.5 Thus, our analysis
focuses on all individuals who are not exempted from premium payments. 5,956
individuals living in 2,710 households gave information on regularly sent transfers,
while information on regularly received transfers was available for 4,985 individuals
in 2,611 households.
5.3.2 Identification Strategy
To investigate the relationship between informal transfer networks and formal health
insurance, our identification strategy is based on a quasi-experimental setup. We
collected data on the precise implementation dates for the NHIS at the district level,
i.e., when health insurance coverage became available, and benefit from the fact that
the district’s sub-districts were surveyed at different points during the survey period
between October 2005 and September 2006. As most districts introduced the NHIS
during this survey period, we were able to use the variation in interview dates to
compare individuals who were interviewed before and after the introduction of the
insurance scheme. However, some districts did not implement the NHIS during the
survey period or were entirely surveyed before it was implemented. For instance,
the Nkwanta district in the Volta region is divided into eight sub-districts, four of
which were surveyed in November 2005, with the other four interviewed in March
2006. The Nkwanta district introduced the NHIS in January 2006. In comparison,
the Nanumba district also consists of eight sub-districts and was surveyed during the
same months, but the NHIS was not implemented until July 2006.
Thus, in our identification strategy we compare individuals at different points in
time (interview months) that are living in districts where the NHIS is implemented
5We also have information on the purpose of the transfers, obtained via the question: ‘Please
rank the three main uses of sent/received transfers?’. 58 percent indicated ‘health’ as one of the
two main reasons for making transfers. However, as this question is entirely self-assessed and does
not allow us to make quantitative statements, we stick with the general indicator.
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and where it is not, once time- and district-fixed effects are partialled out. In or-
der to control for time-invariant district characteristics such as financial ability or
health infrastructure that are likely to be correlated with both the timing of NHIS
implementation and our dependent variables, we include district dummies into all
our specifications. We also include interview month dummies in order to allow for
changes in the macroeconomic situation during the course of the year, which likely
affect individuals in the treatment and control group similarly. More formally, our
estimates are based on the following equation:
yidt = β0 + β1NHISidt + µd + δt + idt (5.1)
The dependent variable yidt indicates if respondent i that lives in district d and
was surveyed in month t, makes (receives) transfers. This variable is regressed on the
binary treatment variable NHISidt, which takes the value 1 if the respondent was
surveyed after the district implemented the NHIS and 0 otherwise. β0 is a constant,
while µd represents district fixed effects and δt interview month fixed effects. The
results we provide are based on variation which is orthogonal to the district- and
time-specific part of our specification’s error term. In accordance with the concept
of potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974, 1977), our identification strategy is based on the
assumption:
E(y0idt|d, t) = µd + δt (5.2)
i.e., if the NHIS had not been implemented, the potential outcomes, y0idt, would
solely depend on district-specific levels, µd, and common time effects, δt (cf. Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). As discussed above, in our application the length of time periods
before and after the introduction depends on the time of the interview and the date
when the insurance scheme was introduced. In order to increase the precision of
our estimates and to control for confounding factors that might be correlated with
the introduction of the NHIS and the dependent variable, we furthermore include
individual and household specific variables Xidt in our specifications. Such variables
reflect important socio-demographic differences but also indicate if the respondent is
living in an urban or rural sub-district.6 Thus, we extend equation (5.1):
yidt = β0 + β1NHISidt + β
′
2Xidt + µd + δt + idt (5.3)
6The description of the variables is presented in the next section.
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Our coefficient of interest is β1, which represents an intention-to-treat effect (ITT)
i.e. the effect of an offer to participate in the NHIS on the individual’s transfer behav-
ior. This parameter has a causal interpretation, if no additional differences between
the treatment and control group exist that can be traced back to the introduction
of the NHIS. This assumption is not directly testable. As urban sub districts are
probably differently affected by changes in the economic situation, we supplement
our identification strategy by interacting the interview month with the urban eco-
logical area dummy allowing for an additional time trend and to evaluate whether
our findings are triggered by urban specific changes over time.
Our use of the variation in NHIS implementation dates across districts and the
variation in interview dates within districts has two potential sources of bias which
may confound our estimate of β1. First, the order of the NHIS rollout might have
been driven by time-invariant district characteristics that are also correlated with our
dependent variables. For example, wealthy districts that spend more than average
on transfers might have been able to implement the NHIS earlier than less aﬄuent
districts. In order to check whether our outcome variables are fundamentally different
for districts with and without the NHIS, we provide a balance table of our dependent
variables using the fourth wave of the GLSS (1998/1999)7.
Second, interview dates may have been driven by heterogeneity between sub-
districts that also influence the potential outcomes of our analysis. If, for example,
the sub-districts were not randomly surveyed over time and the survey team inter-
viewed urban sub-districts first, this would bias our estimates for NHIS implementa-
tion. To investigate the extent to which observed changes in NHIS implementation
were triggered by structural heterogeneity among sub-districts, we conduct several
estimates as robustness checks in section 5.4. We conduct regressions using pre-
determined, time-invariant characteristics of the sub-districts and their inhabitants
such as education, gender and an indicator of whether the respondent was living
in an urban or rural sub-district as dependent variables. We also conduct placebo
regressions by using the fourth wave of the GLSS (1998/1999). Thus, we can gauge
whether a systematic relationship between the sub-districts interviewed at different
times and the dependent variable would bias our estimate of β1.
7This survey was conducted in the same manner over a 12-month period between 1998 and 1999
and contains the same number of districts as the GLSS from 2005/2006.
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5.3.3 Estimation Models
We begin by generating a linear probability model (LPM) to evaluate whether the
introduction of the NHIS influenced the probability that a household engaged in
transfers. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the respondent transferred money or goods to non-household members and 0 if no
transfers took place. We employ the same model to investigate whether an individual
received transfers. The binary nature of the dependent variable would conventionally
suggest the estimation of a probit or logit model. Binary choice models, however,
can be problematic when applied using the least-squares dummy variable approach,
because they suffer from the incidental parameters problem and a substantial loss of
observations. In a second step, we examine the extent to which the number of sent
or received transfers was affected by the implementation of the NHIS. Therefore, we
estimate a regression model with the actual value of either sent or received transfers
as the dependent variable.
5.4 Results and Robustness Checks
Before we turn to the empirical results, Table 5.1 displays the means of our dependent
variables, distinguished by the availability of the NHIS. Less money was sent to
other households by respondents living in areas with the NHIS available. Among
the respondents able to use the NHIS, 41% sent money regularly, compared to 70%
of individuals living in areas without the NHIS. In addition, the average transfer
amount was 44 GHC less among respondents from areas without the NHIS, 38 %
less than in areas with the NHIS. To understand how the implementation of the
NHIS affected informal transfers, we also examine the impact of the NHIS on health-
related outcomes such as the probability of low health status (in which a respondent
had to stop their usual daily activities for two weeks or more), the number of sick
days taken during the previous two weeks and OOP expenditures. All indicators are
lower for sub-districts with the NHIS available.
To check whether districts with and without the NHIS were fundamentally dif-
ferent before the implementation of the NHIS, we provide a balance table that shows
the means of our dependent variables from the fourth wave of the GLSS, conducted
in 1998/1999 (see Table 5.2). As can be seen from the p-values, two-sided tests com-
paring the values for the two groups do not show statistically significant differences.
This indicates that both groups were balanced across all outcome variables before
the NHIS implementation.
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total NHIS No NHIS Difference
mean mean mean in means p-value
Sent transfers (0/1) 0.46 0.41 0.69 -0.28 0.00
Value of sent transfers 75.77 68.49 111.95 -43.46 0.00
N 5956 4955 1001
Received transfers (0/1) 0.35 0.32 0.47 -0.15 0 .00
Value of received transfers 54.52 53.86 59.39 -5.53 0.38
N 4985 4054 931
Low health status 0.13 0.12 0.19 -0.07 0.00
Number of sick days 0.47 0.77 1.25 -0.48 0.00
Medical expenditures 33.67 31.5 45.12 -13.62 0.00
N 5009 4025 984
Notes: For our calculation we use the GLSS (2005/2006).
Table 5.2 Difference in means before the implementation of the NHIS
(GLSS 1998/1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NHIS No NHIS Difference
mean mean in means p-value
Sent transfers (1/0) 0.26 0.24 0.02 0.16
Value of sent transfers 62.12 55.02 7.1 0.28
N 4807 934
Received transfers (1/0) 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.35
Value of received transfers 49.12 45.83 3.29 0.45
N 5003 926
Low health status (1/0) 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.86
Number of sick days 1.07 1.21 -0.14 0.27
Out-of-pocket expenditures 85.81 74.94 10.87 0.46
N 4807 934
Notes: Our calculations use the 1998/1999 GLSS, which was conducted over a 12-month
period between 1998 and 1999 in the same manner and for the same number of districts
as the 2005/2006 GLSS.
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Table 5.3 provides estimates of the NHIS implementation on health-related out-
comes. We find negative effects of the NHIS implementation for all outcomes. Having
the NHIS available improved health status and reduced the average number of sick
days by 0.38, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. OOP expenditures
decreased by an average of 26 GHC, a relative reduction of 58 %. Our findings are
in line with Powell-Jackson et al. (2014), who examine the impact of removing user
fees for healthcare using data from a randomized control trial in Ghana. The au-
thors also find a reduction in OOP expenditures and no statistically significant effect
on health. These results suggest that sick individuals were financially relieved by
the implementation of the NHIS. To examine whether transfer behaviour was also
affected, the first three columns in Table 5.4 present estimates from the LPM using
sent transfers as the dependent variable.
Table 5.3 Effect of NHIS implementation on health status, number of
sick days and medical expenditures
LPM OLS 1 OLS 2
Dependent Variables: Low health # of sick days OOP expend.
NHIS -0.047 -0.382 -26.320***
(0.034) (0.261) (8.578)
N 5009 5009 5009
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.041 0.027
District and interview month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Individual and HH control variables Yes Yes Yes
Urban time trend Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
The first column shows the NHIS coefficient without including individual and house-
hold variables into the estimation model. We find a negative and statistically sig-
nificant effect for the NHIS dummy. The implementation of the NHIS decreased
the probability of transferring money to other households by 15 %. The size of the
coefficient remains similar if we include our control variables, which suggests that
the implementation of the NHIS is randomly assigned in terms of individual and
household specific variables. In addition, including control variables increases the
precision of our estimates, as the NHIS coefficient then becomes significant at the 5
% level.
We consider a range of variables that are typically used to control for socioe-
conomic characteristics such as education level, employment status, age and sex
(see Table in Appendix 5.A2). In addition, we include household expenditures as
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an important control variable for a household’s financial potential (Deaton, 1997).
Expenditures are corrected via a region-specific consumer price index and an equiv-
alence scale to reflect age- or sex-specific relative consumption needs (Service, 2008).
We also include a dummy that indicates whether a respondent lives in an urban sub-
district. We condition on variables that possibly determine the degree of informal
risk sharing. These are household size, marital status, owning a savings account and
migration status. We also include an urban-specific time trend (column 3) which
does not affect the size of the NHIS coefficient, indicating that our findings are not
confounded by regional changes during the survey period.
The last three columns of Table 5.4 contain the estimates for the value of sent
transfers as the dependent variable. The implementation of the NHIS led to a crowd-
ing out of 24 GHC in the specification with control variables. Interestingly, the re-
duction in OOP payments (26 GHC, see Table 5.3) is very similar to the reduction
in sent transfers (24 GHC), which suggests that sick individuals and donors were
financially relieved by the implementation of the NHIS.
Table 5.4 Effect of the NHIS implementation on sending transfers
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.148* -0.146** -0.148** -23.803 -24.172* -23.723*
(0.079) (0.061) (0.060) (14.866) (14.130) (14.005)
N 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956
adj. R-sq 0.061 0.163 0.164 0.023 0.150 0.150
District and interview month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and HH control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Urban time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01; See Appendix 5.A3 for detailed regression outputs.
To determine whether there is also a reduction in received transfers, we use our
estimates with received transfers as the dependent variable. The coefficients indicate
a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between the implementation of
the NHIS and receiving transfers for all models (see Table 5.5). Looking at the
estimates for the value of received transfers as our dependent variable shows the size
of the coefficients is small and statistically insignificant.
Based on our theoretical framework, we would expect received transfers to also be
affected by the NHIS implementation. One economic explanation for our empirical
findings could be asymmetric information between network partners. As the NHIS
was disseminated gradually, individuals who were already covered by the insurance
might still have received transfers from districts where the NHIS was not available.
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Table 5.5 Effect of the NHIS implementation on receiving transfers
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.089 -0.081 -0.086 -1.926 -0.835 -0.640
(0.092) (0.106) (0.105) (14.649) (14.919) (15.247)
N 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985
adj. R-sq 0.040 0.091 0.091 0.007 0.065 0.065
District and interview month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and HH control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Urban time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01; See Appendix 5.A4 for detailed regression outputs.
Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis, as we cannot determine which districts
the donor and recipient from the same network live in; however, a growing body of
empirical literature has shown that information asymmetries play a crucial role in
remittance decisions (Ashraf, 2009; Jakiela and Ozier, 2012; Ambler, 2015).
We next assess whether the size of the crowding out depends on the relation-
ship status and sharing obligations between network partners. In order to examine
whether this factor mediates the impact of the NHIS implementation on informal
transfer behaviour, the next subsection explores the heterogeneity of the NHIS effect
using information on the relationship status between donor and recipient.
5.4.1 Treatment Heterogeneity
In order to empirically examine the role of kinship relationships in our empirical
findings, we explore the heterogeneity of the NHIS effect using information on the
relationship status between donor and recipient. We define three relationship groups:
children/parents (inner family), siblings/cousins/uncles and aunts/grandparents (ex-
tended family) and non-relatives.
First, we use the information on whether a respondent received transfers from
these three groups as dependent variables and estimate the group-specific effects
of implementing the NHIS (see Table 5.6). The probability of receiving transfers
is negative and statistically significant if the recipient receives transfers from non-
relatives. Furthermore, the estimates show that the probability of receiving less is
reduced the closer the relationship between recipient and donor, which is in line with
the second prediction of our theoretical framework: that the degree of the crowding
out depends on the relationship status and sharing obligations (exit costs) between
network participants. Thus, it seems that the closer the relationship (strong sharing
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obligations), the lower the crowding out.
Table 5.6 Effect of the NHIS implementation on received transfers from
different donors
Transfers received from: Children/ Ext. Family/ Non- Children/ Ext. Family/ Non-
Parents Siblings relatives Parents Siblings relatives
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.071 -0.141 -0.155* 13.884 -4.847 -14.625
(0.111) (0.112) (0.088) (15.794) (16.289) (9.062)
N 4018 3590 3706 4018 3590 3706
adj. R-sq 0.158 0.071 0.078 0.041 0.044 0.037
Notes: Individual and household control variables are included. District and month dummies are
included. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
The results at the intensive margin for receiving transfers from different donors show
a positive but statistically insignificant effect for children/parents as donors. Con-
versely, we find a negative effect for non-relatives which is close to being statistically
significant at the 10 % level. As the share of received transfers from inner family
members (children/parents) is similar to the share of received transfers from non-
relatives (see Appendix 5.A1), the effects offset each other on average. Thus, in
combination with the asymmetric information between network partners, hetero-
geneity in the treatment effect (i.e., the availability of the NHIS) can explain why
we only found a small effect of NHIS implementation on transfers received.
Second, we use the information on whether a respondent sent transfers to chil-
dren/parents (inner family), extended family members and non-relatives as depen-
dent variables (see Table 5.7). Compared to transfers received, we find the same
kind of pattern for the NHIS effect across the three groups at the extensive and
intensive margins. Interestingly, we do not find the same offsetting effect as with
received transfers, as donors substantially reduced remittances to non-relatives after
implementation of the NHIS. Thus, the crowding out effect is mainly driven by a
short-term reduction in remittances to non-relatives. In addition, the coefficients for
sent transfers are lower than those for received transfers, which again emphasizes the
importance of asymmetric information on insurance status across districts. If this is
the case, recipients who were already covered by the NHIS would still receive trans-
fers from network partners who were not aware that the NHIS had been implemented
in their network partner’s district.
As the NHIS covers all basic outpatient/inpatient services and also treatment for
chronic diseases, it is likely that the crowding out effects are largest for individuals
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Table 5.7 Effect of the NHIS implementation on transfers sent to
different recipients
Transfers sent to: Children/ Ext. Family/ Non- Children/ Ext. Family/ Non-
Parents Siblings relatives Parents Siblings relatives
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.081 -0.182** -0.259*** 1.821 -6.158 -38.331*
(0.085) (0.086) (0.078) (19.562) (10.102) (22.619)
N 4136 3623 3813 4136 3623 3813
adj. R-sq 0.114 0.154 0.186 0.144 0.095 0.051
Notes: Individual and household control variables are included. District and month dummies are
included. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
sending/receiving regular transfers for health purposes. To investigate whether this
is indeed the case, we use information on the purposes of transfers. 58 percent of
respondents indicated ‘health’ as one of the main two reasons for sending/receiving
regular transfers. Table 5.8 contains estimated coefficients for a regression model us-
ing the values of regular transfers made for different purposes as dependent variables.
The results indicate that, after the implementation of the NHIS, donors mainly re-
duced transfers made for health reasons, which is in line with the negative impact of
the NHIS on OOP expenditures (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.8 Effect of the NHIS implementation on transfers sent for
different purposes
Dep. var.: Health Daily consumption Education Housing
NHIS -28.785** -1.048 -12.413 -4.496
(14.512) (5.317) (14.028) (5.694)
N 3849 3422 3784 3278
adj. R-sq 0.101 0.060 0.142 0.062
Notes: Individual and household control variables are included. Dis-
trict and month dummies are included. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01
5.4.2 Robustness Checks
We next examine whether the sequencing of the NHIS implementation within dis-
tricts, i.e., on the sub-district level, confounds our identification strategy. Follow-
ing our baseline specification (equation (5.1)), we conduct regressions using time-
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invariant and predetermined characteristics such as education level, gender and re-
gional characteristics as dependent variables. The results show that the implementa-
tion of the NHIS has no effect on these time-invariant and pre-determined character-
istics (see 5.A5 and 5.A6 in the Appendix). We also estimate the effect of the NHIS
on our main outcome variables by using the fourth wave of the GLSS to test whether
our findings are confounded by the timing of interviews between sub-districts. As
this wave was conducted in the same manner and contains the same districts, we
can adapt the NHIS variable for that time and provide a placebo estimate. The
results show that the implementation of the NHIS had no significant effect on the
probability of sending or receiving transfers (see Appendix 5.A7). In addition, no
significant effect was found for the monetary equivalents.
Overall, we conclude that our findings are due to the implementation of the
NHIS and are not driven by a systematic relationship between the NHIS rollout,
sub-districts, interview dates and the outcome variables.
As a certain amount of insurance premiums had to be collected before the NHIS
was officially launched in each district, most individuals had to pay premiums before
actually being able to benefit from insurance coverage. Thus, we explore whether
individuals changed their transfer behaviour in anticipation of the official launch of
the NHIS. If this was the case, our estimates could be biased. To investigate the
presence of this bias, we ‘shift’ our treatment indicator backwards by two months.
The results indicate no significant changes in transfer behaviour before the scheme
was officially launched (see 5.A8 in the Appendix of this chapter). Thus, changes in
transfer behaviour are only found once district authorities had officially launched the
NHIS and healthcare services were freely available for premium payers. This suggests
that the respondents did not substitute premium payments by reducing remittance
to other households.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided empirical evidence that a formal health insurance scheme
crowds out regular informal transfers in Ghana. We analysed cross-sectional data
from the fifth Ghanaian Living Standard Survey, which benefited from the fact that
various sub-districts were surveyed at different times during the survey period. As
most districts introduced the NHIS during this period, we compared different in-
dividuals who were interviewed before and after the introduction of the insurance
scheme. We evaluated whether the availability of formal insurance resulted in re-
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duced contributions to informal transfer networks and also investigated the impact
of the NHIS on health-related outcomes. We also investigated whether our results
were due to the relationship status and level of sharing obligations between network
partners. We differentiated between three groups: Children/parents (inner family),
siblings/cousins/aunts and uncles (extended family) and non-relatives. We also ex-
plored whether the results were driven by different reasons for making transfers. Our
findings suggest that there is a crowding out effect, since the introduction of the for-
mal health insurance scheme reduced the probability of making transfers. The value
of remittances also decreased to a significant extent, due to a reduction in transfers
for health purposes. Our analysis of health-related outcomes found that the NHIS re-
duced respondents’ OOP expenditures. Interestingly, the reduction in expenditures
was very similar to the reduction in sent transfers. We also found that the closer
the relationship between recipient and donor, the lower the crowding out. Thus,
the degree of crowding out depends strongly on the relationship status and sharing
obligations between network partners. As the NHIS covers all basic outpatient and
inpatient services, such as blood tests and malaria treatments, and also maternity
care services, we interpret our results as indicating that it is not only ill individuals
who benefit financially from the NHIS: donors have also been financially relieved by
the implementation of the NHIS.
This effect seems most relevant for unrelated network partners, as they showed
the largest reduction of transfers. Lower sharing obligations and information asym-
metries make it possibly less costly for these network members to reduce transfer
payments after the implementation of the NHIS. Since the risk of default in times of
financial hardship due to health shocks is probably higher in networks characterized
by low sharing obligations, it is more beneficial for these individuals to reduce trans-
fers and rely on formal insurance mechanisms. Conversely, as we do not find large
crowding out effects for networks between immediate family members, we conclude
that it probably takes more time to convince members of networks characterized by
strong sharing obligations and high costs of leaving the network.
As we only observe changes in transfer behaviour in the short run, we believe
the effects of changes in investments or savings are likely to take more time to be-
come apparent. However, from a policy perspective it would be useful to investigate
whether the observed changes in transfer behaviour translate into higher investments
or savings in the long run. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate the
extent to which the crowding out of informal transfers is used for investments or con-
sumption purposes by also considering the direct (insurance premiums) and indirect
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costs (2.5% addition to the value added tax) of the NHIS. As the sixth round of the
GLSS is now available, a promising avenue for future research would be to examine
whether the implementation of the NHIS has on average been a net gain or loss for
covered individuals in the long run.
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Appendix Chapter 5
5.A1 Shares of sent and received transfers from/for different
donors/recipients
5.A2 Descriptive statistics
Sent transfers Received transfers
Variable Mean Mean
Household size 5.29 5.26
HH expenditures quintile 2 (0/1) 0.2 0.2
HH expenditures quintile 3 (0/1) 0.19 0.18
HH expenditures quintile 4 (0/1) 0.19 0.17
HH expenditures quintile 5 (0/1) 0.22 0.18
HH savings account (0/1) 0.29 0.23
Migrant (0/1) 0.18 0.18
Formal employment (0/1) 0.13 0.09
Informal employment (0/1) 0.06 0.06
Self employment (0/1) 0.79 0.81
Primary school (0/1) 0.16 0.16
Junior high school (0/1) 0.17 0.17
Secondary high school (0/1) 0.27 0.23
Technical school (0/1) 0.05 0.04
University (0/1) 0.02 0.01
Female (0/1) 0.54 0.55
Age 37.04 0.61
Married (0/1) 0.61 37.48
Urban (0/1) 0.32 0.28
Number of observations 5956 4985
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5.A3 Effect on sent transfers (detailed output)
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.148* -0.146** -0.148** -23.803 -24.172* -23.723*
(0.079) (0.061) (0.060) (14.866) (14.130) (14.005)
Household size 0.018*** 0.018*** 5.395*** 5.390***
(0.004) (0.004) (1.197) (1.196)
HH expenditures Q2 0.086*** 0.085*** 26.224*** 26.318***
(0.031) (0.031) (7.742) (7.741)
HH expenditures Q3 0.117*** 0.116*** 40.484*** 40.671***
(0.037) (0.037) (10.417) (10.390)
HH expenditures Q4 0.134*** 0.133*** 52.712*** 52.933***
(0.039) (0.039) (9.503) (9.472)
HH expenditures Q5 0.263*** 0.264*** 111.333*** 111.184***
(0.041) (0.041) (11.463) (11.395)
HH savings account 0.138*** 0.139*** 41.733*** 41.469***
(0.022) (0.023) (6.962) (6.989)
Migrant -0.004 -0.002 10.388 10.040
(0.023) (0.023) (8.321) (8.288)
Formal employment 0.343*** 0.347*** 69.156*** 68.382***
(0.041) (0.041) (13.421) (13.479)
Informal employment 0.099** 0.099** 8.514 8.464
(0.044) (0.044) (7.622) (7.663)
Self employment 0.211*** 0.214*** 56.270*** 55.815***
(0.029) (0.028) (9.284) (9.252)
Primary school -0.007 -0.007 0.495 0.462
(0.023) (0.023) (5.602) (5.617)
Junior high school 0.002 0.000 5.543 5.846
(0.019) (0.019) (5.565) (5.689)
Secondary high school 0.030* 0.029 19.585*** 19.798***
(0.018) (0.018) (5.408) (5.426)
Technical school 0.046 0.046 38.429*** 38.441***
(0.032) (0.032) (11.703) (11.702)
University 0.067 0.064 95.394*** 95.807***
(0.042) (0.043) (22.007) (22.052)
Female -0.036*** -0.036*** -4.623 -4.543
(0.010) (0.010) (2.811) (2.819)
Married 0.042*** 0.041*** 2.843 3.009
(0.014) (0.014) (4.224) (4.226)
Age 0.005* 0.005* 0.998 0.992
(0.003) (0.003) (0.817) (0.816)
Age squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.013 -0.012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.009)
Urban -0.117*** -0.165*** -14.373 -5.313
(0.032) (0.057) (10.588) (17.425)
Urban time trend 0.009 -1.700
(0.008) (2.443)
N 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956
adj. R-sq 0.061 0.163 0.164 0.023 0.150 0.150
Notes: Individual and household control variables are included. District and month dummies are
included. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
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5.A4 Effect on received transfers (detailed output)
LPM 1 LPM 2 LPM 3 OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3
NHIS -0.089 -0.081 -0.086 -1.926 -0.835 -0.640
(0.092) (0.106) (0.105) (14.649) (14.919) (15.247)
Household size 0.001 0.001 1.299 1.294
(0.004) (0.004) (0.992) (0.996)
HH expenditures Q2 0.008 0.008 7.634 7.651
(0.036) (0.036) (5.772) (5.783)
HH expenditures Q3 -0.011 -0.011 12.063 12.084
(0.032) (0.032) (8.118) (8.139)
HH expenditures Q4 0.038 0.038 28.051*** 28.060***
(0.035) (0.036) (10.149) (10.139)
HH expenditures Q5 0.062 0.065 37.260*** 37.169***
(0.044) (0.044) (11.628) (11.641)
HH savings account 0.002 0.001 -1.829 -1.818
(0.025) (0.025) (5.365) (5.351)
Migrant -0.050** -0.049** -10.681* -10.705*
(0.023) (0.023) (5.398) (5.397)
Formal employment -0.355*** -0.350*** -112.921*** -113.099***
(0.052) (0.052) (22.358) (21.980)
Informal employment -0.287*** -0.286*** -98.208*** -98.264***
(0.066) (0.065) (27.237) (27.061)
Self employment -0.303*** -0.301*** -110.627*** -110.687***
(0.054) (0.053) (24.165) (24.001)
Primary school -0.001 -0.001 2.989 2.995
(0.019) (0.019) (4.014) (4.027)
Junior high school 0.033 0.031 8.671 8.738
(0.022) (0.023) (5.512) (5.576)
Secondary high school 0.010 0.007 13.813** 13.905**
(0.025) (0.025) (6.213) (6.340)
Technical school 0.043 0.042 28.391** 28.432**
(0.041) (0.041) (12.034) (12.125)
University -0.019 -0.020 11.981 12.022
(0.045) (0.046) (15.392) (15.398)
Female 0.065*** 0.065*** 22.136*** 22.137***
(0.013) (0.013) (4.115) (4.116)
Married -0.059*** -0.060*** -7.755* -7.724*
(0.017) (0.016) (4.597) (4.548)
Age -0.011*** -0.011*** -2.402*** -2.405***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.622) (0.626)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
Urban -0.020 -0.074 -7.809 -5.806
(0.033) (0.067) (6.941) (16.660)
Urban time trend 0.010 -0.360
(0.011) (2.645)
N 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985
adj. R-sq 0.043 0.091 0.091 0.007 0.065 0.065
Notes: Individual and household control variables are included. District and month dummies are
included. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01
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5.A5 Effect of the NHIS implementation on time-invariant
characteristics 1
Primary Jun. High Secondary Technical
Urban Female Married School School School School University
NHIS -0.039 0.019 -0.184 -0.027 0.037 -0.024 -0.017 -0.017
(0.122) (0.038) (0.177) (0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.022) (0.019)
N 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956 5956
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.004
Notes: Sample of made transfers is used. District and month dummies are included. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
5.A6 Effect of the NHIS implementation on time-invariant
characteristics 2
Primary Jun. High Secondary Technical
Urban Female Married School School School School University
NHIS -0.139 0.036 -0.027 0.006 0.025 -0.021 0.011 -0.005
(0.118) (0.035) (0.056) (0.034) (0.041) (0.051) (0.020) (0.007)
N 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985 4985
adj. R-sq 0.060 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.001
Notes: Sample of received transfers is used. District and month dummies are included. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
5.A7 Placebo effect of the NHIS implementation
Variables Transfers Amount of Received Amount of Low health # of OOP
made (1/0) made transf. transfers (1/0) received transf. status (1/0) sick days expend.
NHIS 0.19 6.41 -0.05 -6.33 -0.04 -0.29 0.19
(0.15) (4.57) (0.04) (19.80) (0.05) (0.42) (0.26)
N 5741 5741 5929 5929 5741 5741 5741
Notes: GLSS 1998/1999 is used. Individual and household variables are included. District and
month dummies are included. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the district level. *
p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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5.A8 NHIS shift
Sent Transfers Received Transfers
LPM (t-2) LPM (t-1) LPM (t-2) LPM (t-1)
NHIS -0.033 -0.10 0.022 -0.085
(0.095) (0.101) (0.122) (0.146)
Household size 0.082*** 0.080** -0.002 -0.005
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036)
HH expenditures Q2 0.116*** 0.115*** -0.014 -0.016
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.034)
HH expenditures Q3 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.023 0.021
(0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
HH expenditures Q4 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.075* 0.073
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045)
HH expenditures Q5 0.042*** 0.043*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
HH savings account 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.021 0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026)
Migrant 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Formal employment 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.019
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Informal employment 0.003 0.001 -0.047** -0.049**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Self employment 0.346*** 0.349*** -0.334*** -0.329***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.051)
Primary school 0.099** 0.102** -0.299*** -0.296***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.057)
Jun. high school 0.210*** 0.214*** -0.291*** -0.287***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.048) (0.049)
Sec. high school -0.007 -0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Technical school -0.002 -0.001 0.031 0.031
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023)
University 0.029 0.028 0.021 0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026)
Female 0.047 0.046 0.061 0.063
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
Married 0.036*** 0.036*** -0.067*** -0.068***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 0.004 0.004 -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000** -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 5956 5956 4985 4985
Notes: District and month dummies are included. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered at the district level. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Chapter 6
Closing Remarks
This dissertation assessed contemporary health economics research questions with an
emphasis on healthcare expenditures. We emphasised the importance of ageing in
properly predicting healthcare expenditures and the role of individual characteristics
that may be barriers to successful participation in public healthcare programmes.
We also critically discussed the methods used to detect selection and information
asymmetries in insurance markets and evaluated the impact of a formal insurance
scheme on health and participation in informal transfer networks.
First, the role of ageing and end-of-life morbidity for projecting healthcare expen-
ditures was evaluated using aggregated data from Sweden. We provided an indicator
capturing severe morbidity at the end of life to empirically distinguish a pure ageing
effect from morbidity in the context of (non-curative) long-term care expenditures.
This empirical application is of special interest in the context of countries where costs
of ageing are expected to be considerable due to an increasing share of the elderly in
the population.
Second, using survey data, we evaluated whether restrictions in individual health
decision-making processes can serve as barriers to participating in a national health-
care programme in England. If the success of a healthcare policy depends on the
behaviour of individual decision makers, policy designers must carefully account for
these individual characteristics to achieve the desired programme outcomes. We em-
pirically showed that a decline in an individual’s ability to memorise is negatively
related to their decision to participate in a public healthcare programme against
bowel cancer. We interpret this finding as an indication that participation with the
programme is suboptimal from a normative point of view if we assume that the people
in our analysis would have participated if their memory had not declined. From an
applied perspective, our findings are of interest because health policy makers should
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be able to estimate participation in a healthcare programme to be able to judge the
corresponding consequences for (public) healthcare expenditures.
Third, the dissertation contributed to detecting selection in health insurance mar-
kets. Efficiency is a major concern in the stability of private health insurance markets
across both developing an developed countries, since (additional) private health in-
surance is potentially an important part of the architecture of future healthcare
systems. However, if selection occurs in health insurance markets based on risk
which is not accounted for in risk premiums, this suggests inefficient resource alloca-
tion, potentially inducing market instability. We provided further knowledge about
commonly applied approaches used to detect selection in insurance markets based
on ‘unused characteristics’. We show that these approaches can easily lead to false
conclusions about the direction of selection, i.e., whether adverse or advantageous
selection is occurring. This knowledge should be used to empirically assess selection
in insurance markets and derive consequences for efficiency and market stability.
Fourth, we assessed the relationship between public health insurance and private
transfer networks from an economic development perspective. Using survey data
from Ghana, we analysed whether the introduction of a nationwide formal health
insurance scheme reduced participation in informal transfers. We found robust evi-
dence that the availability of the insurance scheme reduced transfers at the extensive
and intensive margin. This finding may be beneficial from a development perspective,
since the crowding out may reduce the high financial burden for employers. However,
our estimates suggest that this crowding out depends strongly on the relationship
status between network members. Since the crowding out of informal transfers at
the intensive margin is highest for transfers to non-relatives, a group where sharing
obligations are probably relatively low, overoptimistic expectations about positive
effects due to a reduction in social pressure within transfer networks should be mit-
igated. In addition, we found insurance reduced OOP health payments. Under the
assumption that resource allocation for health purposes is organised more efficiently
under a formal insurance scheme, our findings indicate that formal health insurance
can be beneficial from a development perspective.
One lesson that can be learned from this dissertation is that when mean outcomes
are emphasised in an empirical analysis, taking a closer look at subgroups can often
be fruitful for assessing heterogeneous individual behaviour or heterogeneous policy
effects. This knowledge can be used to provide a better understanding of human be-
haviour and successful policy design. For example, when estimating the role of ageing
and morbidity on LTC expenditures, we found heterogeneity for age/sex outcomes
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in different domains of LTC provision. We also found evidence that heterogeneous
effects play a role when analysing the relationship between formal insurance and in-
formal transfer networks. In the context of detecting selection in insurance markets,
it is clear that conclusions drawn using the discussed methods can be completely
misleading if group specific heterogeneity is not accounted for.
Our findings may be further used to test and develop hypotheses to generate
knowledge about decision making in many health economics contexts and to design
successful policies. Proper policy design and evaluation are key, because increas-
ing healthcare expenditures and financial restrictions in public budgets may induce
substantial burden for financing welfare states.
When detecting selection in insurance markets, future research may allow for
group-specific parameter heterogeneity to decrease the data dimension, which may
be advantageous from an empirical perspective and provide further insights into
selection mechanisms. We also see the relationship between formal and informal
markets in the context of healthcare provision and insurance as an important research
question in more developed countries. We hope our ideas and contributions will be
helpful for future research and promote the successful adjustment and design of
healthcare policies, allowing for both successful and affordable healthcare provision
in different regions of the world.
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